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INTRODUCTION 
In October of 1933, Adolf Hitler, German Chancellor 
and head of the National Socialist Party, pulled the Reich 
out of the Geneva Disarmament Conference. By the spring of 
1934, reports reached the French Intelligence Agency that 
indicated the Germans were rearming. This was publicly 
confirmed by Hermann Goering who on March 10, 1934 announced 
the creation of the German Air Force. On March 16, 1935, 
Hitler demanded compulsory military service to be paralleled 
by the development of twelve army corps or thirty-six 
divisions, a plan that would keep about 500,000 men in 
uniform. In the-same year, the construction of a fleet of 
German submarines began. 
A special aspect of German rearmament was the 
development of the armored corps or panzer division. The 
brain child of Heinz Guderian, a German officer who had seen 
the success and failure of tanks during the First world War, 
these special divisions allowed the tank to. assume the 
primary role in battle instead of being subordinated to the 
infantry. 1 They lent maneuverability and speed to military 
1Guderian was the author of Achtung-Panzer! Die 
Entwicklung der Panzerwaffe, ihre Kampfstaktik und ihre 
operative Moglichkeiten (Stuttgart: Union Deutsche 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 1937). 
1 
strategy, a sharp contrast to the static, linear defense 
that so dominated the World War I theaters. As a mate for 
these mobile armored columns, dive bombers were added. 
Known as Stukas, these planes were to precede the panzers 
or tanks so as to silence antitank artillery. 
Hitler accompanied this rearmament by an increas-
ingly aggressive foreign policy. His long range aims: 
revenge for the war guilt clause of the Versailles Treaty, 
annihilation of France as an independent force, and living 
space in the East were cleverly disguised by a series of 
h t d . . t . 2 s or range iversionary actics. These varied from 
manipulating European fears of Bolshevism to playing on 
French guilt feelings over the harshne~.s of. the Versailles 
2 
Pact. Whenever Hitler made a specific move, it was often in 
response to a supposed threat. An example was the reoccu-
pation of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, justified on the 
grounds that the Franco-Soviet Entente of February 1936 
threatened Germany with encirclement. 
France was ill prepared to face Hitler. Exhausted 
by the loss of life, physical disability of veterans, and 
material damage of World War I, the nation signed a series 
of treaties whose terms the country proved unable to live 
up to. The first was an alliance with Poland drawn up in 
2tn his autobiographical account, Hitler wrote: 
"France is and remains the inexorable enemy of the German 
people." See Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf [translator not 
indicated] (New York: Stackpole Sons, 1939), p. 600. 
1921. It stated that as mutual allies, France or Poland 
would assist the other partner in case of attack by a third 
party. Also drawn up was the Locarno Treaty of 1925. In 
this arrangement, Germany, France, and Belgium agreed to 
respect their common frontiers and to foreswear the use of 
war against each other except in self-defense or in accor-
dance with the League of Nations covenant. Great Britain 
and Italy guaranteed the Rhineland chapter of the Treaty 
which forbade German military reoccupation of the Rhineland 
as stipulated in the Versailles settle:ment of 1918. 
3 
The Petite Entente rounded out the series of 
alliances drawn up during the 1920s. Completed in 1927, it 
included the Central European powers of Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, ana Rurnania. Understood was military aid given 
by France in case one of these nations was attacked by an 
aggressor. The one serious weakness in this and other 
treaties was the diminished or absent position of France's 
strongest European ally, Britain. Determined to steer clear 
of continental entanglements, England saw itself much more 
as an arbitrator between France and Germany than as a third 
party ready to act in case of aggression against France. 
With this as a background, the 1930s worked to the 
disadvantage of France in terms of foreign policy. Unable 
to rely on an ineffective League of Nations, the country 
witnessed the reoccupation of the left bank of the Rhine in 
19 3 6 partly because Britain refused tc• intervene. In the 
year before, the same lack of resolve on the part of the 
two western democracies had been responsible for allowing 
Benito Mussolini to pursue his big coup of the 1930s, the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia. Further, the Franco-Soviet 
Accords of February 1936 were too weak to insure Russian 
aid in case of German aggression. Thus the stage was set 
for the Munich Accords of September 1938. 
4 
Perhaps more than any other event of the 1930s, this 
arrangement demonstrated the diplomatic weakness of France. 
Hitler, supported by Mussolini, wrested a settlement from 
Neville Chamberlain and Edouard Daladier that allowed 
Germany to annex the Sudetenland sector of Czechoslov~kia, 
a deal that made the rest of this slavic country vulnerable 
to immediate and successful attack. In this respect, Munich 
saw the complete bankruptcy of French foreign policy since 
the understanding was a flagrant violation of the Petite 
Entente. 
One of the main reasons for French weakness was the 
failure to align foreign policy on mili.tary strategy. In 
truth, France did not .develop an arr.ty capable of fulfilling 
its alliances. The reasons for this stemmed back to the 
1921 publication by the general staff of a manual on the 
tactical employment of army units. Known as the Instruction 
provisoire du 6 octobre 1921 sur l'ernploi tactique des 
5 
grandes unites, 3 this instruction booklet which set the tone 
for French military strategy between the wars stressed the 
role of the infantry as the principal weapon of combat. 
Supported by artillery or fire power, the infantry could 
anticipate a continuous front after having established 
couverture, a situation in which specially designated 
troops would stave off an attack until the bulk of the 
military had been mobilized and assembled. While ultimate 
victory lay in attack, the tank played a secondary role to 
the infantry because it was vulnerable to antitank weapons 
and fuel limitations. In any event, it could not be 
expected to penetrate deeply behind enemy lines until the 
latter's defenses had been sufficiently weakened. 
This strategy, reiterated in a 1936 edition, 4 
complemented the laws on the organization and recruitment of 
the army as passed by parliament in 1927-28. Reducing the 
army to twenty divisions of 106,000 professionals and 
240,000 conscripts, the measure left a skeleton force 
intended only for the defense and not for the attack as 
3Ministere de la Guerre, Instr~ction pr~visoire du 
6 octobre 1921 sur l'emploi tactique des grandes unites 
(Paris: Charles-Lavauzelle, 1930), pp. 10-11, 23-25, 112, 
161. 
4Ministere_de la Guerre, Instruction sur l'emploi 
tactique des grandes unites (Paris: Charle$-Lavauzelle, 
' 1940), pp. 15, 17-18, 27, 44-47. This edition stressed that 
only the offensive could give decisive results but it kept 
all the details of the previous manual which overwhelmingly 
supported a defensive doctrine. 
would be needed if Germany attempted to reoccupy the 
Rhineland or the Saar. 
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To reinforce the defensive concept, the construction 
of the Maginot Line was undertaken in 1930. Completed in 
1934, it consisted of 196 miles of concrete subterranean 
forts and guns. Running from the Swiss to the Belgium 
border, it was intended to protect France from another 
disastrous invasion as had occurred in 1914. As for the 
remaining frontier from Belgium to the sea, couverture would. 
be used to protect the nation. 
Another reason for French weakness abroad was the 
Great Depression, an economic catastrophe so pervasive in 
impact, it touched every aspect of French life. Thus when 
the Popular Front coalition composed of Communists, 
Socialists, and Radicals, took power in June of 1936, their 
program for socio-economic reform was gradually wittled away 
by continual fiscal crisis. The unrest that followed from 
this distracted attention from important foreign policy and 
military questions and forced the politicians to focus 
unduly o~ domestic issues. 
In the political arena, the severity of the 
depression was aggrayated by France's multiparty system in 
which fragile coalitions made it difficult-for one 
government to stay in power long enough to work effectively 
on economic problems. As the depression worsened, the 
frequency of cabinet changes accelerated. Attempts at 
national union such as the Gaston Doumerque experiment in 
1934 and the 1938 appeals of Leon Blum ended in failure. 
Another factor working for internal weakness in 
the face of growing foreign peril was the revelation of the 
Stavisky scandal, an affair that implicated several key 
politicians and which led to the February 1934 Place de la 
Concorde riots. In addition to sharply reducing the credi-
bility of government leaders, the demonstrations pointed to 
a growing hostility toward Third Republican politics. This 
was best exemplified by the important role the street 
leagues played in the riots. Essentially antiparliamentary 
in attitude, the leagues had little or no faith in the 
democratic system of government. 
7 
One important repercussion of this loss of faith was 
the obsession with the antidemocratic forces of fascism and 
communism. French fear of sinking into one or the other · 
blurred rational thinking and caused politicians to hesitate 
on crucial issues. Such was the case with the Spanish Civil 
War, a prolonged and bloody conflict which sharply split the 
nation into left-right camps thus eliminating good judgement 
and stalling effective response. 
It was this France that Paul Reynaud knew. Born on 
October 15, 1878 at Barcelonnette in the southern French 
Alps, Reynaud was the son of a well to do French businessman. 
At Paris~ he attended the Lycee Louis le Grand and the 
Sorbonne from which after a year of service in the 
thirty-seventh French infantry, he earned a law degree. 
After a trip around the world in 1906 at the age of twenty-
eight, Reynaud returned to Paris and took a job as a 
lawyer's secretary, a position that allowed him to plead 
cases for his employer at the Palais de Justice. His 
development of a succinct, simple style of defense earned 
for him the position of first secretary of the Paris Bar 
Association Conference. Other fame in the field came about 
the same time when he married the daughter of famous 
Parisian lawyer, Henri-Robert. 
8 
Reynaud's public career began in 1913 as a municipal 
councillor at St. Paul, a small town eight miles northeast 
of Barcelonnette. In 1914, he ran and lost an election to 
the Chamber of Deputies from the Hautes-Alpes district of 
Gap: but in 1919 (after a four year interlude of wartime 
service) , he was elected from Basses-Alpes on a rightist 
National Bloc list. In this postwar chamber·, Raynaud joined 
an obscure center-right group, !'Action republicaine et 
. 1 5 Socia e •. 
Although defeated in the 1924 Basses-Alpes plebe-
scite and in the 1926 by-election held in the second 
arrondissement of Paris, Reynaud was successfully elected 
to that same Parisian district on a National Republican 
ticket in 1928. This stockbroker, small shopkeeper quarter 
5
rn this study, less well known parties or political 
groups whose names do not readily translate into English are 
left in French. 
reelected him in bo~h the 1932 and 1936 campaigns allowing 
Reynaud to keep the same seat from 1928 until June of 1940. 
9 
Once elected in 1928, Reynaud's talents were quickly 
noticed by Andre Tardieu, a centrist who made Reynaud his 
finance minister in 1930 •. From March of 1930 to June of 
1932, Reynaud served in succession as minister of finance, 
colonies, and justice. After the 1932 election, he became 
a member of the finance commission of the chamber, a 
position which he maintained for the rest of the decade. 
His great moment to shine came during 1938-40 when as 
Edouard Oaladier's finance minister, Raynaud helped lift 
the nation out of its desperate financial straits. 
Chosen premier on March 21, 1940, Reynaud resigned 
on June 16, 1940 when a majority of his cabinet opted for an 
armistice. From 1940-42, Reynaud remained a prisoner under 
Vichy and then for the duration of the war, a Nazi captive 
in various concentration camps. Liberated in 1945, he 
married his secretary, Christiane Mabire, by whom he 
fathered three children, the youngest born after Reynaud 
passed his eightieth year. After the war, he reentered 
politics and was successfully elected to the chamber from 
the Departement du Nord (Dunkirk) , a seat he held from 1946 
until 1962. In addition to being appointed minister of 
finances in 1948, Reynaud presided over the finance 
commission of the National Assembly from 1951 to 1962. 
Defeated in 1962 because he opposed the election of the 
;; 
' 
10 
Fifth Republic's president by referendum, he died on 
September 21, 1966. 
Petite, handsome, and impeccably dressed, Reynaud 
was in constant demand on the lecture circuit. His facility 
with English and Spanish, his reading of the foreign press, 
and his travels abroad all joined to make him an important 
source for measuring the state of Europe and the world. 
At home, his liaison with pretty Madame Helene de 
Portes, the mistress who gradually replaced his wife, 
attached Reynaud to a social set years younger than himself. 
This milieu also contained well known bankers and financiers 
whose ties with Reynaud were interpreted by some as 
favoritism toward big business. 
An important weak spot in Reynaud's personality was 
his inferiority complex over his height, a factor which he 
himself described as a thorn and handicap. 6 Referred to as 
a midget, Reynaud compensated by developing a superiority 
complex which demonstrated itself by a need to surpass and 
7 excel others. As a result, he often.came across as 
haughty, caustic, affected, and cocksure. His perpetual 
smile was considered smug. His manner of walking was a 
strut. His clothes, physique, and mannerisms seemed 
6Paul Reynaud, Memoires, vol. 1: Venu de ma 
montagne (Paris: Flammarion, 1960), p. 41. 
7Memoires d'un eresident [anonymous] (Paris: La 
table ronde, 1972), p. 192. Madame Reynaud states her 
husband's height as 5'6". Letter of December 20, 1973 from 
Madame Reynaud to the writer. 
p 
. 11 
bizarre. Vendemiaire (Paris), a rightist weekly, compared 
the "wearer of the highest false collars in the chamber" to 
a bantam rooster whose nose and face were always arched back 
and pointed upward toward the ceiling in order to give 
people the impression he was taller than he really was. 8 
These aspects of Reynaud's life: his personality, 
associates, ti.me abroad, and like .for Anglo-Saxon ways and 
customs set him apart from many of the other deputies whose 
experiences and opportunities were of a more limited nature. 
Coming up to Paris for the chamber debates, these poli-
ticians, at the close of the session, returned to their 
provincial departements in order to immerse themselves in 
local affairs or electoral interests. 
Over and above personal biography, it is Reynaud's 
ideas on national defense that hold the predominant place. 
in this narrative. That they m~scarried among the poli-
ticians, the military, and the people at large is a foregone 
conclusion. The reasons why, on the other hand, are the 
main focus of the study. The story begins with Charles de 
Gaulle. 
8 d' .. Ven em1a1re, January 3, 1936, p. 2. 
CHAPTER I 
THE FOUNDATION 
Jean Auburtin, a Parisian lawyer, introduced 
Reynaud to Charles de Gaulle on December 5, 1934. 1 Forty-
four years old to Reynaud's fifty-six, de Gaulle was reputed 
to be the tallest lieutenant-colonel in France. Born at 
Lille in 1890, the son of a professor, de Gaulle received 
his education at St. Cyr military academy and graduated in 
1912 with the grade of second lieutenant. Stationed at 
Arras in 1914 when the First World War began, he won a 
promotion to captain of infantry in 1915, was wounded and 
captured in 1916, escaped from a prisoner of war camp, was 
recaptured, and after the war, went to serve in Poland under 
General Maxima Weygand. 
From 1921-24, he taught as an assistant professor of 
military history at St. Cyr and in 1924, he joined the 
general staff at Mayence in the Rhineland. Marshal Philippe 
Petain, then vice-president of the Conseil Superieur de la 
Guerre (CSG) , used de Gaulle as an aide-de-camp in his 
1925-27 cabinet, during the last year of which de Gaulle was 
1Auburtin met de Gaulle for the first time at the 
home of Colonel Emile Mayer in the spring of 1934. He. later 
brought a copy of de Gaulle's ~rs l'armee de metier to 
Reynaud who after reading it requested to see de Gaulle. 
See Jean Auburtin, "Apropos de l'armee de metier," Revue 
politique et parlementaire, no. 816 (1970), pp. 4-5. 
12 
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promoted to the rank of major. From 1927-30, he commanded 
the nineteenth infantry division at Triers in the Rhineland 
and from 1930-32, he served on the French general staff in 
Lebanon. De Gaulle was promoted again in 1933 to the grade 
of lieutenant-colonel and was attached to the Secretariat 
General of the Conseil Superieur de la Defense Nationale 
(CSDN) • 
In 1934, de Gaulle presented in his newly published 
book, \ers l'armee de metier, 2 plans for a major military 
reform. Unable to find a receptive audience among his army 
superiors, de Gaulle, on the advice of Auburtin, sought a 
political voice to present his ideas to the public. This 
voice was Paul Reynaud's. 
De Gaulle's Vers l'armee de metier centered around a 
corps of six armored divisions. This motorized army of 
shock was to be characterized by lightening speed and a fire 
power capacity double that of the French army of 1914. The 
100,000 men needed for this armored corps would be hired by 
contract and would serve long term. The basic components 
were speed, surprise, maneuver, camouflage, and the elite or 
professional soldiers. This specialized army would be a 
division of the national conscript army, the latter 
continuing to serve as couverture ior the frontiers. 3 
2charles de Gaulle, \ers l'armee de metier (P?ris: 
Editions Berger-Levrault, 1934) • 
3rbid., pp. 40, 44-45, 54, 56, 115, 117. 
. 14 
The armored.corps would be trained to cross the 
frontier and take the offensive or counteroffensive which-
ever was needed. This offensive strategy based on 
mechanized vehicles consisted of an attack by waves of tanks 
grouped together according to weight. The heavy tanks 
charged first followed by the medium and then the light 
tanks. The infantry would terminate the liquidation and 
take possession of the conquered territory. The occupation 
was to be carried out not in continuous chains but in 
centers of force. Air planes would be used for reconnais-
sance. Fina~ly, the entire operation would be under the 
control of intelligent generals among whom a spirit of 
enterprise would be fostered by the decentralization of 
leadership. A strong man was needed, however, to bring 
about the creation of the project. 4 
·"The demonstration," wrote Reynaud after listening 
to de Gaulle's ideas, "was made with such power and with 
such clarity that I was won by the man and by his plan. 115 
Reynaud, in spite of the fact that he was already under fire 
for his support of the franc devaluation, decided to embark 
on this second undertaking. The groundwork consisted of a 
4rbid., pp. 111-17, 161-67, 202-3, 205. De Gaulle 
was not the first Frenchman to expound on an offensive based 
on tanks. General Jean Estienne, the "father of the tank," 
gave a series of lectures published in 1920 on the super-
iority of armored, mobile warfare in which the tank played 
a predominant role. Estienne reiterated and expanded on 
this view throughout the 1920s. 
5 Reynaud, Memoires, 1:432. 
15 
series of meetings and letters between the two men that 
stretched over a period from 1934 to 1938. No recorded 
account has been found of their conferences but de Gaulle 
wrote frequently to Reynaud particularly in 1935-36. Out 
of these contacts between deputy and lieutenant-colonel grew 
a close friendship. To Reynaud, de Gaulle was "my con-
ception of war chief: an intellectual as well as an animal 
of cornbat. 116 To de Gaulle, Reynaud was both a patron of 
his new ideas as well as a protector against a hostile 
military world wedded to outdated strategy and doctrine. 
One of de Gaulle's first communications to Reynaud 
advised using the armored corps to maintain order within 
France. In his note of January 28, 1935, 7 de Gaulle 
6Paul Reynaud, Memoires, vol. 2: Envers et centre 
tous (Paris: Flammarion, 1963), p. 195. Most of these 
meetings between the two men occurred at 5, place du Palais 
Bourbon, Reynaud's office and later, his home. There is 
some question as to the actual number of letters wri·i.:ten 
before, during and after the war. This writer has found 
fifty-nine among Reynaud's Memoires and the archives, six 
having been dated after 1945. Reynaud, however, claims 
there were seventy letters. See Reynaud, Memoires, 1:420. 
According to Madame Renee Bazin, the private archivist 
assigned to the Reynaud papers, this group of letters had at 
one time been stolen from the Reynaud family but later was 
recovered. The writer assumes that the other eleven letters 
have been lost or are in the possession of Madame Paul 
Reynaud. 
In his letter of May 10, 1973 to the writer, the son 
of General de Gaulle, Rear-Admiral Philippe de Gaulle stated 
that there does not exist any letters written by Paul 
Reynaud to his father in the de Gaulle papers deposited at 
the National Archives. 
7Reynaud Papers, "Lettres de Gaulle," Archives 
Nationales de la France, Paris (hereafter cited as AN), 
Charles de Gaulle to Paul Reynaud, January 28, 1935. The 
Reynaud papers have not yet been classified so referral is 
16 
observed that an elitist group of specialists could best 
deal with the tumults and disorders arising from the 
rightist street leagues or the newly formed Popular Front 
coalition on the left. Noting that the National Guard had 
the responsibility of maintaining internal order, de Gaulle 
ventured to doubt their effectiveness if riots were to 
break out simultaneously across France. How could loyalty 
be assured if their ranks were made up of men who had 
participated in the February 1934 riots or of natives from 
French colonies whose devotion to the mother country was 
rapidly becoming a thing of the past? Far better to rely 
on an elite of professionals whose trustworthiness was 
certain. 
Other letters encouraged the armored corps because 
of German rearmament. On January 14, 1935, 8 de Gaulle wrote 
that the Germans now had three armored divisions and that 
another three were to be activated in 1936. The personnel 
of this specialized corps were an elite and each division 
had an aviation unit attached to it. 
In July 1936, de Gaulle submitted to.Reynaud sta-
tistics on the German army labeled "not to be cited at the 
not by carton or folio but by dossier. The dossier is 
indicated by the quotation marks. When shortened references 
are repeatedly made to the de Gaulle-Reynaud correspondence, 
they always refer back to the last dossier cited. This 
continues until a new dossier is used. 
8 De Gaulle to Reynaud, January 14, 1935. 
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tribune [the speaker's podium of the Chamber of Deputies]." 
Suggesting that these facts might help Reynaud to develop 
his forthcoming speech before the chamber, the figures 
showed the Germans possessed more than 2,000 modern tanks 
while the French had only 310. De Gaulle also cited 
510,000 men as serving in the German army: 350,000 
recruits and 160,000 draftees. As of April 1, 1935, these 
men formed twenty-four regular divisions and three panzer 
or armored divisions. The evidence also indicated that the 
ranks of the panzer divisions were being filled by enlisted 
men or recruited soldiers. 9 
Again on August 26, 1936, de Gaulle warned of the 
widening gap between the French and German armies. "In the 
game called armaments competition," wrote the officer, 
"there are two aspects: mass [men] and quality." De Gaulle 
ruefully observed that "We loose on the first for not being 
able to win it and on the second, for not wanting it. 1110 
De Gaulle was quick to defend the feasibility of the 
armored corps in terms of supplying the 98,000 soldiers 
needed. In his May 8, 1935 correspondence, 11 the officer 
noted that the war budget allowed for 84,012 career soldiers 
to outfit the 1935 army but 116,000 professionals were 
9 Reynaud, Memoires, 2:484-85. The French had 
400,000 men under arms in 1936. See General Maurice Gamelin, 
Servir, 3 vols. (Paris: Plon, 1946-47), 2:208. 
10
oe Gaulle to Reynaud, August 26, 1936. 
11De Gaulle to Reynaud, May 8, 1935. 
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currently serving. Following from this, de Gaulle felt that 
the 98,000 could be supplied as based on the data in 
Table 1, page 18. 
His figures, however, were questionable as to their 
numbers and reliability. Who could say that the 15,000 
youths then serving would stay and join the armored corps? 
TABLE 1 
SOURCE OF SOLDIERS FOR DE GAULLE'S ARMORED CORPS 
Difference between the 84,012 professionals needed 
for 1935 and the 116,000 men then serving . 
Youths now serving their tour of duty but who 
would soon be professionals • • • • • • • . . . . 
Career men or specialists to be transferred from 
the regular army along with their units or 
portions of their units . • ••• 
National Guardsmen 
South African natives currently serving in France 
Unexplained . 
32,000a 
15,000 
7,000 
15,000 
18,000 
11,000b 
Total • -98,.000 
SOURCE: "Lettres de Gaulle," AN, de Gaulle to Reynaud, 
May 8, 1935. 
a The actual figure is 31,988. De Gaulle apparently 
rounded off the number to 32,000. 
bA line is missing from the letter that explains the 
11,000. 
Moreover, the manner in which the 7,000 men transfer would 
be made from the regular army without depleting its ranks 
was not clear. Also, the heavy reliance on National 
Guardsmen and native troops raised the issue of loyalty 
(de Gaulle, himself, had brought out this point in his 
letter of January 28, 1935) particularly at a time of 
internal disorder and colonial unrest. 
Other letters spent less time with figures. "We 
need," wrote de Gaulle on October 15, 1937, "an instrument 
capable of striking without delay .• The heart of 
this instrument was to be the modern tank which was for 
19 
de Gaulle, an invention of great importance. Its appearance 
was an evolution in the form and art of war. All tactics, 
all strategy, and all other armaments depended on it. The 
conclusion was always the same: a concert of tanks in large 
armored units accompanied by infantry, artillery, signals 
officers and other specialists. 
The letters did not merely give Reynaud the reasons 
why the armored corps should exist. They also assisted 
Reynaud with direct help in advancing the cause before the 
pilblic. This aid ranged from constructing Reynaud's parlia-
mentary proposals to suggesting material for his 1937 book, 
Le Probleme rnilitaire fran9ais, or to the writing up for 
Reynaud's referral, a plan for the organization of a 
ministry of national defense. 
12 De Gaulle to Reynaud, October 15, 1937. 
De Gaulle continually informed Reynaud of appro-
priate moments to broach defense questions to the chamber. 
His letter of May 24, 1935 observed that the recent nego-
tiations on the Franco-Soviet Alliance, the approaching 
Danubian Pact, and the latest speech of Hitler (Germany's 
plans for Central and East Europe) , "bring to your plan of 
military reorganization some arguments of decisive 
importance. 1113 
20 
On June 25, 1936, de Gaulle simply wrote: "Doesn't 
it seem to you that the time has come to maximize the 
importance of the army question? 1114 On other occasions, 
de Gaulle would go into detail and highlight for Reynaud 
what should constitute the essence of his next parliamentary 
intervention. In his November 25, 1936 letter, he stressed 
that in speaking on foreign policy, Reynaud should emphasize 
the narrow relationship between "security, international 
solidarity and military policy. 1115 
Sometimes de Gaulle helped Reynaud focus on the 
current sway of ideas in the chamber. On January 30, 
13
oe Gaulle to Reynaud, May 24, 1935. The Franco-
Soviet Pact stipulated that one nation would come to the aid 
of the other if the latter were attacked by any European 
power. The Danubian Pact, if it had developed, would have 
included Austria, Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Hungary 
and Yugoslavia. These countries wo~ld have refrained from 
interfering in the domestic policies of their fellow members. 
France, Poland, and Rumania were to be eligible for mem-
bership upon request. 
14 Reynaud, Memoires, 2:76. 
15 b'd 137 I J.. • ' p. • 
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1937, 16 he noted that everyone agreed that French defense 
forces must have their quality improved both in materiel and 
in personnel. He also noted that an evolution of thought 
among orators was evident because the deputies were 
stressing the most powerful and specialized part of France's 
forces: aviation, mechanized corps, fortifications, and the 
navy. 
De Gaulle kept Reynaud informed on party strategy 
which included the general outlines of planned political 
speeches particularly those given by leftist deputies. On 
March 14, 1935, 17 he advised Reynaud of the Radical party's 
planned ordre du jour. Scheduled for the following day, 
this motion, to be moved by a Radical deputy at the end of 
his speech, would indicate that his party felt the military 
problem could not be solved by a simple increase in the tour 
of duty--a move intended by the Flandin ministry for the 
following day. 
At other times; Reynaud's advisor on military 
affairs would focus on men favorable to their ideas such as 
Joseph Paul-Boncour, an Independent Socialist, senator, and 
occasional minister. This also included Philippe Serre, a 
lS 
member of the Left Independents. Whatever or whoever, for 
16
rbid., p. 143. 
17oe Gaulle to Reynaud, March 14, 1935. 
18 Reynaud, Memoires, 2:136, 143. 
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de Gaulle, the political milieu offered more hope for change 
than did military circles. "It would be inconceivable," 
wrote de Gaulle, "if the public powers did not take the 
initiative and at the same time their responsibilities for 
such a profound transformation of the nation's military 
19 instrument." 
De Gaulle himself mixed with the politicians. On 
September 23, 1936, he described his visit to the Radical, 
Camille Chautemps. The latter began by asking de Gaulle to 
keep the meeting a secret because he did not like Edouard 
Daladier, war minister and chief of the Radical party. The 
army officer thereupon explained to Chautemps the military 
problem and the solution. De Gaulle later reported to 
Reynaud that Chautemps appeared favorably disposed toward 
the armored corps not only as a means of intervention beyond 
the frontier but also as a method of maintaining internal 
order both in France and North Africa. 20 
A great deal of-hope was placed ·in Daladier. At the 
moment of approval of a fourteen billion armaments expen-
ditures program in the fall of 1936, Daladier had uttered no 
words of opposition. 
. f 21 sign o progress. 
This was interpreted by de Gaulle as a 
22 Later, on January 30, 1937, de Gaulle 
190~ Gaulle to Reynaud, March 29, 1935. 
20
oe Gaulle to Reynaud, September 23, 1936. 
21Reynaud, M~moires, 2:132. 
22
rbid. I p. 143. 
IL 
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informed Reynaud that Daladier might make an important 
declaration as a sequel to Philippe Serre's excellent speech 
supporting the armored corps. (The only declaration 
oaladier was to make, however, was to be his support of the 
23 Maginot Line, couverture, and fire power. ) 
By the following year, de Gaulle's hopes were 
completely crushed. On February 14, 1938, he wrote: 
I fear that MM Daladier and [Minister of Air] 
Guy La Chambre who at the tribune summarily 
condemned your project of an elite armored corps 
and the ideas of the "young school," might 
neither have read Vers l 'armee de metier, nor the 
article of Guderian and [they] know the question 
only through clouds with which they deliberately 
surround themselves.24 
The letters also provided Reynaud with .an open 
window to the military world. On January 14, 1935, 25 
de Gaulle observed that the incomprehension of some and the 
routine of others prevented them from seeing the truth. Two 
months later, he noted that "The technicians are too 
occupied by their current duties • • • too divided by their 
23Assemblee nationale, Journal off iciel. de la 
republique francaise 1870-1940, Chambres des deput~s 1876-
1940, Debats parlementaires, 1933-39 (hereafter cited as 
JOC), February 2, 1937, p. 292. 
24 . 
De Gaulle to Reynaud, February 14, 1938. De Gaulle 
is referring to a 1936 article by General Heinz Guderian 
written in Militar Wochenblatt. The article urged the 
development of panzer divisions. 
25 De Gaulle to Reynaud, January 14, 1935. 
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theories, their activities .•• to undertake and pursue 
. . tl f 1126 eff icien y a re orm. • • • 
Occasionally his dissatisfaction became more 
. f 27 . pointed. His letter o May 8, 1935 · contained a response 
from General Louis-Antoine Colson, director of publications 
for the Revue militaire fransaise and member of the CSG. 
Colson emphatically denied de Gaulle the right to publish 
an article entitled: "How to Construct a Professional 
Army." According to Colson, it would be impossible to 
include the essay because it put the military forces of 
France into two categories: the arm~e de metier or profes-
sional army and the national army composed of volunteers 
serving their normal tour of duty. This was contrary to the 
current views of the war ministry which sponsored the 
journal. 
In spite of this discouraging atmosphere, de Gaulle 
worked to find an audience for their ideas. In his letter 
to Reynaud of March 29, 1935, 28 he submitted a list of 
military personnel who seemed open to their ideas and who 
because of this, would receive from de Gaulle, a copy of 
26
oe Gaulle to Reynaud, March 29, 1935. 
27
oe Gaulle to Reynaud, May 8, 1935 and Reynaud, 
Memoires, 1:507. 
28
oe Gaulle to Reynaud, March 29, 1935. The list of 
military personnel originally affixed to the letter is 
missing. The majority of notes that de Gaulle attached to 
his letters have been separated from the original corres-
pondence. Some are in Reynaud's private papers and the 
rest appear to have been lost. 
Reyn_aud' s March 1935 chamber speech on the armored corps. 
one of these sympathizers was General Jean Flavigny, 
commander of France's only division legere m~canique (DLM) 
or lightly mechanized division--a unit composed of light 
tanks and armored cars and designed essentially for 
reconnaissance. 
25 
In a letter of April 24, 1936 to Reynaud, 29 Flavigny 
concurred that the armored corps was "absolutely indis-
pensable." De Gaulle was elated with Flavigny's reaction 
and wrote to Reynaud that the General's objection to using 
only professionals could be skirted by putting the latter 
in the fighting ranks and the draftees in the maintenance 
crews. To de Gaulle, the fact that nearly 50 per cent of 
Flavigny's DLM troops were already professionals indicated 
a future trend in that direction. 30 
More support for the armored corps came from 
General Pierre Hering who like Colson was a member of CSG. 
De Gaulle on May 20, 1937, praised Herin·g for his "indepen-
denc.e of spirit," but stated that "We must be near victory 
. ·~·· 
in orde~ to make the Council (CSG} confess its faith. 1131 
De Gaulle used the correspondence to give Reynaud 
detailed information on proposed military expenditures: how 
29Reynaud Papers, "Dossier Militaire 1936-38," AN, 
de Gaulle to Reynaud, April 24, 1936. 
3011Lettres de Gaulle," de Gaulle to Reynaud, July 1, 
1936. 
31oe Gaulle to Reynaud, May 20, 1937. 
they were planned to. improve the defense network and how 
the armored corps would or would not fit into the budget. 
32 The September 23, 1936 note informed Reynaud of the 
fourteen billions to be spent between 1936 and 1940. This 
acceler~ted rearmament effort called for the constrU~tion 
of tanks, mechanization of units, and increase in the 
number of recruited soldiers. Yet according to de Gaulle, 
the program, because of its mode and manner of execution, 
was powerless to build something great. 
It called for the creation of three DLMs and two 
tank divisions. The former while able to explore were not 
26 
strong enough to produce rupture and exploitation. The tank 
divisions on the other hand lacked the basic infantry, 
artillery, and specialized crew which could permit them to 
act independently. De Gaulle's sad conclusion was that the 
poorly devised plan was unintentional "homage to our 
conceptions," but lacked the breadth to bring the armored 
. . t 33 corps into exis ence. 
Other letters of de Gaulle fluctuated between 
pessimism and optimism. On August 26, 1936, faced with the 
knowledge of German armaments escalation, de Gaulle noted 
that: 
It is very easy to forsee what will be the 
reaction of the humorous sexagenarians who comprise 
32oe Gaulle to Reynaud, September 23, 1936. 
33 Ibid. 
the CSG. They are going to ask you for a com-
pulsory three year tour of duty. When they have 
it, they will notice that we are still short of 
the mark.34 
De Gaulle showed renewed hope on October 15, 1937. 
Excited about his recent appo_intment _ as commander of the 
507th tank regiment at Metz, he assured Reynaud that the 
idea of an armored corps had made immense progress in the 
27 
k f h ff . 35 h' h h f d d ran s o t· e army o icers. T is ope, owever, a e on 
February 14, 1938 when the newly promoted de Gaulle lamented 
the "stubborn conformism that bars all roads to reform." 36 
Riding the seesaw of military opinion, de Gaulle was up with 
it one minute and down with it the next. 
De Gaulle repeatedly informed Reynaud of important 
press articles. On April 2, 1936, he recommended that 
Reynaud read General X's article on the professional army as 
written in Mercure de France. De Gaulle labeled its 
negative attitude toward the new concept as typical of the 
official doctrine of the moment, "bereft of thought and 
·11 "37 W1 • 
34De Gaulle to Reynaud, August 26, 1936. . 
35De Gaulle ·to Reynaud, October 15, 1937. 
36De Gaulle to Reynaud, February 14, 1938. 
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"nossier Militaire 1936-38," de Gaulle to Reynaud, 
, April 2, 1936. On General X, see his article in "L'Arm~e de 
m~tier," Mercure de France, April 1, 1936, pp. 9, 14-17. 
Also, see references to him in Chapter Four. 
28 
38 On January 12, 1938, he sent Reynaud a recent 
article written by Commander Tony Albord in Revue de l'armee 
de l'air. Albord, General Hering's assistant, envisaged a 
vast modernization of the military machine by a concen-
tration of the different instruments of war. De Gaulle was 
so impressed by these ideas that he suggested Reynaud 
contact Albord. 
De Gaulle also discussed an important article from 
the German military press. In early 1938, he sent Reynaud 
a translation of a 1936 study in Militar Wochenblatt. The 
essay, written by General Heinz Guderian, discussed the 
development of the panzer divisions. Bluntly, de Gaulle 
noted that the Germans had pursued its development and the 
39 French had not. 
Reynaud received comments from his military advisor 
on relevant articles in the political press. These included 
two 1936 editorials in the moderate Le Temps (Paris) which 
were favorable to the armored corps as well as a series 
authored by Raymond Patenotre in the leftist Le Petit 
Journal (Paris) entitled: "Are we defended?" Once again, 
de Gaulle raised a glimmer of hope. The articles in Le 
Temps suggested that their ideas were taking hold while 
38 
"Lettres de Gaulle," de Gaulle to Reynaud, 
January 12, 1938. 
39De Gaulle to Reynaud, February 14, 1938. 
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Patenotre of Le Petit Journal could prove a powerful ally. 
ld R d d h . ?40 wou eynau go an see im. 
In the realm of foreign affairs, de Gaulle called 
attention to the German reoccupation of the Rhineland on 
March 7, 1936. In his letter of July 22, 1936, 41 the 
officer weighed the damage this did to their ally, Belgium, 
who had had a magnificent occasion to watch the total 
paralysis of France. Giving Reynaud classified information, 
de Gaulle stated that in case of war with the Germans, the 
joint Belgian defense commission was "resolutely opposed" 
to fighting at Liege while waiting for the French. Thus in 
opposition to Defense Minister Deveze, the Franco-Belgian 
Accord of 1931, and the Locarno Treaty, the majority of the 
commission preferred to fall back to Anvers rather than 
defend the eastern frontier from which they could stall the 
Germans while the French moved up into Belgium. 
Later, de Gaulle wrote that "One can no longer 
clearly tie the idea of Belgian resistance to the immediate 
42 
and powerful cooperation of France." The reason for this 
was the lack of a French armored corps to counter the 
40Reynaud, Memoires, 2:132. De Gaulle was on good 
terms with Edouard Delage, editorialist for Le Temps and 
favorably disposed toward the armored corps. In 193-7, 
de Gaulle advised Reynaud to address a copy of the latter's 
newly published Le Probleme militaire frang~ise to Delage. 
See de Gaulle to Reynaud May 21, 1937. 
41 Reynaud, Memoires, 2:80-81. 
42 De Gaulle to Reynaud, October 9, 1936. 
lightning warfare t~ctics of German panzer divisions. De 
Gaulle concluded that France had vis a vis Germany two 
geographic areas over which she must "eternally" exercise 
30 
control: the left bank of the Rhine and the Low Countries. 
Hitler now had the first .and would soon have the second if 
France did not come out of its military policy of 
passivity. 43 Five days after de Gaulle wrote this second 
letter, the Belgians declared themselves neutral on 
October 14, 1936. 
To stem this growing loss of allies and subsequent 
isolation, de Gaulle advised Reynaud that France's remaining 
friends should create solidarity by means of military inter-
dependence. This should extend not just from chief or staff 
to chief of staff but from government to government. It 
would ultimately evolve into an "entente of democracies" 
44 based on arraaments. 
In assessing de Gaulle's impact on Reynaud in 
foreign affairs, it is evident that he was of less help here 
than in other areas. For one thing, a considerable amount 
of time was spent bemoaning past errors as in the case of 
Belgium. More important, precious little time was spent 
detailing how the armored corps would come to the assistance 
of allies especially in the case of Belgium. Generalizations 
about collective security were insufficient support for 
43 Ibid. 
44
oe Gaulle to Reynaud, January 12, 1938. 
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convincing the French about the need for an armored corps 
capable of taking the offensive beyond the frontier. Later, 
this weakness would serve to hamper Reynaud whose own vague 
references to the specialized corps traveling to the aid of 
allies both near and distant raised numerous objections arid 
adverse reaction. 
In other respects, de Gaulle served Reynaud as a 
ghostwriter. In the fall of 1937, he sent his parlia-
mentary friend a speech intended to represent Reynaud's 
participation in the November congress of the Democratic 
Alliance, an electoral organization to which deputies from 
the center adhered. The disc~urse centered around: 1) the 
contradiction between the nation's military and foreign 
policy; 2) the inadequacy of the "nation in arms" principle, 
a theory that at the moment of danger, the people would rise 
up to protect the motherland; 3) the need for a central 
control over the branches of the armed forces or la direction 
militaire unique; and 4) a plan for the organization of the 
45 
nation in time of war. 
Loaded with information and supported by the his~ 
torical past, de Gaulle's speech stressed the importance of 
the motor, the tank, and the enormous burden of armament 
expenditures. These last three made for an enormous 
45oe Gaulle to Reynaud, n.d. [?November 1937]. The 
principle of the "nation in arms" went back to the lev~e en 
masse of 1793. In spite of this elaborately prepared speech, 
Reynaud was not given the opportunity to speak on defense 
matters at the Congress. 
32 
difference between the nature of the First World War and 
that of the anticipated conflict. De Gaulle also emphasized 
that while Russia, Italy, and Germany had almost achieved 
unified command, France decentralized its own defense among 
war, navy, air, and colonies. Would the only way that 
France would unite be, de Gaulle asked, "under the bombs?" 
A short time later, the French officer wrote another 
discourse that underwent extensive corrections by Reynaud. 
This time the perilous international situation of 1937 was 
cited. Hitler demanded colonies on November 20; Joseph 
Goebbels, the Nazi propaganda minister, threatened war on 
December 10. The Japanese occupied Shanghai and Peiking on 
December 11; Mussolini left the League of Nations on 
December 12. Faced with these facts, France had to insure 
safety by her own means. To de Gaulle, the avenue to this 
security lay in military reform and, as he had written 
before, the impetus for this had to come from the politicians 
not from the military technicians. 46 
********** 
Aside from having cited specific aspects of defense 
problems, the letters yielded valuable insight into de 
Gaulle's motivations. In this respect, the correspondence 
struck a delicate balance between love for France and 
personal ambition--Reynaud figuring prominently in both 
areas. This love for France reached on occasion the 
46oe Gaulle to Reynaud, n.d. [?December 1937]. 
r 
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deification level .. De Gaulle talked of France's "eternal 
national instinct." He stressed the need to restore France 
to her "rightful place in the sun." France was for de 
Gaulle someone alive and vital, a being with a soul. Such 
was the theme of his 1938 book, La France et son armee, 
which de Gaulle described as "a thousand years of history 
of our militant, suffering, and triumphant nation. 1147 
Within this loyalty, this passionate love for the 
homeland, there resided a sense of de Gaulle's personal 
mission, a sense of his own destiny, a search for a role to 
play in the nation's history. In this regard, de Gaulle was 
quick to inform Reynaud of events that might hold back this 
48 destiny. On May 10, 1935, he wrote that his forthcoming 
book, La France et son armee, was about to be published 
without the collaboration of .Marshal Philippe Petain. The 
Marshal, hero of World War I and an important military 
personality in the interwar period, was infuriated that the 
project, originally begun in the 1920s under his auspices, 
was now being independently authored by one of his former 
staff officers. 
47Reynaud Papers, "La France Demission 1938," AN, de 
Gaulle to Reynaud, September 24, 1938/and "Lettres de 
Gaulle," de Gaulle to Reynaud, November 24, 1938 and 
September 24, 1938. La France et son armee (Paris: Berger-
Levrault, 1938). 
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A more serious incident occurred in December 1936. 
De Gaulle informed Reynaud that his career had been ruined 
because he had been removed from the promotion list. 
Reynaud immediately contacted Minister of War Daladier who 
in turn explained that de Gaulle had spent too much time in 
prison during World War I and, therefore, had not been 
sufficiently decorated. When Reynaud faced de Gaulle with 
this, the latter submitted a list of his numerous citations. 
De Gaulle further hinted that perhaps Daladier was not well 
acquainted with his dossier and might have been wrongly 
informed by those who "listened to their theological 
passions rather than to strict equity. 1149 
De Gaulle pointed out that since 1933, the moment of 
his promotion to the grade of lieutenant-colonel, neither 
his fellow officers nor he had had to wage war. In light 
of this, he could not understand how others were being 
preferred to him. De Gaulle, alluding to the conformism 
and rigidity of the high command since 1933, noted that 
"Some people would find it very suitable to stifle ideas by 
strangling the protagonist." He concluded that the whole 
affair was of small import; it was only significant to the 
extent it constituted "an episode in the great battle for 
·1· . 1150 mi itary renovation. Reynaud, confronted with this, 
49 Reynaud, Memoires, 1:439-40 and de Gaulle to 
Reynaud, December 12, 1936. 
50oe Gaulle to Reynaud, December 12, 1936. 
35 
again sought Daladier who upon reexamination of de Gaulle's 
dossier had the lieutenant-colonel reinstated on the 
promotion list. "My devotion to you," responded de Gaulle, 
• d • t • f • t • II 51 
"fin s new JUS 1 ica ion. 
Thus surfaced another weakness in the foundation: 
Reynaud had hitched his cart to a man with a grudge, a man 
who wished to pursue his own success on a course separate 
from that of the rest of the army. Inevitably de Gaulle's 
prejudice toward and dislike for the high command were 
communicated to Reynaud whose later references to its 
inadequacies served only to raise the enmity of several key 
members of the general staff. Aware that Reynaud was the 
front for a renegade officer bent on personal advancement 
through the political arena, these officers were predisposed 
to frown on the de Gaulle-Reynaud plan, a predisposition 
that made it easier to concentrate on negative and weak 
points rather than on the fact that the armored corps 
represented an important change in military strategy since 
the days of World War I. 
Other letters of de Gaulle reiterated the devotion 
to Reynaud that followed the farmer's reinstatement on the 
promotion list, a devotion that showed itself as a desire 
to serve. II [I am] at your complete service up to the 
last minute before the debate," wrote de Gaulle on March 14, 
51
oe Gaulle to Reynaud, December 18, 1936. 
1935. "From the 17th to the 30th of November (1936]," 
penned the officer, "I will have some free time that I beg 
you to use as you please." During October of 1937, he 
wrote to Reynaud that "I stay resolved to serve you on any 
occasion that you give me. 1152 
Hand in hand with this fealty went the automatic 
assumption that Reynaud would use de Gaulle in his future 
war ·ministry. In that event, de Gaulle was Reynaud's man. 
36 
"My regiment," he wrote during the Munich crisis, "is ready. 
Let me tell you that in any case I will be--barring my death 
--resolved to serve you." The army officer came to believe, 
in fact, that their mutual destinies were interwoven by 
fate. "All the signs show," wrote de Gaulle, "that our 
hour is approaching. 1153 
Opposite ambition on the coin was the officer's 
vision of Reynaud's future, and in this respect, the genius 
of de Gaulle lay in intermingling the deputy's destiny with 
the future glory of France. Nowhere in fact is the sense of 
grandeur and destiny more present than in de Gaulle's 
prediction of Reynaud's future role. In a series of 
letters from March 1935 to November 1938, de Gaulle foresaw 
the realization of mili.tary reform in a government led by 
Paul Reynaud. 
52De Gaulle to Reynaud, March 14, 1935 and October 15, 
1937. Reynaud, Memoires, 2:132. 
53 De Gaulle to Reynaud, May 31, 1935, September 23, 
1936, and September 24, 1938. 
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Reynaud was the "great force of the future." His 
name was to be attached to the great national task of 
reform. It was Reynaud who, tomorrow, would regroup 
national forces to bring change. The country would turn to 
him and beg him to direct it. Reynaud would win the battle 
for military renovation. "France, in fact," wrote de 
Gaulle, "will not call Paul Reynaud to hold a function, 
make a transition, [or] to wait and see but indeed for some 
great and momentous actions." De Gaulle reinforced this 
idea in one of his last prewar letters. "I am convinced," 
he wrote, "of your success. Your destiny as a statesman 
is to put France back in its place in every respect."s 4 
To do so, however, Reynaud needed more than just 
high sounding words. One essential for such an undertaking 
was support which in itself begged the question as to why 
Reynaud and de Gaulle were not aided by a group, by a 
militant organization sincerely interested in the armored 
corps? 
Several accounts of de Gaulle's struggle to promote 
his project mentioned a group of advisors who worked with 
him.SS These helpers included Lieutenant-Colonel Emile 
s 4De Gaulle to Reynaud, March 29, 193S, May 31, 193S, 
December 14, 1936, and November 24, 1938. Reynaud, 
Memoires, 2:84 and Reynaud Papers, "La France Demission 
1938," AN, de Gaulle to Reynaud, December 14, 1936. 
SS 11 . p . Jean Lacouture, De Gau e, trans. Francis K. rice 
(New York: The New American Library, 1965), pp. 47-52; 
Stanley Clark, The Man who is France (New York: Dodd, Mead 
~ . 
' 
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Mayer, a retired officer in his eighties who knew many people 
in military-political circles and who met occasionally with 
de Gaulle at the Brasserie Dumesnil where the two discussed 
military history and strategy among mutual friends. In this 
coterie were Colonel Lucien Nachin, a talented author and 
intimate of de Gaulle's, Jean Auburtin, a lawyer and an 
admirer of the lieutenant-colonel, Berger-Levrault, the 
editor, and Remy Roure, writer for Le Temps. Also favorably 
disposed toward de Gaulle was General Andre Doumenc who in 
1928 had submitted a plan for modernized armored divisions 
to the general staff. 
Among the politicians who sympathized with de Gaulle 
were Leo Lagrange, Socialist and future minister of leisure 
during the Popular Front, Marcel Deat, a Socialist who 
defected in 1933 to form the Parti Socialiste de France, 
Philippe Serre, a meritber of a left wing Catholic group, 
Jeune Republique, Raymond Patenotre, onetime editor of 
Le Petit Journal as well as a member of the leftist group, 
Union Socialiste et Republicaine, and Jean Le Cour 
Grandmaison, a member of the right wing Republican 
Federation. 
Aside from Roure and Delage of Le Temps, journalists 
who supported de Gaulle included Andre Pironneau of the 
center-right L'Echo de Paris (later L'Epoque), Emile Bure 
& Company, 1963), pp. 76-82: and Brian Crozier, De Gaulle 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), pp. 61-76. 
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of the rightist daily, L'Ordre (Paris} and Daniel Halevy of 
56 Revue des Deux Mondes. 
Jean Lacouture has stated that de Gaulle mobilized 
these men into a "politico-military guerilla war. 1157 This 
was something of an exaggeration. The truth was that the 
armored corps was a "conception of the mind, 1158 the men 
interested in it being too looseknit and too poorly 
organized to further its advancement effectively. 59 More-
over, none of these men were from the commanding circles of 
the general staff or of the government. They lacked 
. fl 60 in uence. Le Cour Grandmaison and Serre, for example, 
56 John Marcus in his French Socialism in the Crisis 
Years 1933-36 (New York: Praeger, 1958}, pp. 111-12 men-
tioned Marcel Bedouz and Pierre Hexa as two Socialists who 
as writers on military topics in Le Populaire (Paris} were 
favorably disposed toward de Gaulle's ideas. Their names, 
however, appeared neither in his correspondence nor in 
Reynaud's Memoires. 
57 Lacouture, De Gaulle, p. 70. 
58As described by Jean Auburtin in a personal inter-
view with the author at Paris, April 18, 1973. 
59
clark called the armored corps project a "time to 
time" affair in which these men gave de Gaulle their 
interest and support. See his The Man who is France, 
pp. 81-82. In this group, Clark included General Baratier 
and General Maurice Duval, Pierre Bourget and Charles Giron. 
Little is known of any of these men. Baratier and Duval 
wrote occasional articles on military subjects. 
In addition to these men, Auburtin claims to have 
arranged interviews between de Gaulle and Joseph Paul-
Concour as well as Alexandre Millerand, both independent 
' socialists. See Auburtin's Le Colonel de Gaulle (Paris: 
Plon, 1965}, p. 15. 
60Personal interview with Joseph Laniel, Paris, 
France, May 11, 1973. 
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who were later to speak on behalf on de Gaulle's ideas were 
nonentities when it came to wielding political power. 
Another weak spot in the foundation was de Gaulle's 
emphasis on reform coming from the civilian government. To 
some extent, this attitude must have been developed from the 
army officer's personal failures to get on in the military 
world. It was in fact the end result of de Gaulle's error 
to underestimate the still very influential role the 
military played in matters of defense. To attempt an 
usurpation of this role by collaboration with a politician 
was to invite a resistance; but on this point of civilian 
control, Reynaud acquiesced with de Gaulle. 
Reynaud, in various Chamber of Deputy speeches, 
pointed out that the two pasic military reforms in recent 
French history were conducted by civilians: Michel le 
Tellier Marquis de Louvois who by gradually introducing 
officers and soldiers directly responsible to royal 
authority, created for Louis XIV the first true standing 
army, and Lazare Carnot who in 1793 unified the revolu-
tionary army by drawing together the officers of the old 
regime and the conscripts of the new Republic (known as the 
arnalgame) . 61 
61JOC, March 15, 1935, p. 1041 and January 26, 1937, 
p. 171. Auburtin, in an interview with this writer, also 
mentioned the introduction of compulsory military service 
in 1872 by Adolf Thiers. 
A final point of note in the de Gaulle corres-
pondence was the praise and flattery bestowed on the poli-
tician by the army officer. Reynaud was referred to as a 
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man of authority, a man of the future, a man well qualified. 
His chamber speeches were magnificent, decisive, and 
masterly. He spoke with the "great voice of a statesman 
at a moment and in a way that would be noted by History." 
To find such another man, it was necessary to go back to 
Jean Jaures, a pre-World War I Socialist possessed of great 
I 
t . 1 d 1 t. 62 ora orica power an persona magne ism. 
Was this manipulation on de Gaulle's part? Most 
likely not. De Gaulle was in desperate need for a hero. 
Disenchanted with the military chiefs, he imagined he saw 
in Reynaud the man who could implement his armored corps. 
One letter produced in its entirety tends to affirm the 
idea that Reynaud for de Gaulle was a saviour of sorts: 
Not having been able to listen to you, I had 
to content myself with reading and rereading in 
the Officiel [Journal Officiel] your magnificent 
speech. 
To the extend that: national defense is able 
to excite a French Parliament, when the issue does 
not raise an electoral interest (length of military 
service) or a political maneuver (condemnation of 
a government) , you have known how to leave your 
imprint on the minds [of the deputies] . But more-
over and especially, you have,--the first one in a 
long time--developed the issue to its essence, and 
on this subject [you] have made [the people] listen 
62
"Lettres de Gaulle," de Gaulle to Reynaud, March 14, 
1935, May 31, 1935, and May 14, 1937 and Reynaud, Memoires, 
2:142. 
to the great voice of a statesman at a moment 
and in a manner that will be marked by History. 
While waiting, everyone talks of it •. 
As to the solutions of which you are the 
representative: modernization of the army, 
specialized and mechanized corps, united 
command, there is not a shadow of a doubt that 
they are each day making more headway ~han the 63 . day before ••.• 
. 42 
63oe Gaulle to Reynaud, January 28, 1937 in Reynaud, 
Memoires, 2:142. 
CHAPTER II 
REYNAUD'S POSITION 
The law of Europe today is the law of force. 
Paul Reynaud, Le Probleme 
militaire fran3ais, p. iii. 
"The French problem from the military point of 
view, 11 stated Reynaud in the Chamber of Deputies, "is to 
create a specialized corps equally fast in both attack and 
counter attack, because if the attacked does not have 
counter strokes as rapid as the assaillant's, everything is 
lost." 1 The solution was the armored corps as Reynaud 
presented it to the chamber army conunission on June 5, 
1935. Written up in the form of an amendment to the Two 
Year Law, a measure allowing the government to prolong the 
length of military service beyond a year, Reynaud's proposal 
envisaged six armored divisions (see fig. 1, p. 44) and one 
light division (DLM) along with general reserves and 
services. 
Based on the premise that the national army would 
not be able to guarantee the integrity of French territory 
at the beginning of a conflict, this armored corps which 
was capable of maneuver and the offensive would be added to 
the national army's couverture and Maginot Line defenses. 
1JOC, March 15, 1935, p. 1041. 
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The armored corps would be implemented gradually over a 
period from 1935 to 1940 and the cost would be 300,000,000 
1 
Briides 
tanks) armored (500 
-------)•Regiments 
~ 
1 reconnaissance 
Battalions~<(------~---------
'1t. 1 engineer 
2 regiments of 
tanks 
heavy t~nks and infantry 
carried in light 
vehicles 
1 regiment of medium 
tanks 
1 battalion of light 
tanks 
"' 
1 camouflage 1 infantry 
1 2 regiments on foot 
1 signals 
1 battalion of scouts 
1 ~ artillery 
3 regiments: 
heavy field guns (short range) 
light field guns (long range) 
anti-aircraft guns 
Fig. 1. Diagram of an armored corps division. 
SOURCES: Paul Reynaud, Le Probleme militaire fransais (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1937), p. 60; Stanley Clark, The Man Who is France (New 
York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1963), pp. 80-81; Fernand Schneider, 
Histoire des doctrines militaires (Paris: Presses Universitaires, 1957), 
p. 90. 
NOTE: By contrast, a lightly mechanized division or OLM was 
composed mostly of light tanks and armored cars and was designed 
essentially for reconnaissance, the role formerly taken by the horse 
cavalry. , 
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francs ($7,800,000). Finally, it would be the means of 
relating army strategy to foreign policy. Through its speed, 
mobility, and striking power, it would be the instrument to 
2 guarantee mutual assistance pacts. 
Taking into consioeration that the next war would be 
short, that movement would be lightning quick due to the 
technical revolution in the art of war and that France 
lacked strength in numbers, the card to play was the armored 
corps or the card of quality. 3 While Reynaud in the chamber 
and in his amendment did not go heavily into the details of 
armored corps strategy, he did so in his 1937 publication, 
Le Probleme militaire frangais, a 1937 compilation of all 
his ideas on national defense. 
The most important weapons were the tanks. By 
moving rapidly in dense, concentrated waves and by maneuv-
ering under fire, they would catch the enemy off guard, 
break his line and disrupt his defenses. Crucial cover for 
these metal monsters would be supplied by the artillery. 
The infantry, carried in fast moving vehicles capable of 
2JOC, Amendement au ojet de loi portant modifi-
cation a Ia"°""loi du 31 mars 19' 8 sur le recruternent de 
1 1armee, contre projet de Paul Reynaud, Nog (Paris: 
Imprimerie de la Chambre des deputes, March 28, 1935), 
pp. 1-11 and JOC, lSieme legislature, Commission de l'Arm~e, 
Proces-Verbau'X"[sur l'] p..mendement [de M. Paul Reynaud] au 
rojet de loi de recrutement, Archives de l 1Assemblee 
Nationale herea ter cite as P..AN), June 5, 1935, p. 3. 
p. 168. 
800,000 
3 JOC, March 15, 1935, p. 1041 and January 26, 
According to Reynaud, Germany could mobilize 
men to France's 434,000. 
1937, 
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operating in all types of terrain, would conduct mop up 
operations and occ~pation of the territory. Other support. 
would come from engineers, camouflage, signals, and 
reconnaissance units. The entire division would be 
mechanized or enclosed in armored vehicles ready to do 
combat. 4 
Aviation was the weak spot. Reynaud failed to see 
planes as a form of artillery which could not only provide 
cover for the tanks but also a path for them by silencing 
the opposition. In his 1935 chamber speech, it was true 
that Reynaud noted the disharmony between French aviation 
with its spirit for the offensive as contrasted to the 
5 defensive nature of the French army; yet he never allowed 
planes to share the burden of attack. His air force was 
designed to inform, to fight independently, and to destroy. 
Planes as destroyers, however, were not tied closely to the 
movement of armored columns. Bombers were primarily 
designed to hit airports, fuel depots, ships, and commun-
ication centers. 6 
4Paul Reynaud, Le Probleme militaire franlais 
(Paris: Flammarion, 1937), p. 47. 
5JOC, March 15, 1935, p. 1041. 
6JOC, January 26, 1937, p. 169. In his La France a 
sauve l'Europe, 2 vols. (Paris: Flammarion, 1947), 1:445, 
Reynaud admits this oversight when he states: " •.. [we] 
did not understand that the new factor in modern war would 
be the coupling of armored corps and dive bombers both 
protected by fighters." 
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To develop a rationale for the existence of an 
armored corps of professionals·, Reynaud went beyond the 
point of simply naming its strategic advantages. He sought 
to enhance it by developing effective slogans or by citing 
examples of where its use proved or could have proven 
effective. Thus the centrist deputy created with de Gaulle's 
approval, the expression, fer de lance or iron head of the 
spear. 7 The armored corps was to be, in fact, the iron head 
of the national army which it would precede in the business 
of piercing enemy lines. It was not a separate army as some 
had charged but, to the contrary, an integral part. Further, 
it was a preventative weapon which Reynaud described in 
Jeunesse, quelle France veux-tu? as the best means to 
8 preserve democracy. The armored corps stood ready to 
protect the Republic and its interests. 
Among these interests were the pacts and treaties 
France has signed since World War I. Thus when Hitler 
reoccupied the Rhineland on March 7, 1936--in violation of 
the Locarno Treaty--France could not respond rapidly because 
of its costly and dramatic mobilization process. 9 An 
7Reynaud, .Memoires, 2:81. 
8Paul Reynaud, Jeunesse, quelle France veux-tu? 
(Paris: Gallimard, 1936), pp. 43-46. This 1936 pre-election 
campaign booklet concerned itself with a variety of economic, 
political, and military matters. 
9 JOC, January 26, 1937, p. 169. 
48 
armored corps could have moved into the Rhineland within 
hours of the aggression. It would have forced Hitler to 
withdraw as he had originally intended if France had 
attacked and it would have freed France from dependence on 
England who in the end did not support the French. 
The proof of the success in using elitist troops was 
demonstrated in the Spanish Civil War. This conflict began 
in 1936 when General Francisco Franco headed a revolt of 
Spanish legionnaires in Morocco against the Republican 
government in Madrid. After transporting his troops to 
Spain, he developed a right-wing following called the 
Palange which, with the help of German-Italian troops and 
arms, waged war against the Republicans or Loyalists. 
Franco, by means of 30,000 professionals, conquered half 
of Spain. The only way the Republican government of Madrid 
survived was by using the specialized troops of their 
. 1 d 10 nationa guar . 
Where were the elitist troops for the armored corps 
to come from? As indicated in Table 2 on page 49, Reynaud 
presented a wide range of figures; but the key word was 
"gradual." This was the basis of his amendment to the Two 
Year Law. Without altering that portion of the measure 
dealing with the extension of the tour of duty, Reynaud 
recommended that there be a gradual transfer of troops from 
the national army to the armored corps. This was to be 
10Reynaud, Le Problcme mili taire, PP.• 72, 76-77. 
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TABLE 2 
RECRUITMENT SOURCES FOR THE ARMORED CORPS 
Jeunesse, 
suelle Le Problerne 
de Gaulle's Reynaud's France rnili taire 
letter of amendment veux-tu? francais 
. 
Sources May 8, 1935 of 1935 (1936) (1937) 
1) Surplus of career 
professionals not 
needed in current 
army budget 32,000 18,000 15,000 28,000 
2) Youths who would 
join later but were 
currently serving 
in national army 
(enga2es) • 15,000 15,000 15,000 15,000 
3) Transfers from 
national army of 
specialists in 
lightly mechanized 
divisions. 7,000 25,000 25,000 18,000 
4) Specialists to be 
drawn from the 
15,000 profes-
sionals still to be 
recruited ------ 7,000 ------ ------
5) Transfers from 
National Guard 15,000 15,000 ------ ------
6) Native Troops 18,000 ------ 20,000 20,000 , 
7) Recruited ------ 20,000 25,000 25,000 
8) Unexplained 11,000 ------ ------ ------
Total 98,000 100,000 100,000 106,000 
SOURCES: Reynaud Papers, Lettres de Gaulle, AN, May 8, 1935; 
Paul Reynaud, Jeunesse, quelle France veux-tu? (Paris: Gallimard, 1936), 
pp. 46-47; Paul Reynaud, Le Probleme militaire francais (Paris: 
Flarnrnarion, 1937), pp. 51-52, 56; Commission de l'Armee, Proces-Verbaux, 
Amendernent .•• de recrutement, AAN, June 5, 1935, p. 3. 
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accomplished by transferring the surplus of professional 
soldiers over and above the number required by the budget 
for a particular year. Further, by lowering the draft age 
from 21 to 20, more soldiers could be obtained for the 
national army which would allow the transfer of other cate-
gories such as specialists and members of lightly mechanized 
units. Native troops would be admitted but would under no 
circumstances constitute more than one-fifth of the 
11 100,000 men needed. 
The figures prompt questions. Who was to say that 
the engages (category two) would stay on to serve the six 
year term required of ·the corps' professionals? Reynaud and 
de Gaulle were, in fact, gambling that the high performance 
of the elitist corps would attract the necessary recruits 
as needed in category seven. Further, between de Gaulle's 
letter, the amendment, and the figures arrived at in 
ReyLaud's two books, there was a wide range in numbers as 
well as variation in sources that suggested uncertainty and 
ambiguity. Table 2, in fact, was more hypothetical than 
real especially since it had to draw on a population scarred 
by World War I and tinged with a desire to be left in peace 
behind the Maginot Line. 
Reynaud's position on national defense went beyond 
the armored corps and related strategy. It demanded a 
ll · . d l' "' " b A d t Comm1ss1on e Armee, Proces-Ver aux, men emen 
de recrutement, AAN, June 5, 1935, pp. 2~3. 
variety of changes on which the military, Reynaud told the 
chamber, could not be expected to take the initiative. 12 
Not the least of these reforms was the need to establish a 
unified command or as Reynaud called it, a ministry of 
national defense. Up to this time, the three branches of 
defense: army, navy, and air had been loosely tied and 
51 
poorly coordinated since each had its own minister and chief 
of staff. As an alternative, Reynaud proposed that one 
minister and one chief of staff be given authority over all 
three branches with a chief of the general staff being 
delegated the power of commander-in-chief in time of war. 13 
Reynaud noted that there was a superior echelon of 
thought and action that functioned over and above the three 
armies. This level of strategy and military direction 
involved diplomatic and economic questions such as whether 
to use French aviation in a foreign theater or for protection 
of Paris. Reynaud used as an example the feud that erupted 
during World War I when the French army generals resisted 
the transfer of men from the western front to Salonika 
(Greece) • If a unified command had been established at the 
14 time, a decision would have resulted not an argument. 
One of the most important points was readiness. The 
army had not been prepared to defend French security in 1338 
12Joc, January 26, 1937, p. 172. 
13Ibid., p. 171. 
14Paris Soir, February 15, 1937, p. 5. 
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(Hundred Years War)'. 1792, 1870, or in 1914. "In France," 
stated Reynaud, "it is our national tradition of never being 
ready •.• [and] It is a tradition that we must abolish." 15 
The lack of this readiness was evident in rearmament where 
Reynaud cited the alarming lag behind the axis powers in 
production and quality of arms. An example of this was the 
famous 1937 Istria-Damascus race in which Italian planes 
averaged 62.1 miles per hour better than French planes. 
Aside from the poor quality of the finished planes, Reynaud 
noted that in January of 1937, France and England possessed 
a combined air force of 1,300 planes to Germany and Italy's 
3,900. 16 
Coming back from Germany in the fall of 1937, 
Reynaud described the German worker as toiling twenty-four 
hours a day on three shifts and producing an average of 300 
planes a month to France's forty-five. By December of the 
same year, this ratio had changed from 350 to France's 35-40 
giving the Germans somewhere between eight and nine times 
more production. As Reynaud put it to the finance commission 
on March 2, 1938, the country was in danger until it stepped 
up its manufacture of planes. 17 
15Paris Soir, .June 3, 1937, p. 4. 
16Le Journal (Paris), September 3, 1937 and JOC, 
January 26, 1937, pp. 169, 171. Of the 3, 900 axis planes, 
2,000 were German and 1,900 were Italian. No breakdown of 
the French-English total was given. 
17 Le Journal, October 21, 1937, p. l; L~ Figaro 
(Paris), December 23, 1937, p. l; and JOC, Commission des 
I 
l 
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To Reynaud, the lags, inferiorities, and gaps were 
everywhere. In 1937, the Italians launched two 35,000 ton 
battleships for which the French had no equivalent. Certain 
French tanks did only four kilometers an hour (2.4 mph) ~~ile 
certain German tanks could do forty kilometers an hour (24 
mph). Certain German canons had a projectile capacity of 
30 per cent more than similar French artillery. It took 
eight months, Reynaud noted, for the Germans to build a 
submarine; but it took eighteen months for the French. 
Further, by 1937, the Germans had almost completed six 
armored corps divisions while the French had none. The DLM, 
the closest thing the French had to approximate a panzer 
division, had 50 per cent fewer armored engines. French 
engines, moreover, were less powerful and some were even 
outdatea. 18 
Describing the armaments race as the "non-bloody 
zone of the war," Reynaud felt that the Germans were by 1937 
rapidly taking possession of that zone. "It is, 11 wrote 
Reynaud, "the diplomacy of the machine that commands." 19 
finances, Proces-Verbaux, AAN, March 2, 1938, p. 77. In 
these minutes, Reynaud stated that France produced 387 
planes in 1937 or on a ratio of one to eight with Germany's 
production represented by the latter figure. See pp. 75-76. 
18Le Journal, September 3, 1937, p. 1; Comoedia 
(Paris), June 20, 1936, p. l; Paul Reynaud, "Ou En Sommes-
Nous? Bilan Politique 1937," Conferencia, December 1937 -
June 1938, p. 52; Le Journal, September 3, 1937, p. l; 
JOC, January 26, 1937, pp. 169, 171. 
19Paris Soir, November 1, 1937, pp. 1-2. 
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In this respect, it was to Germany's advantage not to talk 
or make immediate war with France. For each day that she 
put more distance between herself and France materially, 
Germany stood a better chance of succeeding in an all out 
war. Indeed, Reynaud maintained in December of 1937 that if 
France did not speed up her production of arms, she would be 
at the mercy of a potential air attack within six months by 
the combined forces of Italy and Germany. 20 
With regard civil defense, Reynaud, before the 
finance commission on March 2, 1938, wanted to know what the 
government had developed as a plan for the evacuation of 
Paris. Having previously remarked that if Belgium air fields 
came under German occupation, Paris would be only 200 kilo-
meters (125 miles) in striking distance, Reynaud wanted to 
know if hundreds of Parisians would die for want of gas 
masks. More disturbing still was the response Reynaud 
received from Minister of War Daladier that the delegation 
of control over civil defense was divided between the 
department of interior and the air ministry. Such a 
situation, Reynaud protested, could not continue if civil 
defense was to have any meaning in the real sense. 21 
********** 
20
rbid.; Le Figaro, December 23, 1937, p. 1. 
21JOC, Commission des finances, Proces-Verbaux, AAN, 
December ~1936, p. 112 and March 2, 1938, pp. 74-75. 
; ' 
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To Reynaud, one of the principle problems that 
blocked the way to defense reform lay in the attitudes of 
the French people. They were, in fact, divided into narrow 
interest groups that barred the road to collective effort. 
This lack of a powerful collective ambition stemmed from the 
insufficient numbers of young people to lend the system 
dynamic thrust and also from the harmful discord that 
22 
resulted from the multiple party system. 
It was on the latter problem that the predominance 
of interest groups proved most deleterious. When in 1938, 
Leon Blum, Socialist leader of the Popular Front coalition 
of Communists, Socialists, and Radicals, demanded a national 
union government to deal with the serious financial problems, 
the right refused because of the presence of the Communists. 
This was ridiculous according to Reynaud who noted that the 
Communists had voted all defense credits since 1936. On the 
other hand, the leftist group of the Popular Front was 
guilty of establishing incorrect priorities by demanding 
social reforms before healing a sick economy and a flagging 
23 defense program. 
To bring reform, the French needed to modify their 
frame of mind. They needed to recognize that a problem of 
22 Paul Reynaud, "Ou va le monde? La France et la 
crise," Conferencia, May 1, 1937, p. 485 and Le Jour {Paris), 
November 20, 1936, p. 1. 
23Le Figaro, March 19, 1938, pp. 1, 4, and Paris 
August 22, 1936. 
c . 
uoir, 
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morale dominated their national life. The economic and 
political crises had paralyzed the people. Immobility, 
however, in the Europe of the 1930s meant death. According 
to Reynaud, the country had to evolve. The French had to 
wake up. While the Socialists and Communists of the Popular 
Front squabbled for the forty hour week and the paid holiday, 
the German armament industries were working around the clock. 
While the French army remained mired in an archaic defensive 
strategy, the Germans had put into action more than six 
divisions of their lightning-offensive specialized corps. 
The French were, in fact, fighting for the accessories while 
ignoring the essentials. Failure to modify their race by a 
'ff f · d 1 a f a· t 24 di erent set o attitu es spe le uture isas er. 
In contrast to his press accounts admitting the 
existence of a French morale problem and in Jeunesse in 
which Reynaud lightly admonished his fellow countrymen for 
their slowness, rigidity, and routine, Le Probleme, in a 
much stronger fashion, attacked the bad qualities of the 
French. One of their worst according to Reynaud was their 
legerete or lightness. History proved this in exposing the 
poorly made preparations for the wars of 1870 and 1914. 
Other deplorable habits included their hesitations, timidity, 
and laxity; but the worst by far was their petit-bourgeois 
' spirit. This small mindedness kept the French mesmerized by 
1937, 
1936, 
24Le 
p. 1. 
p. l; 
Journal, August 21, 1936, p. 1 and September 3, 
Paris Soir, August 22, 1936, p. 4; September 6, 
and June 3, 1937, p. 4. 
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their immediate needs: their shop, the bank balance, and 
the family. The way out for them lay in recognizing the 
seriousness of the German menace. Recognition, however, had 
to be followed by action in order to carry out the most 
needed military reform since 1792. 25 
Ultimately called for was the participation of all 
classes and parties in a government of public safety. This 
government of national union, Reynaud felt, would bring a 
sense of cohesion, unanimity, and solidarity that would help 
the country get over its divisions and would recreate a 
conunon soul. This government of national union which would 
replace rule by splinter parties had to conununicate to the 
workers that it depended on them whether or not France won 
the "non-bloody phase." So as the Germans were spurred on 
in their efforts by the mystique of German power, the 
French workers had also the need to be spurred on by the 
desire to save the nation. "We have to," spoke Reynaud in 
the chamber on March 17, 1938, "silently and passionately 
work, work, work! without distinguishing between day and 
night, between the week and Sunday. 1126 
25 Reynaud, Jeunesse, pp. 37, 49, and Le Probleme, 
PP• 16-17 I 23. 
26Le Figaro, March 15, 1938, p. 5; and March 19, 
1938, pp. 1, 4; L'Alliance Democratique (Paris}, February 7, 
1934, p. 2; Le Journal, October 10, 1936, p. 3; October 31, 
1937, p. 1; January 13, 1938; and January 29, 1938, p. 2; 
Journal de Rouen, July 26, 1936, p. 3; Le Jour, November 20, 
1936, p. l; Paris Soir, November 1, 1937, pp. 1-2; and JOC, 
March 17, 1938, p. 842. --
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To channel this effort, it was the duty of the 
elite to direct the people. Included among them were the 
writers, academics, civil servants, bankers, businessmen, 
engineers, farmers, la'Wyers, notary publics and doctors. 27 
It was their responsibility to bring national union and to 
reform the system in order to make France strong. It was 
this elite who had to replace the current public attitude 
of inertia with intellectual hardiness and moral courage. 
They had to find new solutions to old problems. They had 
to reconstruct France by creating a climate where hate 
would have no place. The French, themselves, along with the 
elite had to feel the pride of being French. They had to 
understand that they were the forgers of their own destiny. 28 
As ~f to pave the way by example, Reynaud offered 
brave words of encouragement and advice. Such was the case 
in February of 1938 when with patriotic fervor he declared 
that " .•. the world will be surprised once again when it 
will soon see that both at hom~and abroad, France's 
29 
surrender has never been further away;" or at the moment 
27Reynaud, La France a sauve l'Europe, 2:529. This 
postwar work (1947) is perhaps the first reference by 
Reynaud to exactly who constituted the elite. 
28Marianne (Paris), July 14, 1936, p. l; Le Petit 
Marseillais (Marseilles), November 11, 1936, p. 3; L'Echo de 
Paris, November 11, 1936; Conferencia, May 1, 1937, p. 500; 
and December 1937-June 1938, p. 52; Le Moniteur (Clermont-
Ferrand), June 14, 1937, p. 3; Le Journal, November 11, 1937, 
p. 4; Le Figaro, November 11, 1937, p. 4. 
29Joc, February 26, 1938, p. 649. 
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of the Anschluss when in a spectacular address to the 
entire chamber, he pleaded that" ... at the present moment 
when war and peace hang in the balance, it is a mistake to 
reject the offer made to you [by Leon Blum for a government 
of national union] .. 
Finally, the French had to work not only for 
unanimity in their own country but also for that among the 
democracies. It was through this concord that the various 
peoples could reach agreement on questions that the 
dictators resolved by force. II • • the will of the 
democracy," Reynaud observed in 1935, "is more stable than 
the man who passes. 1131 
********** 
In the realm of foreign affairs, the armored corps 
was suppose to play just as critical a role as it did in 
internal defense. This was aptly expressed by Reynaud in 
the debate of March 15, 1935 when he stated: 
f This corps of maneuver is for us, moreover, 
imposed by our foreign policy. It was stated 
this afternoon and notably by M. Leon Blum that 
the role of our army is like before, that of 
being uniquely defensive inside of our country. 
But this is not our [foreign] policy. And 
it is necessary to have the army of its [our] 
policy. By chance, would we have abandoned the 
policy of assistance and pacts? Do we interpret 
30Joc, March 17, 1938, p. 843. 
31Joc, December 27, 1935, p. 2813; L'Eclaireur de 
Nice et dUSud-Est (Nice), November 6, 1937, p. 2. The 
newspaper recorded a speech given by Reynaud at the Congress 
of the Democratic Alliance held in Nice. 
' 
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assistance as a one way current that one can 
demand from London but that one would not give 
to Vienna, Prague, or Brussels?32 
The brunt of Reynaud's ideas on foreign policy, 
however, did not concern how the armored corps would stra-
tegically assist such allies as Belgium, Poland, 
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Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Rumania. Other than passing 
references to the importance of tightening ties with these 
nations, Reynaud spent considerably less time with them than 
with the super powers: England, Germany, Russia, and Italy. 
This was not to say that he ignored the importance of the 
former. As early as 1933, Reynaud in a series of articles 
for the moderate La Liberte (Paris) , 33 stressed the need for 
reliance on the constellation of alliances with the smaller, 
less powerful nations of central and eastern Europe. 
While occasional reference was made to their value 
later on in chamber speeches and in press articles, Reynaud 
was aware that several of these states were not in step one 
with the other nor for that matter with France. Poland got 
on badly with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia became increasingly 
friendly with Italy, and what was more serious, both Poland 
and Rumania were hostile to the passage of Russian troops 
through their territories (in case the Soviets had to come 
to the aid of France) • This was especially true for Poland 
where Foreign Minister Colonel Josef Beck, whom Reynaud 
32 JOC, March 15, 1935, p. 1042. 
33La Liberte, May 8, August 24, ~~d September 5, 1933. 
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described as a "bad shepherd" to the Poles, impeded French 
efforts at collective security by appeasing Hitler and by 
giving a cold shoulder to the Soviets. 34 
Because of this, Reynaud did not trust the Polish 
government. When Yvons Delbos, Radical foreign minister to 
the Blum ministry, appeared before the finance commission 
on December 23, 1936 to request approval of a 2.6 billion 
franc loan for Warsaw (Rambouillet Accords) , Reynaud raised 
questions. 35 This loan which consisted of credits, arms, 
and cash as well as French military and technical advice, 
appeared to the centrist deputy to have been drawn up under 
duress in a situation where if France did not grant the 
loan, Poland would join with Germany against Czechoslovakia. 
Such a diplomatic move was bad example to other European 
allies who would then conclude that it was necessary to 
threaten to become a traitor in order to get help from 
France. Reynaud observed further that such a loan had been 
granted to Turkey before World War I but during the conflict, 
that country had used the funds against France. 
In this unfortunate atmosphere of distrust, the main 
thrust of Reynaud's foreign policy concerned France's chief 
34Reynaud, Memoires, 2:154. Reynaud described Beck's 
foreign policy as incoherent and "hostile to all its neigh-
bors except Germany." On January 26, 1934, Beck signed a 
ten year nonaggression pact with the Nazis. 
35JOC, Commission des finances, Proces-Verbaux [sur 
le] Projet"de loi N°1525 autorisant le Ministre des Finances 
h accorder la garantie de l'Etat frangais a des emprunts du 
' 
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friend, England; her potential friend, Russia; her chief 
enemy, Germany; and her potential enemy, Italy. Germany 
was, by far, the greatest, most powerful, and most inunediate 
threat. The German need for lebensraum or living space 
south and eastward into the slavic nations as well as the 
German hatred for France and the diktat of Versailles were 
well documented in Mein Kampf. 
A country in the process of deifying its race 
according to Reynaud, Germany would only achieve this 
deification and expansion by combat which explained the need 
to mobilize on a war footing, German industry, technology, 
36 
and manpower. Attempts by Hitler to emphasize the 
Bolshevik threat from Russia were a clever campaign of 
diversionary propaganda since three-quarters of Germany's 
troops were stationed on the Dutch-Belgian-French frontier. 37 
There was no disguising it. Germany was the wolf of 
Europe and those who believed in the nonsense that Hitler 
was its defender against conununism were the "Little Red 
Riding Hoods. 1138 This menace was further compounded by 
Germany's liaison with the man of prey, Mussolini. The 
Gouvernment polonais et de la Compagnie franco-polonaise de 
chemins de fer, AAN, December 23, 1936, p. 5. 
36
conferencia, May 1, 1937, p. 485 and December 1937 -
June 1938, pp. 40-41. 
37 
· S . F b 2 1937 4 Paris 01r, e ruary , , p. • 
38L'Epoque (Paris), October 6, 1937, p. 5. 
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danger from these two was most immediate in the 
Mediterranean where axis involvement in Tripoli (Libya} and 
Spanish Morocco could catch the French colonies of Algeria 
and Tunisia in a pincer movement thus cutting them off from 
France who would have to depend on them in case of a major 
fl . 39 European con ict. 
The reoccupation of the Rhineland and Italian 
invasion of Ethiopia were for Reynaud the prelude to a major 
European conflict that could only be avoided if France were 
militarily strong and if France maintained her allies as 
40 
well as that "card of quality," the armored corps. 
Although Reynaud conceded that discussions with the Reich 
over territorial demands might yield some fruit and although 
not opposed to a settlement with Germany on the arms race 
and on other disputes, the means of reconciliation still 
remained France's military strength since the Germans under 
Nazism lived by the cult of force. 41 
39Reynaud, Memoires, 2:120, and Jean Mistler et al., 
Problemes de politigue exterieure (Paris: Librc.1irie Felix 
Alcan, 1937), pp. 173-79. This book contains a speech given 
by Reynaud on April 15, 1937 before the Socict.y of the former 
and present students of the Ecole Libre des Sciences 
Politique. According to Reynaud, the Italianu had an 
interest in Tripoli while the Germans catered to the Mosl~ms 
in Spanish Morocco by providing them with a bout to Mecca 
so they could fulfill their holy pilgrimage. It was, .in 
fact, from Spanish Morocco that General Francisco Franco 
carried his military coup to Spain with the help of the 
German air force. 
40Paris Soir, September 6, 1936, p. 1. 
41L'Echo de Paris, January 8, 1937, p. 1. 
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The situation with Italy was more complicated. 
Reynaud acknowledged the French love for this latin sister 
in terms of the peninsular's art, language, people, and 
countryside; and actually, the problem lay not so much with 
the people who were essen.tially nonwarlike as with the tiny 
but successful Fascist party headed by Benito Mussolini. 
The Duce's message to his country, the starved nouveau-venu 
of Europe, was a promise of fulfillment through war and 
conquest. Ethiopia (invaded by Italy on October 10, 1935) 
according to Reynaud would not be enough to satisfy 
Mussolini especially when the League of Nations had 
completely failed to enforce sanctions, a factor that would 
encourage the Fascist leader to try his luck elsewhere. 42 
In spite of these realities, Reynaud still worked 
for a rapprochement with Italy. He pointed out that with 
the Germans at the Brenner Pass and Mussolini's troops 
bogged down 2,500 miles away in Ethiopia, the Duce feared 
Hitler's intentions and, therefore, it was to France's 
advantage to drive a wedge between the two dictators by 
offering the olive branch to Italy. 43 
Of Russia, Reynaud, since 1933, had commented on the 
potential value Soviet industrialization could have in terms 
42 JOC, December 27, 1935, pp. 2815-16; Paris Soir, 
Aggust 22:1936, p. 4; and Reynaud Papers, "Dossier Portalet 
N XIV," AN, Reynaud to Henri de Kerillis, August 25, 1935. 
43 Le Journal, November 16, 1937 and Paris Soir, 
August 22:--T936-,-p-:- 4. Reynaud refers to Austrians as 
Germans. 
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of supplying France's smaller allies of Central and Eastern 
Europe. Indeed, if France and Russia could come to an 
understanding, the Russians could serve as the eastern 
buttress of the Petite Entente, a coalition which by itself 
had little support to offer France. Further, Franco-
Russian entente would give equilibrium to the European 
balance of power by containing Hitler who lived in fear of a 
two front war. This was not an imaginary fear for as 
Reynaud pointed out, it was tsarist Russia of 1914 who by 
the attack on German forces in the east had allowed the 
French to win the battle of the Marne. 44 
The road to entente was complicated, however, by 
events both within the Soviet Union and France. Joseph 
Stalin's purges had weakened both the army and the political 
structure of the nation. Further, the Komintern or Third 
International with its goal of spreading international 
communism was still in operation. On the other hand, 
Reynaud noted that there appeared to be an evolution away 
from this goal and a movement back toward the imperialism 
and nationalism of the czars. This was reflected in Stalin's 
emphasis on implementing socialism first and foremost within 
. 45 Russia. 
44La Liberte, May 8, August 24, and September 5, 
1933; JOC, February 26, 1938, p. 648; Conferencia, May 1, 
1937, P:-497, and December 1937 - June 1938, p. 47. 
45
conferencia, December 1937 - June 1938, pp. 46~47. 
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In a like fashion, Reynaud underwent an evolution 
in attitude toward the French Communists. In his 
oecember 4, 1936 address to the chamber, the centrist deputy 
stressed the clear impossibility of diplomatic entente with 
the Soviets while the Communist contingent remained a 
supporting factor in the Popular Front government. 
According to Reynaud, the majority of the French people 
still considered the Third International (to which the 
French Communists adhered) as based out of Moscow and very 
much a real threat. "I believe," stated Reynaud, "that 
alone, a Government independent of the Communist party 
would be able to carry out a policy [of detente]. 1146 
In 1937, however, Reynaud, in an address to the 
University Club of Paris, Stated that he did not believe i~ 
the development of communism in France. The reasons were 
the evolution of the Soviets under Stalin and the social 
make up of the French people which could never take on the 
international character of the Komintern. 47 Further, in 
1938, Reynaud noted that the Communists had voted the 
defense credits for the last two years and they had ceased 
all their antimilitarist activity. This followed, Reynaud 
wrote, from their realization that the interests of both 
Russia and France were identical: the search for a 
46 JOC, December 4, 1936, p. 3325. 
47Le Figaro, May 2, 1937, p. 4. 
European equilibrium. In this same article in Le Figaro 
(March 19, 1938}, Reynaud asked: 
How could the two democracies of the West 
[England and France] with their decreasing 
numbers of youth hope to maintain European 
equilibrium without the aid of this formidable 
reservoir of men and raw materials regardless 
of the internal convulsions of contemporary 
Russia?48 
Failure to get this aid would be disastrous. 
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According to Mein Kampf, which Reynaud cited to the chamber 
on February 26, 1938, 49 Hitler's main aim before launching 
into a great adventure toward the Asian steppe was the 
elimination of an attack from the rear and notably from 
France. Thus before France could be dealt with, the Franco-
Russian entente had to be broken and a temporary pact with 
the Soviets had to be effected. Unless the French could 
strengthen ties with the Soviets, in Reynaud's view, there 
was a distinct possibility that Germany would annex the 
countries of the Petite Entente by a bloodless war of 
persuasion after which the Reich would make a momentary deal 
with the Russians. Then Germany could turn to France and 
off er her slavery or a war in which France would have no 
11 . 50 a 1es. 
48Le Figaro, March 19, 1938, p. 4. 
49 JOC, February 26, 1938, p. 648. 
SOConferencia, December 1937 - June 1938, p. 48. 
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To avoid another Rapallo, a 1920 military pact 
between Germany and Russia, the French had to overcome 
their fears of communism and put the safety of France 
first. To construct a military pact with teeth in it, a 
consultation between the general staffs of France and 
Russia was needed. This was especially desirable between 
the two air forces. Russia, who had bad roads and an 
inferior rail network, possessed an aviation twice as 
strong as that of Germany's. This air force would be an 
excellent means of rapidly closing the distance between 
Russia and the point of possible conflict farther west. 
Lastly, if any Frenchman doubted the effectiveness of 
Soviet strength, let him regard the influence of Russian 
aid on Republican Spain where because of Soviet shipments 
of artillery, tanks and planes, the Loyalists were able to 
resist Franco for more than three years in spite of German-
51 Italian aid to the leader of the Palange. 
The signing of the nonaggression pact between 
Hitler and Stalin on August 22, 1939 indicated that Reynaud 
was one of the few French statesmen to have adequately 
grasped the true design of Hitler toward Russia. The 
Fuhrer, in order to avoid a two front war, maneuvered the 
51L'Oeuvre (Paris), April 16, 1936, p. 2; L'Echo de 
' Paris, November 21, 1936, p. 4; Ce Soir (Paris), March 21, 
1938, p. 4; Conferencia, December 1937 - June 1938, p. 47 
and May 1, 1937, p. 499; JOC, December 4, 1936, p. 3325 
and February 26, 1938, p.~7. 
soviets into a position of neutrality while he first took 
on Poland and then France. Later, with these defeated, he 
turned on Russia in June of 1941. 
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Activity of Russia after September 1939, however, 
indicated a weakness that. Reynaud appeared not to have 
realized. Regard the difficulty th~ Soviets had in over-
coming the Finns in the winter of 1939-40 and later, the 
terrible losses they suffered at the hands of the Germans, 
and still later, the enormous need the Russians had for 
British and American arms (in spite of what Reynaud had to 
say about the might of Russian industrialization and 
manpower). In light of this, how much weaker was Russia at 
the time of the Munich crisis when the Soviet Union was 
reeling under the effects from the mass executions of army 
officers, politburo leaders, and peasantry? 
Moreover, the task of carrying off a pact with the 
Soviets was more difficult than Reynaud had made it out to 
be. Russia of the 1930s was not the tsarist regime of 1914 
which willingly attacked from the east in order to open 
another front. To the contrary, the Russia of Stalin was a 
totalitarian system under a Machiavellian opportunist. The 
atmosphere of distrust and repression he created encouraged 
a hands off attitude among political and military leaders 
not only in France but elsewhere in western Europe. In the 
final analysis, the possible westward movement of Soviet 
arms and ideology was ·thus a qualified risk in any pact with 
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France; but in view of the disaster that befell la patrie 
in May of 1940, it might have been worth the taking. 
On England, the keywords were mutual support and 
the maintenance of European equilibrium through the League 
of Nations. In his famous speech of December 27, 1935, 
Reynaud lamented the failure to pursue this aim following 
Mussolini's attack on Ethiopia (October 2, 1935) •52 Although 
the League had enforced sanctions against Italy on 
November 8, 1935, French Premier, Pierre Laval, had in early 
December convinced Foreign Secretary Samuel Hoare to agree 
to a division of Ethiopia into spheres of influence giving 
two-thirds of the country to Italy. When the deal leaked 
to the press, the British people who for the most part 
supported sanctions were shocked not only at the action of 
the French but also at their own foreign secretary who in 
the course of the uproar was forced to resign and was 
replaced by Anthony Eden. 
It was this deal primarily motivated by Laval that 
Reynaud denounced to the chamber as having done severe 
damage to Franco-British relations as well as to the 
effectiveness of the League Covenant. In his speech, 
Reynaud clearly differentiated between what served British 
interests and what the English people themselves really felt 
was correct. Surely it was true as Hoare had put it to the 
52 JOC, December 27, 1935, pp. 2813-16. 
House of Commons tha_t the deal with Laval was prompted by 
the fact that not one nation ·offered England a ship toward 
policing the enforcement of oil sanctions in the 
Mediterranean. In light of this, a confrontation between 
Italy and Britain would have led to a war in which England 
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would have been isolated; and this was something that Hoare 
wanted to avoid. 53 
Reynaud noted, however, that Ethiopia had been a 
member nation of the League whose Covenant (including 
sanctions in face of an aggressor) the British people had 
really believed in. Reynaud then made a reference to Lord 
Robert Cecil's March 1934 Peace Ballot, a questionnaire put 
to the British on whether League sanctions should be applied 
in case of violation of the Covenant. "Do you believe," 
Reynaud asked the chamber, "that the British people were 
deranged when they voted on this question of peace and the 
League of Nations; [considering] that 9,627,000 voted they 
were ready to impose on their own country the sacrifice--in 
case a war would be unjustly declared--[of] economic 
sanctions and that only 670,000 voted against [?] 1154 
53Joc, December 27, 1935, p. 2814. 
54Ibid., p. 2813. In his Memoires, Reynaud gives 
10,027,608 for sanctions and 635,-074 agairtst. Another 
question on the referendum asked the British if they would 
support military measures if needed. Voting for were 
6,784,368 and against, 2,351,981. See Reynaud, Memoires, 
2:452. 
In spite of this setback, Reynaud never gave up on 
the need to work for closer ties between the two nations. 
In spite of the naval accords secretly drawn up between 
Britain and Germany in the spring of 1935 (to Reynaud, a 
measure taken by Hitler to break up the entente between 
France and England) , 55 in spite of the Ethiopian fiasco, 
and later, the reoccupation of the Rhineland by Hitler in 
which Britain had failed to come to the aid of France, 
Reynaud's idea was the maintenance of mutual solidarity 
between the two nations through an effective and powerful 
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League of Nations. This theme Reynaud repeated in both his 
chamber speeches of December 4, 1936 and February 26, 1938. 
In addition, conur~ntary for press and radio argued either 
for closer ties or for the rapid rearmament of both 
countries. 56 
On England, Reynaud lacked a critical perspective 
he had shown elsewhere. Perhaps this came from too close a 
belief in the antiappeasement forces in England centered 
around Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, and the British 
55Joc, December 27, 1935, p. 2813. This agreement 
which was in violation of the Versailles Treaty was signed 
in London on June 18, 1935. In the following ten years, it 
limited the German Navy to one-third the size of the British 
but accorded it the right to build submarines up to 60 
percent of British strength and to 100 percent in case of a 
security threat. 
56Le Journal, June 19, 1936, p. 3 (Speech given at 
the Ambassadeurs); L'Echo de Paris, fiovember 11, 1936, p. 4 
and November 21, 1936; Paul Reynaud, Discours du Ministre, 
2 vols. (Paris: t!inistere des I'inan:.:(,s, November 24, 1939), 
2:2, 4. 
people of Lord Cecil's Peace Ballot. Thus in the pages of 
ce Soir (Paris) on March 31, 1938, Reynaud mistakenly 
predicted that England would not stand by and let Germany 
repeat in Czechoslovakia what she had done in Austria. 57 
The truth was that the England of the thirties, a decade 
dominated by Prime Ministers Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley 
Baldwin, and Neville Chamberlain, was isolationist and 
appeasement orientated. These leaders were unwilling to 
become involved in continental affairs unless England's 
survival depended on it. A case in point was Britain's 
attitude toward the Spanish Civil War. 
This imbroglio which broke out in 1936 was several 
years in the making. After the expulsion of King Alfonso 
XIII in 1931, a republic was established which undertook a 
program of social and economic reform. Its basic tone was 
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anticlerical and antiwealthy since the government dissolved 
the Jesuit order and confiscated its property while at the 
same time, it broke up some of the large landed estates and 
redistributed their lands. When the 1936 elections were 
held, all the elements of the left--Republicans, Socialists, 
Syndicalists, Arnarchists, and Communists~-joined in a 
Popular Front platform against the elements of the conserv-
ative old regime--the monarchists, clerics, and army 
57
ce Soir (Paris), March 21, 1939, p. 4. This 
article also appeared on the same day in the Sunday Times 
(London). While most of Reynaud's newspaper articles are 
mentioned in his Memoires, this one is conspicuously absent. 
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officers. The left won a victory and in July of 1936, 
General Francisco Franco then stationed in Spanish Morocco 
staged his famous coup. With the help of the German air 
force, he transported his followers known as Falangists to 
continental Spain where three years of bloody civil war 
ensued which ended in Franco's victory. 
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In actuality, the Spanish Civil War was a contest 
between rival European ideologies since Fascist Franco was 
supported by German and Italian arms and men while the 
Loyalists or Republicans received Soviet aid. This localized 
European war saw the almost complete absence of England and 
France, the latter under the influence of the former 
developed a position 0£ nonintervention even when it later 
became clear that Germany, Italy and Russia were all in 
violation of the nonintervention agreement. Thus while 
Britain advised France to stay neutral so as to avoid a 
general European conflagration, Germany and Italy used 
Spain to test their new strategies based on a hardware of 
tanks and planes. 
All of Reynaud's references to the Spanish Civil War 
followed this position of nonintervention. His first 
mention of the war came on July 26, 1936 when in a speech at 
Rouen, the deputy noted that a similar civil war in France 
could easily lead to an invasion by Hitler on the excuse 
that the FUhrer was reestablishing order. 58 While Reynaud 
SS Journal de Rouen, July 26, 1936, p. 3. 
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did not say that this was adequate grounds for noninter-
vention, he argued for neutrality five days later in the 
Chamber of Deputies. The issue at stake was the same, 
French security. If France became involved, the vital 
pathways to her colonies in North Africa would be endangered 
since Spain was the bridge across tl "~ western ~edi terranean, 
a position which allowed her to choke off French traffic to 
the dark continent. 59 
While a later position stated in Le Figaro on 
November 21, 1936 voiced frustration at the free for all the 
Fascists were having in Spain (in violation of noninter-
vention) , 60 a second chamber reference of Reynaud to the 
civil war stuck to the line of neutrality. In this speech 
of December 4, 1936, Reynaud advised that if the fronts 
were to stabilize during the winter, France should attempt 
a mediation between the two antagonists "because we are 
unable to do anything else. 1161 
Without mentioning why France could do nothing else, 
Reynaud made no further reference to the civil war until 
October 12, 1937 when he again voiced dismay at the "unfor-
tunate Spanish affair" in which the French because they had 
cast their die with neither contestant had lost all 
59 JOC, July 31, 1936, p. 2307. 
60Le Figaro, November 21, 1936, p. 2. 
61 JOC, December 4, 1936, p. 3323. 
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influence with both factions. 62 This short reference in 
Le Journal thus hinted for the first time that Reynaud 
himself had made an error in choosing neutrality. The error 
was magnified because the war took place very close to 
French North Africa. Thus the French were reduced to the 
role of spectator: watching with uncertainty and appre-
hension, powerless to assure their best interests at the 
outcome of the war. A later conunentary on Spain in 1939 
reflected this position of weakness while at the same time 
attempting to assure France's best interests at the eleventh 
hour. France in cooperation with England, stated Reynaud 
in a radio broadcast, had to help the triumphant faction 
establish order which meant in turn ridding Spain of German 
and Italian troops who Reynaud made a veiled reference to as 
"people who have come to its [Spain's] aid. 1163 
Hugh Thomas in his lengthy book, The Spanish Civil 
War, has described Reynaud as "one of the strongest 
supporters of the Republic. 1164 The evidence presented here 
does not agree with that statement. Reynaud never mentioned 
support for the Spanish Republic either in his Memoires or 
in the accounts considered in this study. This in itself is 
62 Le Journal, October 12, 1936, p. 1. On September 3, 
1937, Reynaud in Le Journal made a passing reference to the 
continuing presence of German specialists in Spain. 
63L'Oeuvre, March 29, 1938, p. 4. 
64 Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York: Harper 
& Row, 1963), p. 537. Thomas does not present evidence to 
prove his statement. 
·. 
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puzzling because Reynaud in his speeches had encouraged the 
principles of democracy in face of Fascist dictatorships. 
The Spanish Republic was the representative of democracy in 
Spain. It had legitimately won the 1936 election and was 
now being challenged by an illegal Fascist contestant. 
Several possible explanations as to what motivated 
Reynaud to choose neutrality do not stand up well. These 
included: that the French Popular Front support of 
Republican Spain would cause a civil war in France between 
the forces of left and right, and that because of such 
support, a victory of the Spanish Popular Front would mean 
a Communist take over in Spain paralleled by a strengthening 
of the Communist movement in France (with Reynaud portrayed 
to his electors and the nation as a Bolshevik) ; that under 
these conditions, Hitler had a perfect opportunity to invade 
France; and finally, French participation in the Iberian 
conflict would open a possible third hostile front along the 
Pyrenees. 
The idea of a civil war in France was encouraged by 
an alarmist press of the extreme right who, fearful of the 
Communist element in the Popular Front, refused to recognize 
the fact that this leftist coalition was firmly-and legally 
installed with the Socialists and Radicals dominating the 
cabinet. Further, in Conferencia of May 1, 1937, Reynaud 
interpreted the fear of a Communist takeover in the 
respective countries as more German propaganda than real: 
The other result is that this [Franco-Soviet] 
pact has allowed Germany to conduct a campaign 
against us in which she declares: 
- "France is sovietized." [Moreover] Since the 
Popular front has arrived in power, Germany has 
been able to say: 
- "In February, it is the Popular Front in 
Spain, in May, it is the Popular Front in France. 
These are the same raised fists, the same 
International, the same red flag. That [spirit] 
has been destroyed in the Civil War in Spain. 
France will soon follow in its footsteps." 
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- So much for the German propaganda. 
78 
Other evidence indicated that in the initial stages 
of the civil war, the Spanish Communists did not occupy the 
predominant influence that later fell to them out of forced 
reliance upon Soviet aid. Historian Dante Puzzo has noted 
that this initial stage was crucial since the failure of 
Franco to win a quick victory could have led to his early 
defeat if the Madrid government had been permitted to 
purchase the necessary war materials in France. 66 On the 
other hand, historian Gordon Wright has maintained that 
French intervention was exactly what Hitler wanted because 
it would have involved Britain and France in a dragging, 
spreading war which would have allowed Hitler a free hand to 
strike eastward. 67 
65conferencia, May 1, 1937, p. 498. 
' 
66
oante Puzzo, Spain and the Great Powers 1936-41 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 241. 
67Gordon Wright, France in Modern Times (Chicago: 
Rand McNally & Company, 1966), p. 499. 
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The truth was, however, that Hitler was still very 
weak in 1936 and had given the order to retreat from the 
Rhineland if the French took to the offensive. Thus it 
seemed highly unlikely the Fuhrer would have attempted an 
invasion of France or an expansion elsewhere under the 
circumstances. Moreover, the Loyalists were mainly looking 
for arms and other supplies not soldie=s. This was far 
short of an all out war that Reynaud tended to foresee in 
his speeches. Indeed Puzzo, in a vein of thought different 
from Reynaud's, saw French aid to the legitimate leftist 
government as the means of insuring the tranquility of the 
Pyrenean frontier as well as of safeguarding the legitimate 
interests of France in the Mediterranean and North Africa. 68 
Historian Gordon Craig has stated that the triumph 
of Franco weakened France's strategical position in any 
dispute with Germany by placing a potential enemy on her 
flank. According to Craig, it also deepened the tendency 
toward defeatism in the democracies and carried the principle 
69 of collective security closer to bankruptcy. This appears 
to be an accurate description of the disastrous results of 
nonintervention in which France out of deference to her 
"ally" England, deserted the camp of the legitimately 
elected government in Spain and thus lost a potentially 
68Puzzo, Spain, p. 85. 
69Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815 (New York: Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 714. 
important ally. Reynaud in his support of close ties with 
England was a part of this blunder equivalent in impact to 
more highly publicized capitulations such as the Italian 
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occupation of Ethiopia and the reoccupation of the Rhineland 
by Hitler. 
In the presentation of Reynaud's ideas on defense, 
one becomes aware of the modification of his views after 
the chamber vote of February 2, 1937. This vote, a ratifi-
cation of Daladier's attitude on military strategy, was an 
approval of the Maginot Line and the accompanying theories 
of the defensive: the predominance of fire power with the 
limitations it set upon movement, and the theory of the 
continuous front to be held by couverture troops. 
After this vote, Reynaud's last major campaign for 
the armored corps and related military strategy occurred in 
June with the release of Le Probleme militaire fran~ais. 
Other than this publication, Reynaud made only three news-
paper references in 1937 to his armored engines and none at 
all to them in 1938-39. 70 Instead, Reynaud concentrated on 
the strong points of the French as well as on the improvement 
70The three newspapers were Vendemiaire (Paris} , 
February 10, 1937; Paris Soir, June 3, 1937; and Le Figaro, 
December 23, 1937. Reynaud made a passing reference to the 
failure of the chamber to act on his 1935 amendment .in the 
debate of February 26, 1938. See JOC, February 26, 1938, 
' p. 647. From 1937 on, the de Gaulle correspondence to 
Reynaud also tapered off 'til by 1939, Reynaud received only 
two letters from de Gaulle. Contrast this with the eighteen 
received in 1936. 
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of defense within the existing systems (armaments, unified 
command, and the need for French unanimity). 
Thus in a speech before the Kultur Bund of Vienna 
on October 15, 1937, Reynaud stated that France had the best 
army in the world and that, indeed, this·would be the 
assurance peace would be maintainea. 71 Later, in the chamber 
on February 26, 1938, Reynaud stated that in face of the 
problems of Europe in 1938, the French were never farther 
72 
away from surrender. Moreover, on March 21, 1938, in an 
article for Ce Soir (Paris) , Reynaud wrote that once the 
country had overcome certain shortages in armament materials, 
the French army would be the first in the world. Continuing 
in the same article, Reynaud noted that no other army had 
such an extensive corps of officers or instructed reserves 
as did the French. 73 
After joining the Daladier cabinet as justice 
minister on April 11, 1938, this burst of optimism continued. 
At Leeds, England on May 22, 1938, Reynaud stated that 
Daladier's government of national defense would not fail in 
its duty. 74 Much the same idea was pronounced in a radio 
discourse a year later when as finance minister, Reynaud 
71Le Journal, October 16, 1937, p. 5. 
72JOC, February 26, 1938, p. 649. 
73Ce Soir, March 21, 1938, p. 4. 
74Le Figaro, May 22, 1938, p. 3. 
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remarked that in spite of the German advantages of secrecy 
and an army capable of lightning attack, the Daladier 
government of national union behind which the French people 
d ld . t th . 75 stoo wou rise o e occasion. 
Needless to say, this change in attitude led to a 
decline in Reynaud's accuracy of vision and engendered a 
variety of errors. Thus Reynaud's statement about the 
superiority of the French army was exaggerated. His speech 
before the chamber on February 26, 1938 was in direct 
contradiction to the strong current of defeatism among the 
French. Further, the statement in Ce Soir that the English 
would not stand by and allow the Germans to repeat the 
Anschluss in Czechoslovakia was incorrect just as were 
Reynaud's assertions that the Daladier administration would 
be strong in face of the dictators, a mistake that became 
evident at Munich when France along with England capitulated 
to Hitler on the Sudetenland question. That Reynaud would 
repeat his belief in the strength of the Daladier regime 
the following summer in his radio broadcast of June 15, 1939 
can only be explained as false optimism. 
General Alfred Conquet, Marshal Philippe P'tain's 
personal secretary during much of the thirties, has suggested 
that this change in attitude was a kowtow to Daladier, a 
premier whose defense views were diametrically opposed to 
those of Reynaud's. Thus in order to be promoted from the 
75 Reynaud, Discours, 2:5. 
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justice to the finance ministry, Reynaud according to 
conquet, had to muzzle his ideas on defense, an arrangement 
1 f d t t . 76 a so necessary or Reynau o s ay in power. 
Conquet's conclusions, however, do not take into 
consideration the attitude of optimism Reynaud has assumed 
before his entry into Daladier's cabinet on April 11, 1938. 
This went back as far as the Kultur Bund speech of 1337. 
Moreover, Reynaud in his Memoires stated that since it was 
impossible to alter Daladier's position on national defense, 
he would do better to enact a program of financial recovery 
beginning with his acceptance of finances on November 1, 
1938. To effect this redressement, an attitude of optimism 
h . . . 77 was t e first prerequisite. 
In the final analysis, a much better explanation for 
Reynaud's change and the errors that followed lay in his 
recognition that the vote of February 2, 1937 was sufficient 
proof that the French nation was thoroughly sold on the 
defensive. Why bother to be negative in light of this? 
"Daladier developed a war doctrine," wrote Reynaud in La 
France a sauve l'Europe, "that he presented as that of his 
party and which corresponded, it is true to the feeling of 
76Alfred Conquet, Aupres du Marechal Petain (Paris: 
Editions France-Empire, 1970), p. 432ff. Conquet presents 
his case by inference: the continued presence of Reynaud in 
' the cabinet represented the sacrifice of integrity to 
ambition. For the Conquet-Reynaud literary feud, see 
Appendix A. 
77 Reynaud, Memoires, 2:200. 
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the large majority of Frenchmen: the systematic 
'i\ 
defensive. 1178 
The diminished relevance and foresight that charac-
terized the later pronouncements of Reynaud on national 
defense must be evaluated, however, within the framework of 
his overall views on how best to protect France. In this 
respect, Reynaud must be given credit for the broad range 
of his ideas: armored corps, collective security, unified 
command, rearmament (battle of the armies in the nonbloody 
zone of the war), civil defense, national union, readiness 
as well as the state of mind, morale, and attitudes of the 
French people. 
On the other hand, this system of national defense 
demonstrated important weaknesses, A case in point was the 
armored corps. The need to change recruitment figures four 
times was a bad foundation since the viability of the 
armored corps lay in finding the necessary men to keep it a 
separate branch of the armed forces. This had to be done 
without weakening the national army, a source which Reynaud 
and de Gaulle had to tap, however, in order to place their 
corps in operation. While Reynaud and de Gaulle tried to 
diminish the effect of this borrowing by explaining the 
armored corps as an officer's training school for the 
national army, the draining of talented troops from the 
latter was to meet with objections. 
78Reynaud, La France a sauve !'Europe, 1:211. 
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The role of aviation in the armored corps was 
undeveloped. No plan was put forth to tie the plane 
closely to the movement of tanks, a mistake that became 
evident when the French had to witness the dive bombers 
covering German tanks in May-June 1940. De Gaulle became 
aware of this after the German blitzkrieg in Poland and 
subsequently did a hasty revision of Versl'armee de metier 
in 1940 called The Army of the Future79 in order to include 
the new role of aviation in armored tank warfare. Noticeably 
absent from the title of the second work were the words 
"professional army," the direct translation from the French 
of the first title, a phrase that had caused consternation 
among both military and politicians since it provided fuel 
for the charge that de Gaulle's armored corps was a totally 
separate army. 
In the realm of strategy, Reynaud never gave the 
exact details on how the armore~ corps would cover the 
unfortified area from Montmedy to the sea (approximately 
218 miles) or what the armored corps would do if the Germans 
broke through the Maginot Line and the unprotected frontier 
at the same time. Reynaud never mentioned where in Belgium 
or Luxemberg the armored corps would pass on its way to 
Germany in case the latter attacked Czechoslovakia. Further, 
he never mentioned which cities or areas of Germany the 
79 Charles de Gaulle, The Army of the Future [trans-
lator unknown] (London: Hutchinson, 1940). 
armored corps should aim for. Moreover, Reynaud never 
seemed to consider the hundreds of miles of Germany that 
separated France from her ally, Czechoslovakia, or the 
possibility that such assistance might overextend the 
armored corps supply line_. 
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Another weakness in Reynaud's defense system was the 
unreliability of France's "friends" to the east. In part, 
this was due to the badly reconstructed Europe of the 
Versailles Treaty, an arrangement which created an impossible 
situation in central and eastern areas of the continent. The 
exclusion of Russia from the treaty negotiations, the 
granting of Russian Bessarabia to Rumania, the acquisition 
of Russian territory by the Poles (done after the treaty 
with the help of the French}, the creation of the miscast 
state of Czechoslovakia with its German minorities and its 
duchy of Teschen coveted by the Poles created long term 
enmities among these powers that made effective collabo-
ration between them and jointly with France out of the 
question. 
An additional weakness in Reynaud's defense views 
was the undue reliance upon England. As later events were 
to prove (the Spanish Civil War an example}, the British 
had become profoundly isolationist and did not intend inter-
vention on the continent unless their own safety was 
seriously threatened. 
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Still, much of Reynaud's message: rapid rearmament, 
readiness, unified command, and national union were geared 
to make France strong. If ·these ideas had been followed, 
France could have played a more influential, more independent 
role in Europe instead of leaning on England, retreating 
behind the false security of the Maginot Line, and mumbling 
commitments to allies that had no credibility. As for the 
armored corps, in spite of its hypothetical character and 
its technical shortcomings, its proposed strategy of mobility, 
surprise, and armored warfare was a step away from the 
defensive mentality of the past and a move toward the war 
tactics of the future. 
CHAPTER III 
REYNAUD AND THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES 
The Background 
The French Chamber of Deputies and the Senate were 
the legislative branch of the Third Republic. In this 
capacity, they dominated the executive or premier who had 
to get parliamentary approval on all important bills in 
order to keep his cabinet and himself in office. Unlike the 
president of the United States, the French premier's 
existence depended on the legislature's sanction of the next 
bill perhaps a day or a few weeks away. Attempts by the 
premier to establish an effective system of checks and 
balances failed which was the case with the 1934 proposal 
of right wing president, Gaston Doumergue. 
His plan involved the president of the Republic, a 
figure elected every seven years by joint session of the 
senate and chamber (National Assembly). It was this 
president who was responsible for appointing premier which-
ever politician believed himself capable of establishing a 
parliamentary majority. According to Doumergue, in case of 
continued impasse between executive and legislature, the 
president would be allowed to dismiss the chamber and to 
request new elections as was the procedure in Britain. The 
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plan resulted in Doumergue's resignation following the 
defection of the Radicals from his cabinet. The chronic 
ministerial instability (see Table 3, p. 90) that came out 
of this imbalance between executive and legislature forced 
the government to rely increasingly on decree law powers. 
Since these powers allowed the premier and his cabinet to 
pass bills without legislative approval, they were a tacit 
affidavit to parliamentary paralysis. This weakness was 
compounded during the 1930s by three important factors. 
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The first of these, the Great Depression, had a 
profound effect on France. Along with the general symptoms 
suffered by most western nations such as loss of trade, 
loss of investment, and high unemployment levels, the French 
economic crisis was aggravated by the failure to understand 
that the franc was overvalued on international money markets 
and thus could not compete for what little import-export 
trade existed. Economic mismanagement by attempting to shut 
out foreign competitors with high tariffs and by deflation 
of government expenditures in the form of budget cuts 
resulted in additional loss of revenue that aggravated state 
indebtedness and discouraged private enterprise from making 
new investment. Ministry after ministry came and went 
because of the dissatisfaction of the legislative branch 
' with the worsening situation. If one peruses the pages of 
the Journal Officiel for these years, the reader can easily 
see the diminished importance of national defense in turning 
Year 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
TABLE 3 
CHIEFS OF THE GENERAL STAFF, PREMIERS, MINISTERS 
OF WAR AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 1933-39 
Chief of General 
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Staff Premier War Foreign Affairs 
Weygand P.-Boncour Daladier P.-Boncour 
1931-1935 12/18/32 - 12/18/32 - 12/18/32 -
1/30/33 1/28/34 1/28/34 
Daladier 
1/31/33 -
10/25/33 
Sarraut 
10/26/33 -
11/25/33 
Chautern2s 
11/26/33 - Fabry 
1/28/34 then 
Daladier P.-Boncour Daladier 
1/29/34 - 1/29/34 - 1/29/34 -
2/8/34 2/8/34 2/8/34 
Doumer~ue Petain Barthou 
2/9/34 - 2/9/34 - 2/9/34 -
11/7/34 11/7/34 10/9/34 
Flandin Maurin Laval 
11/8/34 - 11/8/34 - 10/10/34 -
Gamelin 5/31/35 5/31/35 1/23/36 
1935- 1940 Bouisson Peta in 
6/1/35 - 6/1/35 -
6/6/35 6/6/35 
Laval Fabry 
6/7/35 - 6/7/35 -
1/23/36 1/23/36 
Sarraut Maurin Flandin 
1/24/36 - 1/24/36 - 1/24/36 -
6/2/36 6/2/36 6/2/36 
Blum Daladier Delbos 
6/3/36 - 6/3/36 - 6/3/36 -
6/21/37 5/17/40 3/12/38 
Chau temps 
6/22/37 -
3/12/38 
Blum P.-Boncour 
3/13/38 - 3/13/38 -
4/9/38 4/9/38 
Daladier G. Bonnet 
4/10/38 - 4/10/38 -
3/20/40 3/20/40 
page after page devoted to tariff walls, deflationary 
measures, unemployment relief, monetary panic, and 
government subsidization of faltering industries. 
A second factor was the revelation of the Stavisky 
scandal. 1 Throughout 1933, the French had watched in 
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frustration as a series of cabinets failed to cope with the 
nation's financial predicaments. While the people were 
becoming poorer, the exposure of the Stavisky episode in 
early January 1934 showed that certain politicians and their 
associates in public office were becoming richer. Serge 
Stavisky, a Jewish financier, was the brain behind a major 
fraud concerning the issue of millions of dollars of francs 
based on the fictitious assets of a municipal pawn shop in 
the small town of Bayonne. Before Stavisky could be 
questioned, he was found in January 1934--shot to death at 
the ski resort of Chamonix. 
The fact that the public prefect of Paris, Georges 
Pressard, had put off prosecuting infractions of Stavisky 
nineteen times was serious enough but what was worse, his 
1
on the scandal, see James Joll, ed., The Decline of 
the Third Republic (London: St. Antony's Papers, 1959), 
pp. 9-35; Alexander Werth, France in Ferment {New York: 
Harper and Brothers, 1934); Laurent Bonnevaye, Les Journees 
sanglantes de fevrier 1934. Pages d'histoire (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1935); and France, Assemblee nationale, 1871-
1940, Session de 1934, Rapport seneral fait au nom de la 
commission d'enquete chargee de rechercher les causes et les 
origines des evenements du 6 fevrier 1934 et les JOUrs 
suivants ains1 que toutes les responsabilites encourues, 
2 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie de la Chambre des deputes, 1934). 
92 
brother-in-law was French Premier Camille Chautemps. About 
the same time, it was discovered that two men in Chautemps' 
cabinet, Albert Dalimier, minister of colonies, and Eugene 
Raynaldy, minister of justice were implicated in the fraud-
ulent bond issue and thus forced to resign. In spite of 
sporadic street disturbances during January against the 
"crooks" in the Palais-Bourbon (Chamber of Deputies) , 
Chautemps refused to appoint an investigating committee. 
This only served to increase public indignation and rather 
than risk further hostility, Chautemps resigned on 
January 28, 1934 in spite of the fact he had a parliamentary 
majority in both houses. 
Daladier's arrival did not help. Almost immediately 
he was forced to remove the Paris Police Chief Jean Chiappe 
who had failed to take an active position against Stavisky 
on whom he had a stacked dossier. The firing of Chiappe, 
well liked on the right, became another reason for the 
leagues to demand the resignation of the Daladier regime. 
On the night of February 6, 1934, rightist demonstrators 
estimated at close to 10,000 mobbed the Place de la 
Concorde and attempted to storm the Seine bridge leading to 
the Palais-Bourbon. Cries of "Down with the Crooks" were 
mingled with gun shot as the Garde Publique killed several 
' demonstrators. 
The composition of the mob, mainly rightist leagues 
such as the Camelots du Roi, Jeunesses Patriotes, Croix de 
Feu, and Solidarite Francaise along with veterans organi-
" 
zations such as the Union National des Cornbattants, led 
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leftists to believe that a fascist coup was imminent. Three 
days later on February 9, 1934, the Communists staged a 
massive demonstration against the "fascists" and on 
February 12, 1934, a twenty-four hour strike by the 
Socialist dominated trade unions was held. Daladier was 
forced out on February 8, 1934 and the conservative Gaston 
oournergue replaced him in a ministry of national union which 
boasted Marshal Petain as war minister. 
Aside from a severely damaged faith in the parlia-
mentary process, the repercussions of the Stavisky affair 
helped to polarize the left against the right in an atmos-
phere of extremism that colored foreign affairs and 
inevitably weakened the development of a strong foreign 
policy. Thus the Popular Front coalition interpreted the 
concessions to Mussolini in North Africa as representative 
of appeasement by right wing fascists while the rightists 
looked upon a strengthened Franco-Societ pact as a means 
used by leftists (especially the Communists} to infiltrate 
France with Bolshevism. The Popular Front, in fact, with 
its coalition of Communists, Socialists, and Radicals was 
as much a front against fascism as it was an instrument for 
social reform. 
A third factor that contributed to parliamentary 
weakness was the multiplicity of parties, a situation which 
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encouraged individualism over conformism and which sometimes 
forced premiers to rely on shaky coalitions. A look at 
Figures 2 and 3 (pp. 95-96) , reflecting the distribution of 
political groups in the Palais-Bourbon's semicircular amphi-
theater, showed the number of parties to have been in 
excess of thirteen for the fifteenth legislature and in 
excess of ten for the sixteenth. 
On the far left sat the Conununists. Supposedly 
devoted to the goal of the Communist International 
(Kominterm) , their party was obliged in a doctrinal sense 
to work for the overthrow of bourgeois governments in the 
movement toward the spread of world communism. In reality, 
it was not a revolutionary force but a participant in the 
government of the Third French Republic. Under the 
leadership of Jacques Duclos and Maurice Thorez, it repre-
sented the workers and small wage earners. 
To their right lay the Socialists under the 
leadership of Leon Blum, a jurist, scholar, and wealthy 
Parisian. His party also represented the workers and their 
needs but stressed the move toward social progress by 
working within the framework of legitimate national 
government. Understood was a strong desire for peace. 
Consequently, matters of national defense were neglected or 
' poorly understood. 
Their neighbor was the Radical party led by Edouard 
Daladier. The son of a baker, Daladier, a former teacher of 
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Total Deputies: 614 
160 
Radicals 
Socialists 
(S.) 
(R.) 
Center 
(moderate) 
S.P. 50 
95 
11 S.F.I.C. 
Fig. 2. Numerical distribution, location, and selected 
deputies of political groupings in the Chamber of Deputies, 1932-36 
{Fifteenth Legislature) • 
c. - communist: Doriot, THOREZ 
U.O. - Unite Ouvriere: Garchery 
S. - Socialists: Auriol, BLUM, DEAT, Dormoy, Fevrier, LAGRANGE, 
Ramadier, Renaudel, SALENGRO, Perrin 
P.S.F. 
& R.S.- Parti Socialiste Francais et du Parti Republicain Socialiste: 
R. 
G.I. 
I.G. 
G.R. 
R.G. 
C.R. 
D.P. 
F.R. 
S.P. 
Forcinal, Monzie, Painleve 
- Radicals: Archimbaud, BERNIER, Bonnet, Campinchi, CHAUTEMPS, 
Chichery, Cot, DALADIER, Delbos, HERRIOT, Marchandeau, 
Mendes-France, Mistler, SENAC, zay 
- Gauche Independante: La Chambre, Torres, Renaitour 
- Independants de Gauche: PATENOTRE, HONTIGNY 
- Gauche Radicale:. Carbuccia, Chappedelaine, Cheron 
- Republicains de Gauche: Coty, FU:J·JDIN, Pietri 
- centre Republicain: FABRY, LANIEL, REYNAUD, TARDIEU 
- Democrate Populaire: Champetier de Ribes 
- Republican Federation: Bonnefous, MARIN, Taittinger 
- Splinter Parties: LE COUR GRANDMAISON, MANDEL, Vallat 
SOURCES: Grand Larousse Encyclopedique (Paris: Librairie 
Larousse, 1960-64), 3:819-21; JOC, June 21, 1932, pp. 2298-2300. 
NOTES: The JOC lists 608 deputies in 1932 and 603 in 1935. 
oeat, Ramadier, and Renaudel defected from the Socialists in 1933 to 
form the Parti Socialiste de France. The Unite Ouvriere party was 
loyal to Trotsky while the S.F.I.C. or Section Francaise de 
l'Internationale Communiste obeyed Stalin. 
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Total deputies: 
111 
Radicals (R.) 
149 
Socialist (S.) 
72 
Center 
(moderate) 
69 
S.P. 
Fig. 3. Numerical distribution, location, and selected 
deputies of political groupings in the Chamber of Deputies, 1936-40 
(Sixteenth Legislature) • 
c. - communist: Dewez, DUCLOS, Peri, 'i'HOREZ, Ramette 
S. - Socialists: BLUM, Dormoy, Garchery, Grumbach, IAGHANGE, 
Planche, Rous, SALENGRO, Spinasse, Thiolas, Auriol 
u.s .R. - Union Socialiste et Republicaine: Forcinal, Monz.ie, 
PATENOTRE, Pomaret, Ramadier, Vienot 
S.P.L. - Splinter Parties of the Left: Renaitour, SERRE, Doriot, 
R. - Radicals: Archimbaud, BERNIER, Bonnet, Bossutrot, 
G.D. & 
R.I. 
Campinchi, CHICHERY, Cot, DALADIER, Delbos, HER..TUOT. 
La Chambre, LE BAIL, Marchandeau, Mendes-France, RIOU 
- Gauche Democratique et F~dicaux Independants: 
de Chappedelaine 
MONTIGNY 
96 
R.G. & 
R.I. - Republicains de Gauche et Radicaux Independants: Beauguitte, 
Blanc, Bonnevay, Dignac, FLANDIN, Jacquinot, Lanie!, REYNAUD, 
Rocca-Serra 
D.P. 
F.R. 
S.P. 
- Democrate Populaire: Pezet, Desgranges, Schuman 
- Republican Federation: Dupont, Henriot, des Isnards, MARIN, 
Taittinger, Valentin, Vallat, Dommange, LE COUR GRAND~..AISON 
- Splinter Parties of the Right: Chiappe, Fernand-Laurent, 
KERILLIS, MANDEL, Scapini, Ybarnegaray, Grandmaison, Beaudoin 
SOURCES: Grand Larousse Encyclopedique (Paris: Librairie 
Larousse, 1960-64), 3:821; JOC, June 12, 1936, pp. 1443-1445. I have 
interchanged the U.S.R. and"""S:i>.L. parties since the former is an 
offshoot of the Socialist party. 
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history and geography, replaced Edouard Herriot as leader 
of a party originally founded in the late nineteenth century 
on an anticlerical note. With this issue long dead, the 
party survived on the sheer inertia of a bourgeois elec-
torate content to live in a closed circuit world and intent 
on maintaining the economic status quo. Its electorate of 
school teachers, civil servants, and small town merchants 
understood little of defense matters other than the name of 
Petain and the security for which the Maginot Line suppos-
edly stood. In the chamber, it was a pivot. If it voted 
right, it shared control with the moderates and conserv-
atives. If it voted left, it shared control with the 
S . l" 2 ocia ists. 
To their right lay the center or what Yves Simon has 
described as the "spectacle of absolute confusion. 113 
Reflecting a post World War I tendency away from left and 
right, this conglomeration of political groupings repre-
sented more the individual concerns of electors and elec-
torate rather than those of any particular political 
2Reynaud in a conversation at the house of French 
man of letters, Andre Maurois, described the Radical party 
as a man who wants both wife and mistress. The mistress was 
the Socialist party and the wife, the moderates of the 
center. The mistress provided love but the wife owned the 
house and bank balance. According to Reynaud, these senti-
mental oscillations were the key to French politics. See 
' Andre Maurois, Choses nues (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), p. 132. 
3Yves Simon, La Grande crise de la republique 
fran~aise, observations sur la vi2 politique des francais de 
1918-a 1938 (Montreal: Editions de 1 1 arbre, 1941), p.'102. 
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individualism par excellence. Here reigned the cult of the 
personality: Pierre-Etienne Flandin, Andre Tardieu, Paul 
Reynaud, and Jean Fabry. Unified only during electoral 
periods under campaign agencies such as the Democratic 
Alliance, the centrist deputies voted more their conscience 
than they did party loyalties. Generally speaking, on 
economic and social issues, the groups of the center tended 
to support their more conservative neighbors to the right. 
Here was Louis Marin's Republican Federation party, 
a group of deputies who believed in maintaining established 
economic interests which included the avoidance of state 
interference in business. Their electorate were farmers, 
conservative bourgeoisie and heads of small businesses. 
With the splinter parties to their right, they considered 
themselves republicans although among their ranks were those 
whose faces were turned toward the ancien regime. Hore sat 
the most vocal of the anti-Semites (Xavier Vallat), the 
disabled World War I veterans turned super nationalists 
(Georges Scapini), the parliamentary representatives of 
extraparliamentary leagues such as Pierre Taittinger for 
Jeunesses Patriotes and Jean Ybarnegaray for Colonel de la 
Rocque's Croix de feu as well as Philippe Henriot, the 
spokesman for Action franlaise, a pseudointellectual and 
xenophobic following of Charles Maurras devoted to the 
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restoration of authoritarian rule either by monarchy or in 
some other fashion. 4 
Aside from the shaky status of governments relying 
on a coalition, the multiplicity of parties had another 
debilitating effect: a deputy or group, once they had 
crossed the threshold from their electoral victories, 
entered a chamber influenced less by the campaign platform 
that elected them but by power swings from left to right. 
Thus the Socialists entered the 1936 legislature excited 
over carrying out socioeconomic reforms. One of these, a 
bill restricting the work week to forty hours, was their 
key measure. Caught in a web of financial difficulties, 
however, the Blum ministry {ruling in coalition with the 
Radicals) collapsed and power passed from Chautemps to 
Daladier who in a coalition government of Radicals and 
moderates included Reynaud as finance minister. One of 
Reynaud's first moves was to have the forty hour law 
repealed. 
4Action fransaise was extraparliamentary since it 
had no organized political party. Its center of action was 
its newspaper, L'Action frangaise and its street league, 
Camelot du Roi. An unflattering but accurate portrait of 
the right can be found in Charles Micaud's The French Right 
and Nazi Germany, 1933-39 {Durham, North Carolina: Duke 
University Press, 1943), pp. 14, 222, 225-26. Micaud cites 
the blindness of the right in their anti-Soviet attitudes, 
their overreliance on England, their subordination of 
national interests to class interests, as well as their fear 
of social revolution following such upheaval as the S9anish 
Civil War. According to Micaud the moderates stressed 
economic interests while the extreme right such as L'Action 
fransaise, ideology. 
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Thus the Radicals who up to this point had 
supported the social reforms of the Popular Front were 
forced to look to the right for help with the economy. In 
doing so, they had to swallow other unpopular measures such 
as Reynaud's 2 per cent sales tax and the lay off of 
government workers. On the other hand, Reynaud had to play 
down his comprehensive program for defense reform much of 
which was unpalatable to Daladier. Later, his votes in 
support of Daladier's military policy, the Munich accords, 
and neutrality on the Spanish Civil War bore little 
resemblance to his 1936 campaign platform: armored corps, 
Franco-Soviet Pact, and a show of strength toward the 
dictators. 
The ills of the fifteenth and sixteenth legislatures, 
however, were not restricted to the imbalance between 
executive and legislative, the internal weaknesses of the 
chamber, the divisions wrought by rival ideologies, financial 
difficulties, and scandal. They also surfaced in foreign 
affairs and military strategy. Foreign p~licy was directed 
by nine different ministers (see Table 3, page 89) whose 
efforts to protect France's interests, needless to say, 
lacked the same intensity and continuity of purpose that 
marked the efforts of Hitler and Mussolini. 
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Nineteen thirty-three as Jean-Baptiste Duroselle has 
put it was the "year of hesitations." 5 Daladier desired a 
rapprochement with Hitler but was not encouraged in such by 
his foreign affairs minister, Joseph Paul-Boncour. Feelers 
were put out toward the Soviet Union with whom a commercial 
accord was signed in January 1934. Next came right wing 
Louis Barthou who with the note of April 17, 1934 disengaged 
France from the faltering disarmament conference and launched 
the nation on the search for allies. Barthou was well on 
the way to developing a military alliance with the Soviet 
Union when he was murdered in Marseilles on October 9, 1934. 
After the assassination of Barthou, French foreign 
policy consisted of giving ground on all fronts. The 
Hoare-Laval Pact of December 1935 allowed Mussolini a free 
hand in Ethiopia; France allowed Germany to reoccupy the 
Rhineland without lifting a finger; Blum declared noninter-
vention in Spain while Hitler and Mussolini sent soldiers 
and arms to General Francisco Franco; Austria was annexed 
in March 1938; and the Munich Accord allowed the Germans to 
annex the Sudetenland thus leaving the remainder of 
Czechoslovakia ripe for occupation. 
Somehow, it never seemed to dawn on any of these 
foreign ministers or their premiers to question whether a 
'- military strategy of Maginot Line and couverture were 
5Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, La Politique exterieure de 
la France de 1914 a 1945 (Paris: Centre de documentation 
universitaire, n.d.), p. 228. 
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compatible with assisting Belgium, the Petite Entente, and 
Poland. Did not such a strategy anticipate the development 
of a continuous front followed by static warfare? Was not 
a highly mobile and maneuverable column equipped with 
armored tanks and artillery more valuable in coming to the 
aid of potential allies? 
The Other Deputies 
The general atmosphere of the chamber, however, was 
not conducive to the proper examination of these questions. 
One reason for this was the predominance of electoral 
interests based on tradition and economics. As late as 
1933, Albert le Bail, a Radical, as well as Oswen de 
Kerouartz and Albert Thibault, two independents of the right, 
protested the proposed reduction in the number of army 
horses. Prompted by the depressed horse racing markets in 
their districts, they argued that in wartime, blown out 
bridges would prevent motorized vehicles from fording rivers 
across which horses could swim. 6 
Another factor was the spirit of pacifism mixed with 
an ignorance of the true aims of Hitler. As late as 
December 1933, Blum, still convinced that the Geneva 
6Joc, February 12, 1933, pp. 714-15, 717. 
disarmament conference could bring the German dictator 
around, refused to vote the annual military budget. 7 
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A third factor was the blindness to military real-
aties resulting from preconceived but mistaken ideas. In 
late 1934, Blum vehemently denounced the professional army 
as laid down by de Gaulle in his Vers l'armee de metier. 
In a nostalgic look to the past, the Socialists, according 
to Blum, counted on the revolutionary rise of the masses to 
keep the enemy at bay. 8 In the same unrealistic vein but 
even more so because of the fallacious nature of the charge, 
Communist chief, Maurice Thorez, claimed that the high 
command was going to use the professional army as part of a 
capitalistic plot to destroy the workers. 9 
Another reason why the chamber was at a disadvantage 
in discussing national defense was the failure of the 
civilian politicians to establish a satisfactory rapport 
with the military--this failure making it more difficult to 
understand the issues at hand. One of the best examples of 
this gap in civil-military relations was the debate that 
took place on December 19, 1933. The speaker for the bill 
was Joseph Bernier, a Radical. The measure he sponsored 
proposed to cut military expenditures by delaying the call 
7 JOC, December 19, 1933, p. 4706. 
8 JOC, December 18, 1934, op. 3315-16. 
~- -
9 JOC, March 15, 1935, pp. 1025, 1036-38. 
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up of two months worth of draftees in every twelve month 
period. These men would not be inducted until the 1935-39 
period of the annees creuses. 
The measure, presented in a vague fashion, was 
challenged by rightist Louis Marin who attempted to have it 
returned to the army commission for further clarification. 10 
General Maxime Weygand, chief of the general staff, noted in 
his Memoires that the bill weakened an army already suffering 
the effects of a previous reduction. Weygand also noted that 
even though the CSG had been opposed to the issue, Daladier 
gave it his support in the chamber where it was passed by a 
large majority without benefit of adequate explanation or 
d . . 11 iscussion. 
The secondary role of the military was further in 
evidence when during the course of the same debate, Jean 
Fabry, a colonel-turned-politician and head of the army 
commission, attempted to assure the chamber that the bill 
did not weaken France's defense network even though he 
admitted not knowing what type of reception Minister of War 
Daladier had received from the CSG. 12 Moreover, proof that 
the high command was for some considered more of an opponent 
than anything else surfaced when Bernier warned the chamber 
lOJOC, Decerr~er 19, 1933, pp. 4688-89. 
11General Maxime Weygand, Memoires, vol. 2: Mirage~ 
et realite (Paris: Flammarion, 1950-57) I pp. 404-5. 
12!I.Qf.,- December 19, 1933, p. 4690. 
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that they had better adopt the resolution rather than let 
the CSG push through a measure lengthening the tour of duty 
13 from one to two years during the annees creuses. 
Worse yet the debates were from time to time marked 
bY pettiness and personal rivalry that diverted attention 
from the business at hand and reduced the chamber pro-
ceedings to something akin to a farce. Thus during the 
Bernier resolution debate, Daladier, vindictive, short-
tempered and belligerant, got into a vocal sparring match 
with Tardieu. Having nothing to do with military affairs, 
the feud temporarily centered on the revolutionary banquets 
of 1848 before being concluded by having a number of leftist 
deputies attack Tardieu for his role in a French West 
African trading company scanda1. 14 
The account of the important March 1935 debate, the 
session during which Reynaud announced his support of the 
armored corps, was unimpressive. General Joseph Maurin, 
minister of war, advocated the passage of the Two Year Law 
(then under discussion) while at the same time he affirmed 
his belief in the impregnability of the Maginot Line. Fabry, 
13rbid., p. 4694. 
14Ibid., p. 4699. The affair involved N'-Goko Sangha, 
a colonial trading company in whose crooked dealings Tardieu 
was implicated. At the time, this centrist was editor of 
Le Temps. For details, see Rudolph Binion, Defeated Leaders 
(The Political Fate of Caillaux, Jouvenal, and Tardieu) 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1960). 
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president of the army conunission, could only testify to 
the need for making the Two Year proposal a mandatory law 
rather than an optional affair for future governments to 
draw upon if they so wished to. Jean Senac, a Radical and 
speaker for the bill stated that "We can look at the future 
with confidence based on the situation of the French army." 
The debate was rounded out by rightist Louis Marin and 
leftist Edouard Herriot whose unimpressive, subjective, and 
poorly documented deliveries supported the measure. 15 The 
overall meeting thus suggested that few deputies, if any, 
were conscious of France's serious military weakness vis a 
vis German rearmament. 
While somewhat more aware of the threat during the 
January-February debates of 1937, the deputies could not 
form a united front. Instead, they broke off into a series 
of disconnected criticisms involving the need for unified 
command, construction of more and better planes, air craft 
carriers, roads, and increased military expenditures. 
Little connection was made between foreign policy and 
military strength and on matters of strategy, the influence 
of Daladier predominated. Guy La Chambre, a Radical and 
friend of Daladier's, attacked Reynaud's fer de lance theory 
by saying that if the lance were broken, how could either 
part survive? La Chambre also pointed out that fire power 
lSJOC, March 15, 1935, pp. 1031, 1045, 1048, 1050-51. 
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from antitank artillery would prove deadly to the armored 
. . . 16 divisions. 
Louis Jacquinot, a member of Reynaud's 
Republicains de Gauche et Radicaux Independants, wondered 
how the specialists of the armored corps would be replaced 
if their ranks were decimated during wartime. The sum total 
of all this was general relief when Daladier concluded the 
four day debate by reassuring the chamber that France would 
17 hold the Maginot Line and that the army was strong. 
oaladier had spoken and the deputies were thus relieved of 
their responsibilities. Still even as Daladier was 
receiving general applause from all points in the chamber, 
Le Figaro was writing how distressingly poor the quality of 
the debate had been. 18 
The February 1938 debates were not much better. 
Concentrating on foreign policy, the deputies discussed the 
fast approachin~ Anschluss, North Africa, the Spanish Civil 
War, the Franco-Soviet Pact, and the general situation in 
Central Europe. Aside from the failure to connect military 
doctrine to foreign policy, there was no agreement over what 
to do about the various crises discussed. As in the 1935 
debate, a false sense of optimism prevailed, but this time 
16JOC, February 2, 1937, p. 297. 
17JOC, January 26, 1937, p. 159. 
18Le Figaro, February 10, 1937, p. 8. 
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it was in reference to the departure of Foreign Secretary 
.Anthony Eden from the Chamberlain government. 
Eden, who had resigned because of Chamberlain's 
desire to recognize Italy's claims to Ethiopia, stated that 
such an action betrayed the principles of collective-
security as set down by the League of Nations. Only the 
communist, Gabriel Peri, predicted that Eden's replacement, 
Neville Chamberlain, himself, would finish by appeasing 
the dictators. 19 
The ignorance the majority of deputies showed to 
chamberlain's true nature was heightened by repeated dedi-
cations to the Maginot Line mystique. Such was the 
February 26, 1938 speech of Flandin. Wordy, longwinded, 
subjective and lacking in force for want of a specific 
program, Flandin tranquilized the chamber by reminding it 
that 80 per cent of both German and French youth desired 
peace. In the event that peace was not forthcoming, the 
French still had their magnificent frontier fortresses. 20 
On the same day, the Chautemps ministry stated its 
international position when Minister of Foreign Affairs 
Yvon Delbos spoke unconvincingly of unity with Britain, of 
the need for Franco-Soviet cooperation, nonintervention in 
Spain, and some kind of economic plan to hold the Danubian 
19 JOC, February 25, 1938, pp. 607-8. 
20 JOC, February 26, 1938, p. 640. 
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region (Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Yugoslavia) 
On the Sl.'de of France. 21 s· 'l t Fl ~· I th h 1rn1 ar o anuin s, e speec 
lacked force. Feebleness characterized its proposals which 
Le Figaro described as weak, negative, routine, and worn 
22 
out--an accurate description of the debate in general. 
Indeed, one of the more lively moments of the 
session had nothing to do with solving national defense 
problems. Instead, it concerned the Alsacian Jew and 
Socialist, Salomon Grumbach. Grumbach found himself 
repeatedly assaulted from the right with such statements as 
the Socialists were responsible for French lack of military 
preparedness, that Grumbach had been pro-German during 
World War I, and that France was tired of being governed 
23 by Jews. In such a charged atmosphere, constructive 
interchange was difficult. 
In spite of all, a small but vocal group echoed the 
ideas of Reynaud. In December 1933, Jean de Nadaillac, a 
member of Reynaud's Center Republican group, protested the 
Maginot Line mentality with its accompanying false sense of 
security. A year later, Republicain de Gauche Andre 
Beauguitte demanded that the frontier fortresses be supple-
mented by armored divisions capable of repelling a lightning 
21Ibid., p. 630. 
22Le Figaro, February 27, 1938, p. 1. 
23 JOC, February 25, 1938, pp. 589-592. Even though 
the Blum rnIIlistry fell in June of 1937, the Jewish politician 
continued as vice-president of the cabinet under Chautemps. 
attack; and in March 1935, Jean Le Cour Grandmaison, an 
independent on the right, repeated Beauguitte's idea by 
asking for the creation of a maneuvering corps, the rank 
and file of which would be selected from France's 500,000 
24 
unemployed. 
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Further support in the March 1935 debate came from 
Henri Franklin-Bouillon, a member of the Gauche Radicale. 
Franklin-Bouillon charged that the government and the 
deputies were ducking behind the shelter of the Two Year 
Law in order to prevent the country from seeing the serious 
weakness of France's military system. He felt it was wrong 
for the government to tell the people Germany would even-
tually become peaceful, and also for the Socialists to 
think that troop levels were the only issue at stake when 
alliances, aviation, and armaments were just as important. 
Until the government could reform the military, the alliance 
system, and national life, France remained in terrible 
danger. While Franklin-Bouillon did not touch directly on 
the armored corps, he indicated that the country needed an 
army of its foreign policy, the basic tenet of Reynaud's 
defense creed. 25 
In 1936, both Paul Perrin, an independent Socialist, 
and Henri de Kerillis, an independent on the right, pleaded 
24 JOC, December 19, 1933, p. 4703; December 18, 1934, 
p. 3325; March 15, 1935, pp. 1033-35. 
25JOC, March 15, 1935, p. 1051. 
for the development of the armored corps so France could 
26 fulfill her international obligations in case of war. 
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In 1937, Jean Quenette, an independent on the right, 
warned that France needed Reynaud's armored corps or mobile 
force as soon as possible because history and logic worked 
against the Maginot Line theory. In the same debates, 
Philippe Serre, an independent on the left, and Xavier 
Vallat, a member of the Republican Federation, also argued 
f h . 27 or t e proJect. 
In 1938, it was the speech of Jean Montigny, a 
member of the Gauche Oernocratique et Radicaux Independants, 
that rose above the mediocrity of the debates by noting that 
foreign policy had to be joined to an effective military 
strategy. In this respect, the Spanish Civil War showed 
that a fortified front could not hold against tanks; and 
since these highly sophisticated weapons would play the 
decisive role, France needed a specialized army capable of 
taking the offensive as Paul Reynaud had described. France 
needed, according to Montigny, divisions adept at rupturing 
enemy lines. Such a mobile army could prevent another 
26JOC, January 21, 1936, pp. 108-9; June 23, 1936, 
p. 1543. 
27JOC, January 26, 1937, pp. 206-7; January 29, 1937, 
pp. 256-5~ 
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Rhineland disaster. Did France have this army? No. Thus 
di'd t h th f h l' 28 France no ave e army o er po icy. 
In weighing the effects of Reynaud on the chamber, 
it is clear that not only did others share his views, but 
they also used his ideas as a frame of reference. Moreover, 
most of these deputies came from splinter parties or were 
deserters from the more disciplined, influential groups 
where free opinions on national defense were not entertained. 
The extreme left, the left, and the conservative right of 
Louis Marin for the most part presented little innovative 
thinking on military reform. 
Reaction to Reynaud's Speeches 
In spite of this, Reynaud could, from time to time, 
elicit from these groups a noticeable reaction in terms of 
applause as indicated in Table 4, page 113. Applause, 
which when recorded by parliamentary stenographers served as 
a barometer of a deputy's oratorical effectiveness, 29 was on 
more than one occasion repeatedly received by Reynaud from 
all corners of the chamber. This is evident from looking at 
28 JOC, February 26, 1938, pp. 633-34. Reynaud does 
not mention Montigny on connection with the armored corps. 
In La France a sauv~ l'Europe, 1:403, Reynaud called the 
Deputy a partisan of the "resignation of France [in 1940]." 
29 \ For an example of how this applause as well as 
other commentary were recorded in the Journal Officiel, see 
in Appendix B, a sample page of Reynaud's December 1935 
speech. 
TABLE 4 
APPLAUSE FACTOR 
Reaction of Chamber of Deputies to 
Reynaud's Speeches 1933-39 
Nwnber of Separate occasions Applause 
Received 
Date of Speech and Chamber 
Description E E-L E-L-C L-C L-C-R L c C-R R GA 
2/24/33--National defense 
credits** 1 
3/15/35--Armored corps 1 lb 5 
12/27/35--Anti-Laval, 
sanctions against Italy, 
pro-English 15 4 3 15 
7/31/36--Franco-Russian 
Pact, armored corps, 
plea for unity 3 1 1 3 
12/4/36--Franco-Russian Pact, 
viable foreign policy 1 2 3 l 4 3 
12/5/36--Government iner-
tia faced with Italo-
German rapprochement** 1 
1/26/37--Armored corps, 
lack of arms , unified 
command 2 1 6 
2/26/38--National union, 
arms weakness, weakness 
in military strategy 1 3 1 11 
3/17/38--National union** l 2 3 
5/12/39--National union** 3 
SOURCES: JOC, 1933: p. 921; 1935: pp. 1040-43; 1936: 
pp. 2306-7, 3323-25, 3352; 1937: pp. 168-73; 1938: pp. 646-9, 842-3; 
1939: p. 1319. 
*E-extreme left, L-left, C-center, R-right, GA-general 
applause. **Brief speech. 
113 
* 
' 
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the general applause column on the far right, an indice 
that testified to the nonpartisan appeal of certain aspects 
of Reynaud's speeches. 
While the left and the extreme left were not 
enthusiastic when Reynaud presented his plan for the 
armored corps on March 15, 1935 and on January 26, 1937, 
they gave him remarkable response on his December 27, 1935 
speech advocating sanctions against Italy and a joint hard 
line policy toward the dictators by Britain and France. 
They also gave him support on the Franco-Soviet Pact and on 
pleas for national union during 1938. 
The situation of the center-right was somewhat 
different. Starting out by giving Reynaud a magnificent 
applause factor (number of separate occasions applause 
received) of ten on his March 15, 1935 speech, the center-
right dwindled in its support of Reynaud following the 
devastating December 27, 1935 speech. From that point on, 
the center-right was no longer a focal point since it was 
submerged in the general applause. 
This was most noticeable on February 28, 1938. It 
was this speech of Reynaud's--pleading for national unity 
and defense needs--that Paris ·Soir called magnificent in its 
ability to draw applause from three-quarters of the chamber, 
the exception being the Communists and the extreme right. 30 
30Paris Soir, February 28, 1938, p. 1. 
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Press conunent on the centrist's other speeches noted 
Reynaud's power over the deputies. "A thunderous applause," 
wrote L'Echo de Paris of the December 27, 1935 speech, 
"rolled from the left. The Radicals [and] the Socialists 
literally drink the words of Mr. Paul Reynaud. • On the 
right, they look on with surprise and sadness. 1131 Eight 
months later, the same paper remarked that Reynaud's 
speeches were important, his ideas lucid, and his talent 
demanded the silence as well as the respect of the entire 
chamber. 32 As if in affirmation of this, Vendemiaire, a 
weekly of the same center-right orientation, went so far as 
to suggest that Reynaud, in his capacity to transcend party 
barriers (as evidenced from the general applause column) , 
had the necessary stuff to hew out for himself, a prime 
.. t h' 33 minis ers ip. 
The capacity to transcend, the powerful control over 
the chamber were, however, only momentary phenomena. At 
voting time, party and personal interests neutralized 
Reynaud's oratorical effect. His fatal flaw was to indulge 
in the luxury of political isolation, a chronic disease 
common to centrist deputies in the last years of the Third 
Republic and an ailment that interfered in dealing with the 
realities of chamber politics. Reynaud simply did not have 
31L 1 Echo de Paris, December 28, 1935, p. 3. 
32L 1 Echo de Paris, August 1, 1936, p. 1. 
33v de · · en miaire, January 3, 1936, p. 7. 
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the political force behind him that could have formulated 
~ 
t and pushed through measures geared to his speeches and that 
could have got the needed parliamentary majority. An 
explanation of this contradiction between applause factor . 
and voting urn was given by Revue bleue: 
In an assembly where discourteous sectarianism 
is the daily rule, he [Reynaud] has succeeded in 
making himself listened to and it is a mystery to 
no one that his ideas are very often approved by 
those to whom political obedience will impose a 
hostile vote .•.• 34 
.Perhaps the best example of Reynaud's failure to 
connect parliamentary speech to political action was the 
national union fiasco of early 1938. France, beset with 
increasingly severe financial difficulties and mounting 
foreign peril, was in trouble. To cope with this, Blum 
attempted to broaden his government's political base. Thus 
\ 
on January 16, 1938, the Socialist leader in his capacity as 
vice premier of the faltering Chautemps ministry asked 
Reynaud to join a cabinet stretching from Jacques Duclos 
on the Communist left to Reynaud, himself, in the center. 
Reynaud responded by demanding that Louis Marin, head of the 
rightist Republican Federation, be includea. 35 Blum's party 
refused this request. The next attempt at union occurred 
on March 12, 1938 at which time the Socialists acquiesced 
with Reynaud's demand of January 16, 1938. On this occasion, 
34 Revue bleue, February 20, 1937. 
35 Reynaud, Memoires, 2:177-78. 
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however; Flandin along with the majority of moderates 
. 36 
rejected the plan. 
Finally, on March 23, 1938, Reynaud got a petition 
signed by seventy-seven moderates demanding national union 
in the form of a government of public safety; but this 
measure--essentially anti-flandiniste--evaporated without 
bringing the needed change. 37 
Sennep, the famous French caricaturist, best summed 
up the impossibility of the situation in a cartoon depicting 
as women, the four important party leaders: Marin, Herriot, 
Blum, and Duclos. Each political chief has his pendulous 
breasts bared. Reynaud, sketched as a leprechaun, had just 
finished suckling the long shriveled breasts of Blum who in 
turn, held up the Lilliputian centrist to the enormous left 
mammary gland of Herriot. While Reynaud is tugging on the 
stretched out Radical nipple, Marin and Duclos wait in 
. . . ' 38 
anticipation. 
Aside from its coarse humour, Sennep's cartoon 
brought out a single important message: any national union 
government that involved Reynaud in some political combi-
nation was ridiculous. The deputies would applaud him and 
36Joseph Lanie!, Jours de gloire de jours cruels 
1908-1958 (Paris: Presses de la cite, 1971), p. 97. 
37Le Populaire, March 24, 1938, p. 2. 
38Jean-Jacques Pennes [Sennep] and Gassier, H. P., 
Histoire de France 1918-38 (Paris: Editions Mana, 1938), 
not paginated. 
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his ideas but Reynaud's impact was more transitory than 
lasting. 
Key Politicians 
In the absence of strong political ties, another 
measuring stick of the reaction to Reynaud lay in his 
rapport with several key personalities: Daladier, Flandin, 
Jean Fabry, Andre Tardieu, and Henri de Kerillis. Of these, 
the relationship with Daladier was the most important since 
as head of the pivotal party, the Radicals, Daladier was 
frequently premier, war minister or both. Smaller than 
Reynaud, Daladier was introverted, distrustful, solitary, 
and at times, petty and belligerant. He was the perfect 
representative of the nothingness of the Radical party and 
39 French bourgeoisie in general. 
Reynaud, who had had little direct dealing with 
Daladier's world before 1938, came more and more into the 
picture when the Radical chief had to look to the center for 
help with the financial crisis after the fall of the second 
Blum ministry in April of 1938. At that time, Reynaud 
39
naladier's pugnacious nature comes through in his 
feud with Tardieu in the chamber debate of December 19, 
1933, pp. 4699-4700. It was General Maurice Gamelin who 
described Daladier as mistrustful. See his Servir, 2:91-92. 
Pertinax in his description is more brutal. Daladier for 
'· him was spineless, jealous, suspicious, secretive, mediocre, 
incompetent, weak, lacking in drive, not intellectually 
alert, and unable to get results from the parliamentary 
regime. See Gravediggers, pp. 90, 93, 102. 
obtained the justice portfolio in Dalaider's cabinet and 
the finances, the following Novernber. 40 
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Once at the finance ministry, Reynaud concentrated 
on France's economic recovery, but the rapport between the 
two men was strained. Fapry, a fellow centrist deputy, 
offered a clue as to the cause when he stated that: 
He [Daladier] is of that caliber of political 
men in a hurry to get to the top where he knows, 
however, that he will encounter some difficulties 
beyond the resolution of the average man--Paul 41 Reynaud--the same way only more so [italics mine]. 
Other evidence indicated that the relationship 
between the two men was an uneasy truce of mutual toleration. 
Pertinax, a right wing journalist and editor who wrote for 
L'Europe Nouvelle and L'Ordre, quoted Daladier as having 
stated: "Let him stay if he wants to but he must stop 
repeating that my one idea is to be rid of him and he must 
t t . t t . b 1142 s op rying o ge my JO • If Pertinax is to be 
believed, then L'Actiori fran5aise (Paris} simply reaffirmed 
him when it stated that "Daladier, although knowledgeable, 
is mistaken in believing he can contain Reynaud by including 
40Reynaud was offered the finances in April but 
states he declined because Daladier would have refused to 
do away with the forty hour law. See his Memoires, 2:201. 
41 , 
Jean Fabry, J'ai connu 1934-1945 (Paris: Editions 
Descamps, 1960}, pp. 20-21. 
42 . d. 107 Pertinax, Grave iggers, p. • 
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him in his cabinet. It is, however, Reynaud who will make 
him fall. 1143 
Another source of friction between Daladier and 
Reynaud concerned the position of the former on national 
defense matters. While Daladier conceded that an increase 
in the number of army specialists was needed, the Radical 
premier wanted to avoid cutting the army in two, a situation 
he felt would surely occur if Reynaud's professional corps 
44 
were allowed to develop. Moreover, Daladier was firmly 
ensconced in the theories of the defensive which included 
fire power, the Maginot Line, and couverture. In the area 
of foreign policy, the tone was appeasement with the Munich 
settlement serving as an example. 
Reynaud, by silencing his criticism of Daladier's 
defense policy, paid a heavy price for obtaining a carte 
blanche to reform finances. In addition to being the target 
of post-Munich comment such as the ironic statement of 
L'Humanite (Paris) that Reynaud was still a member of the 
government even though an adversary of Daladier's treasonous 
policy, 45 Reynaud had to stifle a natural impulse to speak 
43L'Action fran~aise, April 24, 1939. 
44JOC, March 15, 1935, p. 1048 and January 29, 1937, 
p. 258. -
45L 1 Humanite, October 9, 1938, p. 2. Reynaud was 
strongly opposed to concessions to Hitler in the Sudetenland 
sector of Czechoslovakia. On September 22, 19,38, two 
independents, George Mandel and Charnpetier de Ribes, went 
with Reynaud to Daladier in order to tender their resignation 
upon discovering that France under the influence of Britain 
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out against the growing gap between the military machines 
of Germany and France. 
While it was true that Reynaud during his tenure of 
office at the justice ministry sent Daladier a letter on 
July 8, 1938 requesting energetic measures be taken to 
accelerate rearmament, 46 this note omitted any reference to 
an armored corps. Moreover, later evidence indicated that 
Reynaud had completely given up on his national defense 
program. In a memorandum dated May 4, 1939 and marked 
"not sent," Reynaud asked Daladier to reconsider the 
problem of war manufactures and to work for an immediate 
remedy to the lags in production. To make his point, 
Reynaud inquired: 
1° Is is true that for lack of antiaircraft 
guns our divisions when transported will be 
was wavering in her support of Czechoslovakia. Daladier 
responded by stating that such a resignation was akin to 
treason since cabinet solidarity was needed and, at any rate, 
France was in the process of mobilizing. Reynaud states in 
his Memoires, 2:209 that Winston Churchill in visiting Paris 
on the twentieth advised Reynaud against resignation on 
grounds similar to those put forward by Daladier. Keith 
Eubank in his Munich (Norman, Oklahoma: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1963), p. 142, states that Reynaud stayed 
in the Daladier cabinet because he hoped the Czechs would 
refuse the agreement over the Sudeten thus forcing France 
to abide by the alliance system with the Petite Entente. 
Reynaud did not mention this in his Memoires but whatever 
his intention, the fact remained he stayed in a government 
that ultimately betrayed an important ally. 
46 Reynaud, Memoires, 2:205. 
exposed to disasters similar to Guadalajara? 
2° Is it true that our divisions have half 
as many antitank guns as the German divisions 
and that certain [divisions] have none at all? 
3° Is it true that we are producing only 
100 cannons of [?size] 25 a month? 
4° Is it true that faced with German tank 
divisions, we are producing only a single 
batta~ion of B tanks a year? 
5° Is it true that we do not have replacement 
pieces for our tanks? 
6° Is it true that we lack antitank mines? 
7° Is it true that we do not have [?size] 
9 guns and medium range artillery in sufficient 
quantity? 
8° Is it true that the majority of our C.A. 
[?antiaircraft divisions] do not have [?size] 
105 long, model 36? 
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9° Is it true that ammunition for the 105 47 long and for the shells of 105 short is lacking? 
This unsent letter was a fitting end to Reynaud's 
campaign for defense reform. Lacking any reference to the 
armored corps, it was reduced to calling Daladier's 
attention to armament shortages. Reynaud was, in fact, a 
prisoner in a government where he lacked the political 
influence to have his views on defense taken seriously. 
Thus his ascendancy to ministerial power that de Gaulle had 
47Reynaud Papers, "Dossier Militaire 1936-38," AN, 
Reynaud to Daladier, May 4, 1939. Guadalajara is the 
capital of the Spanish province of the same name. It is 
located thirty-five miles northeast of Madrid. During the 
Spanish Civil War, Italian and German planes bombed 
Republican forces with devastating results on civilian 
populations. 
predicted ironically marked Reynaud's complete impotence 
to further the cause of the armored corps. 
Reynaud before the finance commission of the 
chamber on November 22, 193848 justified accepting the 
finance ministry on the grounds of the foreign peril. A 
financially bankrupt France, to Reynaud, would be useless 
in face of the dictators and dependent allies alike. 
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Reynaud, however, was part of Daladier's political baggage, 
a cabinet in which the latter's views on defense were 
radically different. Here alas was the contradiction. What 
good did it do Reynaud to keep the country afloat finan-
cially if Daladier's defense policy was defeatist and 
appeasement orientated? 
Reynaud's relationship with Pierre-Etienne Flandin 
was hardly better than that he established with Daladier. 
Flandin, a centrist, president of the Democratic Alliance, 
and member of Reynaud's political group, the Republicains de 
Gauche et Radicaux Independants, was 6'4" to Reynaud's 5'6". 
Their dissimilarities were not just a matter of height, 
however, Flandin, described by journalist Alexander Werth 
as the "living representative of reactionary bourgeois 
mentality, 1149 was pro-Chamberlain as well as appeasement 
48JOC, Commission des finances, Proces-Verbaux, AAN, 
' November 22, 1938, p. 3. 
49Alexander Werth, "The Fourth Partner," New 
Statesman and Nation, February 26, 1938, p. 317.~-
orientated in his approach to Hitler and Mussolini. 
Further, his persistent opposition to the Popular Front 
government of Blum stymied Reynaud's appeal to the center 
for their participation in a national union government 
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so during early 1938. Flandin, moreover, opposed Reynaud's 
views on devaluation and on the armored corps, the latter 
scheme which he termed "idiotic. 1151 Deflation and the 
defensive were his key words. 
Flandin overshadowed Raynaud within the Democratic 
Alliance since the latter's advocacy of devaluation was 
unpopular among the majority of its members. At best, 
Reynaud played a minor role in this electoral organization 
whose members felt that a lot of antipathy expressed by 
Hitler and Mussolini for France was caused by provocations 
f h . t 52 rom Frenc Cormnunis s. · Significantly, it was Jean Fabry 
not Reynaud who developed the alliance's attitude on 
defense related questions at the party's annual congresses. 
Moreover, the party's weekly, the Alliance Democratique, 
represented nothing more than a hymn of praise to Flandin. 
SOLe Journal, February 23, 1938, p. l; L'Echo de 
Paris, March 12, 1938; Michael Brandstadter, "Paul Reynaud 
and the Third French Republic 1919-39: French Political 
Conservatism in the Interwar Years", Ph.D. dissertation, 
Duke University, 1971, pp. 277-78. Flandin's veto of 
national union occurred at the Salle Colbert of the Palais-
Bourbon on March 11, 1938. 
51Reynaud, Memoires, 1:430. 
52E. Rebaud, Enquete sur les partis et groupements 
francais (Marseilles: Editions Rebo, 1938), pp. 18-19. 
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Reynaud' s strong pro.-Soviet, pro-Eden, antiappeasement, and 
aevaluationist stance were hardly mentioned. Thus it was 
inevitable that when Flandin sent Hitler, Mussolini, 
chamberlain, and Daladier congratulatory telegrams 
following the Munich settlement, Reynaud, in protest, 
resigned from this electoral organization. 53 
The differences between the two men in fact helped 
to prevent the center from acting as a united political 
force. Of the controversial military debate of January 
1937 in which Flandin supported the position of Daladier, 
Le Petit Journal noted that "The right and a part of the 
center supported Paul Reynaud while another part of the 
center • • • the left, and a portion of the extreme left 
warmly supported P.-E. Flandin. 1154 The same reaction was 
noted a year later after the foreign policy debate of 
February 26, 1938, a session in which Flandin demonstrated 
his satisfaction with France's defense system while Reynaud, 
on the other hand, found it lacking in several respects. 
Le Populaire observed that while the two men belonged to the 
same electoral party and while they sat on the same benches 
of the minority, "their party and the minority are cruelly 
tested by the divorce between them." 55 
53L'Humanite, October 9, 1938, p. 2. 
54Le Petit Journal, January 27, 1937, p. 4. 
55Le Populaire, February 27, 1938, p. 2. 
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Of the three remaining politicians with whom 
Reynaud shared an important interaction, that with Henri de 
Kerillis was the best. Kerillis, a former running mate of 
Reynaud's in the 1926 Parisian by-election, an independent 
on the right, and editor of L'Echo de Paris, disagreed with 
Reynaud on devaluation. Although he was pro-Italian and for 
much of the decade, unsympathetic with the Russians, 
Kerillis was in agreement with Reynaud on three important 
issues: the armored corps, the need for a Franco-Soviet 
pact, and hard line tactics toward Germany. Whenever 
possible, he allowed the pages of his newspaper to be used 
in support of Reynaud and his ideas. 
Finding Kerillis, "ardent, tormented, and generous," 
Reynaud wrote to him in August of 1935 that Italy as the 
starved nouveau-venu of the continent could not be trusted 
and that England was the only true "Gentleman of Europe. 1156 
Kerillis, in turn, was quick to express his affection and 
esteem for Reynaud whose individualism he admired even 
when it cost the deputy parliamentary friendships and 
ministerial portfolios. Writing to Reynaud prior to the 1936 
elections, Kerillis noted that "If I were an elector in your 
district, I would vote for you with both hands raised. 1157 
56Reynaud Papers, "Dossier Portalet N°XIV," AN, 
Reynaud to Kerillis, August 25, 1935. 
57Reynaud Papers, "Dossier Rebut," AN, Kerillis to 
Reynaud, February 13, 1936. 
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The enthusiasm, however, was mixed with sadness as 
Kerillis noted the inability of Reynaud, Flandin, and 
Tardieu to come together in order to realize a united 
victory of center and right over the forces of the Popular 
58 Front. Kerillis had the newspaper but these three men 
were too divided both on the issues and among one another 
to avail themselves of its full political support. 
Tardieu, an influential centrist who had made 
Reynaud his finance minister in 1930, never made it to the 
1936 fight against the coalition of the left. Frustrated 
by the ineptitude of his fellow parliamentarians and dis-
illusioned by the malfunction of the political system, he 
withdrew from the chamber in 1936 in order to campaign for 
constitutional reform. In contrast to Kerillis, Tardieu 
made Reynaud's sanctionist position on Italy a matter of 
bitter enmity between them at a time when both were members 
of the same parliamentary group, the Centre Republicain. 
Sending an open letter to Reynaud in Le Temps on 
December 29, 1935, Tardieu resigned in protest from the 
Centre Republicain while at the same time, he castigated 
Reynaud for his position on devaluation as well as his pro-
English, pro-Soviet, and anti-Italian stance. 59 
58L'Echo de Paris, February 25, 1936, p. 1. 
59Paul Reynaud, "Pour assurer la paix, revenons a la 
tradition fransaise, 11 discours prononce le 27 decembre 1935, 
n.p., n.d., pp. 15-16. 
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Although Reynaud responded that Laval's appeasement 
of Italy was contrary to France's traditional policy of 
collective security, he was personally devastated by his 
colleague's literary thrusts and noted that "my separation 
from Tardieu caused me more pain than all the other attacks 
on me for my nonconformism. 1160 The separation was to 
continue in the pages of Le Gringoire (Paris), an extreme 
right wing newspaper to which Tardieu, now a political drop 
out, contributed occasional articles. In one of these, 
Reynaud figured as a "friend of the Bolsheviks" with his 
foreign policy characterized as a continual string of 
errors. 61 
The last member of the cast was Jean Fabry. 
Equipped with a wooden leg, this army colonel-turned-deputy, 
president of the chamber army commission, occasional war 
minister, and editor of the conservative daily, 
L'Intransigeant (Paris), was described by Reynaud as having 
earned the esteem and sympathy all. According to Reynaud, 
this was due to Fabry's technical ability, his war wounds, 
his alert sense of patriotism, his anxious eloquence, and 
finally, by the confidence that General Joffre had placed 
62 in him during World War I. A member of the Centre 
60Reynaud, Memoires, 1:292. 
61Le Gringoire (Paris), April 15, 1938, p. 1. 
62Paul Reynaud, Au Coeur de la melee 1930-45 (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1951), p. 46. 
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Republicain, Fabry was considered by Reynaud to be the 
latter's friend in spite of the political differences that 
63 
separated them. 
Fabry in his critical role as president of the 
chamber army commission followed an erratic course on 
national defense matters that indicated only occasional 
comprehension of the changes in military technology and 
their relationship to foreign commitments. In many ways, 
his attitudes reflected the confused ideas that existed 
among the high command where he counted General Maurice 
Gamelin as one of his personal friends. 
On December 19, 1933, Fabry was the only Centre 
Republicain who voted for the budget cutting measure of 
Bernier. For this, he was expelled from the group by 
64 Tardieu and Reynaud. 
On March 15, 1935, he proposed to the chamber that 
the recruitment problem be combined with army organizational 
reform but this tactic, according to Reynaud, was simply to 
assure that the Two Year Law became official--future 
governments being required to keep the men under the colors 
63Reynaud, Memoires, 2:155. 
64 Jean Fabry, De la place de la Concorde au cour de 
l'Intendance (Paris: Editions de France, 1942), p. 172. 
While the stated reason for the ouster was Fabry's accep-
tance of a cabinet post (war ministry} under Daladier on 
January 29, 1934, Philip Bankwitz called it an act of 
personal revenge for the vote of December 19, 1933. See his 
Maxime Weygand and Civil-Military Relations in .Modern 
France (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
1967) I P• 175. 
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for two years instead of approaching the measure as an 
option to be drawn upon when needed, the manner in which 
Premier Flandin presented the bill. 65 Thus Fabry's measure 
anticipated no need for radical change in the system of 
defense in terms of strategy. 
When Reynaud did present a specific program on 
military reform to the army commission in June of 1935, 
Fabry in his official capacity rejected it because he felt 
that the armored corps would be too vulnerable to artillery 
in light of the recent advances in fire power. Other 
reasons included the cutting of the national army in two by 
the creation of this elitist corps whose ranks, moreover, 
would be difficult to replace once they were depleted in 
the initial stages of combat. 66 
65The Two Year Law is a classic example of the 
vagueries and complexities of French parliamentary politics 
in which a measure was bent out of shape in order to gain 
the necessary parliamentary support for a government to stay 
in power. The intended bill was the Two Year Law. Flandin, 
however, needed support from the Radicals but many of these 
as well as the Socialists objected to this law. Thus 
Flandin had the measure phrased in such a way that not only 
was the measure optional with the extended time served 
unspecified, but it also affected only the men currently 
serving. To make it an official law affecting all future 
draftees was Fabry's goal. He apparently wanted the bill to 
become an amendment to the army organization laws of 1927-28 
so future leftist (and possibly unsympathetic) governments 
would be prevented from taking the optional route of not 
enforcing it. On these insights, see Reynaud, Memoires, 
2:426 and La France a sauve l'Europe, 2:311, 321. 
66Joc, Commission de l'armee, Proces-Verbaux, AAN, 
June 5, 1935, pp. 4-5. At this time, Fabry did recognize 
the need for an offensive weapon and he did state that the 
army was in the process of motorizing certain divisions, a 
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Minister of War Fabry took a different approach. 
on January 21, 1936, he reassured the chamber that the army 
was in the process of developing the mechanized and 
specialized corps which would, in fact, be superior to 
Reynaud's since it was to be constructed within the 
national army. 67 Fabry, however, offered no details on 
the specifics of the plan. 
Speeches and articles after this date move from 
disillusionment with the Popular Front's military attitude 
to a position of resignation that France was restricted to 
an essentially defensive weapon. Thus in a 1937 issue of 
Revue militaire, Fabry lamented the government's feeble 
policy and pointed out that the type of army organization 
in France did not allow any bold diplomatic action. 68 At 
the end of 1937, Fabry's speech before the congress of the 
Democratic Alliance (Reynaud was not chosen to develop the 
Alliance's defense views) omitted any reference to a 
specialized armored corps and stressed only that France 
needed a policy commensurate with the possibilities of her 
69 
army. 
fact that he considered to be an evolution toward Reynaud's 
mechanized corps. 
67Joc, January 21, 1936, p. 109. 
68Lieutenant-Colonel Fabry, "La Strategie g~n~rale, 
affairs de gouvernement," Revue militaire g~n~rale 1 (1937): 
387-90. 
69L'Eclaireur de Nice et du Sud-Est, November 7, 
1937, p. 2. 
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Fabry was never totally sold on Reynaud's armored 
corps. He was aware, however, of the need for an offensive 
weapon to complement France's foreign commitments. On the 
other hand, he never presented or encouraged such a detailed 
program as Reynaud demonstrated to the arr.ty commission in 
June of 1935. That Reynaud and he--both members of the 
Democratic Alliance and both adherents to the Centre 
Republicain--never pooled their talents was indeed tragic. 
The Army Commission 
On June 5, 1935, the date on which Reynaud explained 
his amendment to the army commission of the chamber, the 
centrist deputy was presenting it to a parliamentary body 
so influential that war ministers were almost forced to 
consult it before taking action and deputies were expected 
to seek approval from it before taking their defense related 
measures to the chamber. Second in prestige to the 
commission was its president, Jean Fabry, whose views on 
the amendment have already been discussed. 
These views were shared by Radical, fellow 
commission member, and speaker for the Two Year Law, Jean 
Senac. Senac stated that it would be impossible to find 
the recruits needed for such an enterprise. Further, as 
, Fabry was to observe later, Senac felt that the development 
of a mechanized and highly mobile force was already being 
pursued by the high command but the commission member 
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emphasized that for purposes of morale, this development 
was being carried out within the framework of the existing 
army organization. Immediately following Senac's commentary 
and without further discussion or question by any other 
member, the army commission voted unanimously to reject 
70 Reynaud's amendment. . 
Voted by means of raised hands, the rejection was 
accomplished by only nineteen of the forty-four members of 
the army commission. The other twenty-four deputies being 
absent, the political distribution of those present was 
respectively: 10-left, 5-center, and 4-right--giving the 
hostile left a disproportionate majority. 71 Since the 
commission membership was based on the number of deputies 
in each parliamentary group, a full sitting would have been 
even more unfavorable with 24-left, 15-center, and 11-right. 
Thus in addition to having an influential centrist president 
opposed to the measure, the center, itself, was in a 
minority on the commission. Reynaud found no support for 
the armored corps among its members. 
The Votes 
How closely did Reynaud's votes in the fifteenth 
legislature (1932-36} as well as those of his political 
70Joc, commission de l'armee, AAL~, Proces-verbaux, 
June 6, 1935, p. 2. 
71Ibid., p. 3. 
group, the Centre Republicain tend to support a stronger 
system of national defense? 72 A look at Table 5, pages 
135-6 shows that in 1933, when a series of financially 
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pressed, Radical dominated governments (Daladier, Sarraut, 
chautemps) attempted to reduce defense expenditures, 
Reynaud, his group, and the center-right opposed the 
measures. They did this by trying to suppress or return to 
the army commission measures reducing the numerical strength 
of the army such as on February 12 and December 19, 1933; 
returning to the army commission budgetary articles reducing 
expenditures such as on February 12 and February 25, 1933, 
as well as opposing outright on December 19, 1933, the 
passage of the Bernier resolution, a measure designed to 
delay the call up of troops until the annees creuses. 73 
In 1934-35, when control of the chamber moved to 
the right (Doumergue, Flandin, Laval) following the 
Stavisky related riots, the attempt to block defense 
appropriations came from the Socialists. Their measures 
included refusing to discuss military credits as on June 14, 
1934, the adjournment of the discussion on military credits 
72Although Fig. 2, page 94 shows membership in the 
Centre Republicain to be thirty-four, departures after its 
original formation reduced its numbers to twenty-nine, the 
figures that will be used as a constant in this study. 
Fabry was one of the defections. 
73The vote numbers as given in Table 5 but presented 
in the order in which they are cited in the above text (and 
hereafter cited in this fashion) are: 146, 444, 148, 185, 
447. 
135 
TABLE 5 
SELECTED NATIONAL DEFENSE VOTES 
THE CHAMBER, PAUL REYNAUD AND HIS POLITICAL GROUP 
(Fifteenth Legislature: 6/1/32 - 3/21/36) 
Vote #--Date--Initiator 
--Description 
#146--2/12/33--?--Suppression of 
Budgetary article eighty-nine 
calling for the elimination of 
5,000 officers, 40,000 horses 
with a gradual move toward 
motorization 
#148--2/12/33--Fabry (Centrist)--
Return to the army commission of 
article nine calling for reduc-
tions in defense expenses 
#185--2/25/33--Fabry {Centrist)--
Return to the army commission of 
article one of a project reducing 
military expenses 
#444--12/19/33--Marin (Rightist)--
Return to the army commission of 
the Bernier Resolution calling 
for reductions in troop levels. 
#447--12/19/33--Gov***--Bernier 
Resolution (reestablishment of 
budgetary equilibrium) 
#556--6/14/34--Moch {Socialist)--
On the priority question opposed 
to the discussion of military 
credits. 
#557--6/14/34--Auriol (Socialist)--
On the adjournment of the 
discussion on military credits. 
#560--6/15/34--Gov--minister of 
war gets an additional 1,275 
million francs for his budget 
#652--12/18/34--Blum--Motion to 
adjourn the discussion on supple-
mental military credits. 
Chamber 
Pro-Con-Ab* 
Action 
172-396-23 
failed 
266-363-38 
failed 
205-378-8 
failed 
108-483-7 
failed 
447-148-4 
passed 
121-466-6 
failed 
125-459-9 
failed 
452-127-14 
passed 
124-437-25 
failed 
Centre 
Republicain 
** Pro-Con-Ab-01 
Reynaud's Vote 
27-1-1-0 
pro 
29-0-0-0 
pro 
29-0-0-0 
pro 
26-1-2-0 
pro 
0-28-1-0 
con 
29-0-0-0 
pro 
0-29-0-0 
con 
28-0-0-1 
pro 
0-27-0-2 
con 
TABLE 5--Continued 
Vote #--Date--Initiator 
--Description 
#653--12/18/34--Thiolas (Socialist) 
Amendment to nationalize armament 
industry 
#706--3/15/35--Blum--Proposal to 
prevent further military spending 
#707--3/15/35--Gov--Rejection of 
Fabry's plan to combine recruit-
ment problem with army organi-
zational reform 
#708--3/15/35--Laurent-Eynac 
(Radical)--Approval of TWo Year 
Law 
#723--3/25/35--Auriol--Proposal to 
block expenditures on naval reform 
program 
#724--3/25/35--Gov--On the crepits 
for naval reform (1,065 million 
francs for new man of war, two 
torpedo boats, and stock) 
#726--3/25/35--Gov--Proposal to 
improve civil defense in wartime 
#784--12/14/35--Planche (Socialist) 
--Amendment to suppress arma.."ttent 
credits for 1936 (Art 12) 
Chamber 
Pro-Con-Ab* 
Action 
182-363-44 
failed 
176-365-44 
failed 
517-36-32 
passed 
350-196-39 
passed 
157-409-15 
failed 
445-127-10 
passed 
455-11-113 
passed 
134-337-105 
failed 
136 
Centre 
~publicain 
** Pro-Con-Ab-01 
Reynaud' s Vote 
0-27-0-2 
con 
0-28-0-1 
con 
16-11-1-1 
con 
27-1-0-1 
pro 
0-27-0-2 
con 
27-0-0-2 
pro 
27-0-0-2 
pro 
0-28-0-1 
con 
SOURCES: JOC, 1933: pp. 774-75, 776-77, 1059-60, 4727-28, 
4731-2; 1934: pp. 1510-11, 1511-12, 1561-62, 3337-39; 1935: pp. 1057-
61, 1295-97, 1322-23, and 2560-62. 
*Abstention 
**On leave 
***Government 
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as on June 14 and December 18, 1934, and attempts to prevent 
further military spending as on March 15, 25, and 
December 14, 1935. The Socialists further attempted to 
limit the manufacture of arms by proposing a nationalization 
of the armaments industry on December 18, 1934. 74 On all of 
these bills, the Socialists joined by the Communists were 
defeated by Reynaud, the Centre Republicain, and a center-
right coalition supported by the Radicals. 
On measures aimed at strengthening defense such as 
the June 15, 1934 and March 25, 1935 requests for additional 
funds by the war and naval departments, the passage of the 
Two Year Law on March 25, 1935, and the improvement of civil 
defense on March 25, 1935, Reynaud and his party supported 
the proposals. 75 
It was on a measure connected to the debate over 
the Two Year Law that Reynaud's group split. The bill, 
Fabry's previously discussed proposal of March 15, 1935, 76 
would have slightly strengthened Flandin's legislation. In 
this respect, it was of secondary importance. Still, the 
Centre Republicain was divided on the issue, a fact that 
indicated the internal weakness of the group. 
74 Votes: 556, 557, 652, 706, 723, 784, 653. 
75
votes: 560, 724, 708, 726. 
76
vote: 707. 
13S 
In the fifteenth legislature, Reynaud's votes for 
the most part reflected his ideas on foreign policy. On 
the Four Power Pact, an agreement whereby Italy, Germany, 
England and France agreed to seek no territorial changes 
without the approval of the League of Nations, Reynaud, as 
noted in Table 6, p. 139, voted against its discussion on 
April 6, 1933 and against its approval on June 9, 1933. 77 
To Reynaud, as he stated in La France a sauve !'Europe, the 
pact was a walking invitation for the dictators to test 
the effectiveness of the Versailles Treaty by demanding 
. . 78 
revision. 
Reynaud was not opposed, however, to coming to 
terms with Mussolini as evidenced on March 22, 1935 when 
the Centre Republicain and he approved the Rome Pact. 79 
This accord, designed as a good will measure toward 
Mussolini, ceded Italy some desert territory in southern 
Libya and Somaliland, transferred shares in the Djibuti-
r 
Addis Ababa Railroad to Italy, allowed settlers in Tunisia 
to keep their Italian nationality, and insured that both 
France and Italy would consult with each other so as to 
preserve the status quo in the Danube and Balkan regions.so 
77 . 
votes: 235, 299. 
?SReynaud, La France a sauve !'Europe, 2:SS-S9. 
79
vote: 719. 
SOOn page 63 of Reynaud's In the Thick of the Fight 
1930-1945, trans. James D. Lambert (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1951), the centrist deputy stated that the 
' 
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TABLE 6 
SELECTED FOREIGN POLICY VOTES 
THE CHAMBER, PAUL REYNAUD AND HIS POLITICAL GROUP 
(Fifteenth Legislature: 6/1/32 - 3/21/36) 
Vote #--Date--Initiator 
--Description 
#235--4/6/33--Marin (Rightist)--
Rejection of Four Power Pact 
talks 
#267--5/18/33--Torres (Independent 
Left)--Approve Franco-Soviet Pact. 
#299--6/9/33--Herriot (Radical)--
Four Power Pact approved. 
#376--11/14/33--Delbos (Radical)--
Approve pacifism of country and 
safety through League of Nations. 
#377--11/14/33--Delbos--Approve 
government's attempt to realize 
a controlled and guaranteed 
disarmament. 
#378--11/14/33--~---0n both votes 
# 376 and #377. 
#719--3/22/35--Government--Rome 
Pact 
#793--12/28/35--Delbos--Continue 
to interpellate Laval's foreign 
policy. 
#794--12/28/35--Chappedelaine 
(Radical Left)--Approval of 
Laval's foreign policy (Hoare-
Laval Pact). 
#823--2/27/36--Government--Ratify 
Franco-Soviet Pact. 
Chamber 
Pro-Con-Ab 
Action 
105-421-71 
failed 
554-1-41 
passed 
413-163-23 
passed 
53:3-10-48 
passed 
389-158-44 
passed 
394-144-54 
passed 
560-10-17 
passed 
276-296-20 
failed 
304-261-28 
passed 
353-164-45 
passed 
Centre 
~Eublicain 
Pro-Con-Ab-01** 
Reynaud• s Vote 
28-0-1-0 
pro 
24-1-3-1 
pro 
0-28-0-1 
con 
23-0-4-2 
abstained 
0-27-0-2 
con 
0-26-1-2 
con 
28-0-0-1 
pro 
1-26-1-1 
pro 
26-0-2-1 
abstained 
1-25-2-1 
pro 
SOURCES: JOC, 1933: pp. 1955-56, 2463-64, 2863-64, 4141-44; 
1935: pp. 1213-14, 2885-87; 1936: pp. 647-48. 
*Abstention 
**On leave 
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Reynaud and the rest of the chamber were not aware 
of the secret understanding attached to this pact as agreed 
to by Laval the previous January in which Italy was to 
receive a free hand in Ethiopia. When Italy invaded 
Ethiopia in October of 1935, Laval true to the arrangement, 
avoided league sanctions by signing with British Foreign 
Minister Hoare (December 7, 1935), a secret agreement 
carving up Ethiopia into economic spheres with the biggest 
piece going to Italy. 
When the Hoare-Laval deal leaked to the press, the 
French premier was questioned (interpellated} by the chamber 
on December 28, 1935 as to why league sanctions had not been 
applied. Reynaud who had played an important role in 
attacking Laval was the only member of his political group 
to vote for continued cross examination of the Premier. 81 
When approval of Laval's foreign policy was sought on the 
same day, Reynaud and one other member of the Centre 
Republicain withheld it by abstaining. 82 It was after these 
votes and Reynaud's speech against Italian aggression that 
a shocked and dismayed Tardieu withdrew from the Centre 
Republicain. The pro-Italian, pro-Laval sympathizers as 
well as those deputies of center-right who wanted to keep 
colonial compensations in the Rome Pact had been promised 
to' Italy under article 13 of the Treaty of April 26, 1915. 
81
vote: 793. 
82 
vote: 794. 
141 
the government from drifting left had an enemy in the 
midst: Paul Reynaud. 
Leaving the Ethiopian crisis and returning to 1933--
an era when the intentions of Hitler were not entirely 
understood--the votes of November 14, 1933 found Radical 
Yvons Delbos endorsing in a piecemeal fashion, the foreign 
policy of Radical Premier, Albert Sarraut. The first 
portion of this, a proposal approving the country's 
pacifism and safety through the League of Nations, saw 
Reynaud and three other members of the Centre Republicain 
abstain. 83 Later, when Delbos couched the second part of 
his proposal around disarmament and combined parts one and 
two, Reynaud and the majority of his group voted against 
th 84 e measures. Thus it was evident early on in the 
thirties that Reynaud did not feel disarmament and pacifism 
were the solutions to France's defense problems. 
The two foreign policy votes of the legislature 
that should have given Reynaud the most satisfaction were 
the Franco-Soviet Pacts of May 18, 1933 and February 27, 
1936. 85 The first treaty was a reciprocal agreement not to 
join any coalition directed against the other country and 
the second provided for military aid of one country for the 
83 Vote: 376. 
84 Votes: 377 and 378. 
85 Votes: 267 and 823. 
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other in case of att.ack by a third. The trouble with the 
February 29, 1936 agreement was that intervention could not 
take place until the League of Nations and the members of 
the Locarno Treaties had been consulted. By that time, 
the enemy could have either signatory at its mercy or 
defeated. In spite of this weakened arrangement--thanks to 
Laval and his War Minister Fabry neither of whom trusted 
the Russians--Reynaud was the only deputy in his political 
group to vote for the February 27, 1936 measure. Passed 
at a time when the preelectoral campaign of the Communist 
supported Popular Front was gaining ground, the Franco-
Russian Pact for a goodly portion of the center-right 
aroused feelings of apprehension rather than of relief. 
In the sixteenth legislature, Reynaud joined a 
group called the Gauche Democratique et Radicaux 
Independants. Composed of thirty-eight deputies 86 among 
who was included Pierre-Etienne Flandin, the Alliance faced 
a chamber dominated by the Popular Front ministry which in 
turn faced the burden of rearmament and military prepar-
edness. This centered around four areas: 1) control over 
the production of war manufactures; 2) military strategy; 
3) organization of the nation in time of war; and 4) mili-
tary expenditures. 
86The roster in 1936 showed forty-two deputies and in 
1939, forty-one. However, the number of original deputies 
who were still with the Alliance in 1939 was thirty-eight. 
See JOC, June 12, 1936, p. 1444 and June 1, 1939, p. 1449. 
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In the first category, the Socialists, concerned 
with the threat from war profiteers or marchands de canons, 
had the armaments industry nationalized on July 17, 1936 
87 
as indicated in Table 7, p. 144. Reynaud who had 
supported a more modified form of control on the previous 
day had abstained on the nationalization vote. Immediately 
evident from these votes was the lack of influence within 
the Alliance of both Reynaud and Flandin. The latter was 
the sole abstention on the July 16, 1936 vote calling for 
88 
state controls. The former was among the ten abstentions 
on the July 17, 1936 vote in which a majority of the 
Alliance voted for nationalization. On this measure, 
Flandin was absent. 
On the votes of February 2 and November 19, 1937, 89 
measures affirming Daladier's credo of Maginot Line and 
couverture, the Alliance split into a group of abstaining 
deputies that included Flandin and a number of opposing 
deputies that included Reynaud. It was these votes that 
demonstrated the "politicking" that dominated such important 
issues as national defense. An avid supporter of Daladier's 
military strategy, Flandin, by his abstentions was saying, 
87 Vote: 57. 
88 Vote: 52. 
89
votes: 270 and 419. 
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TABLE 7 
SELECTED NATIONAL DEFENSE VOTES 
THE CHAMBER, PAUL REYNAUD AND HIS POLITICAL GROUP 
(Sixteenth Legislature: 6/1/36 - 7/10/40) 
Vote #--Date--Initiator 
--Description 
#52--7/16/36--Valentin (Rightist) 
--State control over armament 
industry rather than national-
ization 
#57--7/17/36--Government--Arma-
ment industry nationalized. 
#270--2/2/37--La Chambre (Radical) 
--Approval of Daladier's 
national defense policy. 
#419--11/19/37--Elbel (Radical) 
--Approval of Daladier's 
national defense policy. 
#593--3/24/38--Government--
Organization of nation in time 
of war. 
#596--4/6/38--Government--Blum 
gets decree laws to cope with 
defense costs. 
#672--3/18/39--Kerillis (Indep. 
Repub.)--Daladier cannot have 
decree law powers. 
#677--3/18/39--Government--
Daladier gets decree laws for 
national defense. 
#694--5/12/39--Chichery (Radical) 
--Approval of Daladier's 
handling of defense.costs. 
Chamber 
Pro-Con-Ab* 
Action 
164-393-37 
failed 
487-68-41 
passed 
413-124-64 
passed 
399-160-50 
passed 
603-0-0 
passed 
311-250-42 
passed 
265-323-6 
failed 
321-264-6 
passed 
367-233-13 
passed 
Gauche oemocratique 
et Radicaux 
Independants 
Pro-con-Ab-01** 
Reynaud' s Vote 
32-0-1-5 
pro 
21-2-10-5 
abstained 
2-12-21-3 
con 
1-15-21-1 
con 
38-0-0-0 
pro 
0-37-0-1 
con 
0-37-0-1 
con 
35-1-1-2 
pro 
38-0-0-0 
pro 
SOURCES: JOC, 1936: pp. 1977-78, 2002-3; 1937: pp. 317-18, 
2502-3; 1938: pp. 969-70, 1112-13; 1939: pp. 1089-90, 1095-96, 
1348-49. 
*Abstention. **On leave. 
"I support your policy but not the political baggage (the 
Socialists) fhat makes up the Popular Front cabinet." 90 
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One of the few measures where both the Alliance and 
the chamber supported the government was on the bill 
designed to organize the nation in time of war. Voted on 
March 24, 1938, the project relegated the general direction 
of war to the government and the conduct of operations to 
the chief of the general staff who was commander-in-chief 
in time of war. Included in the measure were plans for 
civil defense, the role to be played by public officials, 
the use of manpower and other resources as well as the 
1 . . t' f h t' 91 genera economic organiza ion o t e na ion. 
On the remaining defense votes of the legislature--
primarily concerned with requests for decree laws so as to 
better handle military expenses--Reynaud, Flandin, as well 
as the majority of the Alliance voted against Blum and for 
Daladier. 
Blum, who in his second ministry forecast immense 
rearmament bills, requested plenary powers on April 6, 
1938. 92 The measure, which allowed the premier to enact 
90At the time of the February 2, 1937 votes, Blum 
was premier. On November 19, 1937, he was vice-president 
of the cabinet under Chautemps. 
91secretariat d'etat a la guerre, Loi du 11 juillet 
sur !'organisation generale de la nation pour le temps de 
guerre (Versailles: Imprimerie de l'Intendance, n.d. 
[?1951]). 
92 Vote: 596. 
legislation without the immediate approval of Parliament, 
passed in the chamber but failed in the Senate--forcing 
Blum out on April 9, 1938. His program for decree law 
powers understood a tax on capital as well as control of 
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the international exchange, measures abhorrent not only to 
the center and right but also to a number of Radicals who 
voted against the bill. 
Blum's successor, Daladier, was luckier. Having 
extended his cabinet right to include independent, Georges 
Mandel, and centrist, Paul Reynaud, he was successful in 
93 
obtaining the decree laws on March 18, 1939, although not 
without some difficulty. 
Kerillis, clearly unhappy about the occupation of 
Czechoslovakia by Hitler three days before, proposed on 
the same day, a measure to reject giving Daladier the full 
powers. 94 Kerillis' proposal having failed, these decree 
laws served as a green light to Finance Minister Reynaud 
to continue his economic recovery program, an important part 
of which lay in finding the funds necessary to meet defense 
costs. 
At the same time, the full powers were used by the 
government to voluntarily increase defense expenditures 
from twenty-five to forty billion francs on April 21, 1939; 
and even though he had the right to exercise these powers 
93
vote: 677. 
94 Vote: 672. 
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through November 1939, Daladier allowed Radical party whip, 
Albert Chichery, to ask for a vote of approval on May 12, 
95 1939 concerning a loan to meet defense needs. 
All in all, the record of the sixteenth legislature 
on national defense was not encouraging in terms of 
bringing the chamber together to meet the foreign threat. 
Except for the organization of the nation in time of war 
bill, the votes were marked by a high rate of opposition 
and abstentionism first by the center and right toward the 
Popular Front and then by the extreme left toward the 
moderate orientation of the Daladier cabinet. Economics 
without a doubt played a key role in the failure of the 
Popular Front whose beginning saw the Socialists in 
ascendancy but who in the end wound up in the opposition. 
Economics also saw Reynaud elected to the finance 
ministry in the fall of 1938. The price he paid to restore 
France's shattered finances was considerable. It meant 
supporting Daladier which in turn meant placing a muzzle on 
his defense views. Thus this legislature saw a lower level 
of correlation between Reynaud's defense views than in 
those reflected by his votes during the fifteenth. 
Loss of initiative in the realm of foreign affairs 
marked the chamber from 1936-39. While collective security 
had been the aim of the previous legislature, the sixteenth 
95
vote: 694. Reynaud, Memoires, 2:253, and JOC, 
May 12, 1939, p. 1318. 
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chamber turned its gaze inward attempting to impede at 
times the realization of that goal. This was particularly 
true of the center-right opposition which was not particu-
larly excited about throwing itself into the arms of the 
Soviets while a Popular Front ministry reigned. Thus on 
July 10, 1936 (Table 8, p. 149), Kerillis demanded an 
investigation of a plan by the air force to ship the 
f h . 96 prototype o a Frenc canon to Russia. Kerillis, 
remarking that the French did not have a definitive 
military agreement with the Soviets, was supported in his 
request by the center-right which included a majority of 
the Alliance as well as Reynaud. 
Further weakness was evident when the chamber 
voiced its approval of expressions aimed at mutual assis-
tance, but in fact did little to expedite the passage of 
legislation capable of realizing this goal. This is clear 
in the votes of December 9, 1937 and February 26, 1938. 97 
The former talked about peace through social progress, 
collective security, and the League of Nations while the 
latter,. following a speech by Premier Chautemps, affirmed 
France's loyalty to Czechoslovakia and her concern for the 
situation in central Europe. Reynaud as well as a majority 
of the Alliance abstained on both issues. Two and a half 
weeks thereafter, Hitler occupied Austria. 
96
vote: 49. 
97
votes: 438 and 548. 
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TABLE 8 
SELECTED FOREIGN POLICY VOTES 
THE CHMffiER, PAUL REYNAUD AND HIS POLITICAL GROUP 
(Sixteenth Legislature: 6/1/36 - 7/10/40) 
Vote #--Date--Initiator 
--Description 
#49--7/10/36--Kerillis (Indep. 
Repub.)--Demand for investiga-
tion of why a French canon of 
national defense interest will 
be delivered to the Soviet 
union 
#88--7/31/36--Fevrier (Socialist) 
--Approval of Blum's foreign 
policy. 
#187--12/5/36--Carnpinchi 
(Radical)--Approval of Blum's 
foreign policy (nonintervention 
in Spain). 
#254--1/15/37--Governrnent--Prevent 
the departure of volunteers for 
Spain. 
#438--12/9/37--Governrnent--
Chautemps ministry refuses to 
discuss further its foreign 
affairs policy: peace through 
alliances and League of Nations. 
#548--2/26/38--Chichery (Radical) 
--Approval of Chautemps' 
foreign policy. 
#584--3/22/38--des Isnards (Repub. 
Federation)--Demands to know 
whether arms are being shipped 
to Spain (Government rejects 
this priority question). 
#585--3/22/38--Marin (Republican 
Federation}--On the priority 
quest demanding the continua-
tion of discussion on noninter-
vention in Spain. 
Chamber 
Pro-Con-Ab* 
Action 
162-403-29 
failed 
385-190-15 
passed 
350-171-77 
passed 
591-0-0 
passed 
383-96-130 
passed 
439-2-170 
passed 
63-388-146 
failed 
155-398-44 
failed 
Gauche nemocratique 
et Radicaux 
Independants 
Pro-Con-Ab-01** 
Reynaud' s Vote 
33-0-3-2 
pro 
0-31-1-6 
con 
5-29-2-2 
con 
37-0-0-1 
pro 
2-1-34-1 
abstained 
4-0-32-2 
abstained 
1-2-34-1 
abstained 
33-2-2-1 
pro 
TABLE 8: Continued 
Vote #--Date--Initiator 
--Description 
#612--10/4/38--Government--
Daladier government tables 
Chichery's interpellation 
on foreign policy and moves 
to adjourn (approval of 
Munich agreement) . 
#623--12/30/38--Rous (Socialist) 
Full anmesty for French 
volunteers in Spain. 
#636--1/26/39--Chichery 
(Radical)--Approval of 
Daladier's position on foreign 
policy: continuation of 
nonintervention in Spain. 
#659--2/24/39--Governrnent--
Daladier rejects demand of 
Forcinal (Independent 
Socialist) for an explanation 
of whether France will legally 
recognize the government of 
F~anco while Italian and German 
troops are still on Spanish 
soil. 
#671--3/16/39--Government--
Financial assistance to 
Spanish refugees in France. 
Chamber 
Pro-Con-Ab* 
Action 
535-75-2 
passed 
335-234-40 
passed 
379-232-3 
passed 
323-261-16 
passed 
401-127-63 
passed*** 
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Gauche nernocratique 
et Radicaux 
Independants 
Pro-Con-Ab-01** 
Reynaud' s Vote 
38-0-0-0 
pro 
1-33-4-0 
abstained 
38-0-0-0 
pro 
37-0-0-1 
pro 
7-7-23-1 
pro 
SOURCES: ::!.2S• 1936: pp. 1908-9, 2349-50, 3377-78; 1937: 
pp. 63-64, 2824-25; 1938: pp. 660-62, 916-18, 1596-98, 2235-36; 1939: 
pp. 265-66, 714-15, 1018-19. 
*Abstention. **On leave. ***This vote was recorded as 
having failed but the absolute majority needed was only 265. The 
section of the debates for March 16, 1939 that pertained to aid for 
the refugees concluded by passing the relief measure (See JOC, March 16, 
1939, p. 1004). When a print out of voters for and against the 
measure was recorded in the voting tabulation several pages after, the 
vote was recorded as having failed. 
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Later, an additional measure reflected not only the 
abdication of collective security but also an "action after 
the fact" vote. This was the proposal of October 4, 1938 
' 98 
or the approval of the Munich settlement. Although done 
in an indirect manner by having Radical whip Albert 
chichery's interpellation of foreign policy tabled, it did 
in fact imply that the chamber, outside of the Communists 
and Kerillis, was overwhelmingly satisfied with Daladier's 
capitulation on the Sudetenland question. Reynaud, once 
antimunichois and an ardent foe of appeasement but now a 
member of the Daladier government, voted in support of the 
motion. 
One of the worse blunders committed by Blum and 
subsequent ministries was the decision for nonintervention 
in Spain. Occupying nine out of thirteen votes presented 
in Table 8, the war forced Blum into a position of neutrality 
on the grounds that England, for fear of a spreading war in 
Europe, opposed intervention, and that such intervention 
would open France to a potentially third hostile frontier 
on the Pyrenees. Thus in a gradual fashion, France closed 
the border to the passage of weapons. 
This was done in a stop-start fashion. On July 31, 
1936, Blum requested approval of his foreign policy which 
included a general statement of nonintervention but which 
98 Vote: 612. 
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reserved the right to ship arms if Germany and Italy did so. 
Then on December 5, 1936, the Socialist Premier requested 
approval of his foreign policy which consisted of completely 
closing the frontier to the shipment of arms. 99 All 
seventy-seven Communists abstained on this last measure. 
They were in fact completely disillusioned with Blum who 
they felt should have surely supported the Spanish Republic, 
a regime whose political composition was similar to that of 
the Popular Front's. Indeed, this was the first crack in 
the marriage between the French Socialists and Communists. 
Reynaud voted against both these measures. Because 
these bills were blanket statements approving government 
1 . 100 d t . 1 . . . po icy, Reynau was no simp y voting against noninter-
vention in Spain. In fact in his Memoires, Reynaud used 
the debate of July 1936 to discuss in general the feeble 
policy of Blum in the aftermath of the Rhineland coup and 
t . . . . th' . 101 con inuing aggression in E iopia. Still, he summed up 
the situation in Spain--in a rare reference to the civil 
99
votes: 88, 187. 
lOOThe researcher in dealing with many of these votes 
is often confronted with vague or generalized statements on 
which the vote is taken. The vote of December 5, 1936 
stated: "The Chamber approving the policy followed by the 
Government in order to assure the maintenance of European 
peace; confident in it to continue to defend the interests 
and the security of France and rejecting anything else, 
passes to the order of the day." Thus one is often forced 
to refer to the debate to focus on the main matter at hand. 
See JOC, December 5, 1936, p. 3377. 
101 Reynaud, Memoires, 2:79, 82. 
war--as the end result of a policy of pacifism and 
102 
appeasement. 
Reyna.ud, however, did not reproduce in his 
153 
Memoires his speeches examined in Chapter Two in which he 
stated that France, because of her internal weaknesses and 
need to keep communications open with her North African 
colonies, had to avoid becoming enmeshed amidst the 
1 . f t. 103 h. . f . . f quarre ing ac ions. T is was in act a position o 
neutrality and from this it can be deduced that if the 
measure of July had been limited to nonintervention and if 
the government that had proposed the measure had been 
politically favored, Reynaud would have voted for noninter-
vention. 
When the French cabinet under Blum reopened .the 
frontier on March 17, 1938 in order to let Russian arms 
across, Colonel des Isnards, a rightist, a member of the 
chamber army commission, and a foe of Franco-Russian collab-
oration demanded to know whether arms were being sent to 
Spain. 104 Although the demand was rejected and Reynaud 
abstained, he voted for the continuation of the discussion 
requested by Marin on the same day. 105 
102 b.d 82 I i • , p. • 
103Joc, July 31, 1936, p. 2307 and December 4, 1936, 
p. 3323. -
104
vote: 584. 
105
vote: 585. 
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contrast these indecisive and negative votes with 
that cast by Reynaud on January 26, 1939. 106 Now a member 
of Daladier's cabinet, he voted for nonintervention. While 
this vote was also cast as a general approval of Daladier's 
foreign policy, the debate had centered on nonintervention 
and Daladier's support of it. In actuality, the general 
tenor of Daladier' s forei.gn policy--appeasement as at 
Munich--was not much different than the feeble policy of 
Blum which Reynaud had criticized and voted against. Thus 
one can hardly escape the conclusion that Reynaud in terms 
of his votes was not the "lone wolf" he labeled himself in 
his postwar work, In the Thick of the Fight; but, rather, 
he was a jouisseur (player} in the parliamentary game of 
Third Republican politics~ a man who because of his 
ministerial position sacrificed the integrity of his 
national defense views both on the armored corps and in the 
1 f f . l' 107 rea m o oreign po icy. 
Another aspect of the January 26, 1939 vote was that 
Daladier, prior to this date, had delayed the passage 
through French canals of two Russian boats loaded with 
weapons. Destined to assist the Republican forces pinned 
down at Barcelona, the Russian ships were held up for two 
weeks after which time Daladier declared it was too late to 
106
vote: 636. 
107 Reynaud, In the Thick of the Fight, p. 1. 
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help which in fact it was as Barcelona fell on January 26, 
1939. Reynaud, A staunch promoter of improved Franco-
Russian relations, had voted in support of a premier who 
had bottlenecked the Russians in their attempt to help 
relieve the siege of the Spanish loyalists. 
Aside from votes pertaining directly to governmental 
nonintervention, other measures concerned French volunteers 
and Spanish refugees. On January 15, 1937, the French 
chamber unanimously forbade the departure of volunteers for 
. th . . 108 service among e warring armies. However, on 
December 30, 1938, the same chamber granted amnesty to 
French volunteers who had returned from service in the 
war. 109 On this vote, the center-right as well as some 
Radicals voted against. Ministers Reynaud, Daladier, and 
Mandel abstained. Daladier, now dependent on a left-center 
coalition to maintain power, sought safety in neutrality. 
The situation was different for the Spanish refugees 
who since January 28, 1939 had been fleeing across the 
Pyrenees at the rate of 15,000 a day. By the time the 
chamber examined a relief measure to assist these starving 
soldiers as well as civilian men, women, and children, more 
than 490,000 of them were in France. The nation which 
unofficially had already spent $2,288,000 (88,000,000 francs) 
108
vote: 
109v t o e: 
254. 
623. 
• 
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on the refugees was on March 16, 1939 asked to give more. 110 
Reynaud along with the extreme left, the left and some 
center voted the relief bill while another portion of the 
center and right opposed it leaving sixty-three centrists 
to abstain. 
On this measure, the position of the Alliance again 
demonstrated the internal weakness of the group. Reynaud 
and six others voted for the aid, seven voted against it, 
and twenty-three including Flandin abstained. On the two 
other occasions where Reynaud and Flandin split over the 
Spanish Civil War, no discernible pattern can be established 
other than the fact neither man played a guiding light 
within the group. Although Flandin voted against amnesty 
on December 30, 1938--his ballot being one of thirty-two 
against--, on the December 5, 1936 motion, Flandin was one 
of only five who voted for Blum's policy of nonintervention. 
On the recognition of the Franco regime by the 
chamber on February 24, 1939, Reynaud and the majority of 
111 the Alliance supported the government. This was done in 
spite of the continued presence of German and Italian 
troops on Spanish soil, a situation that violated the non-
. t . d t . d 112 in ervention accor s se up in Lon on. 
110 Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, p. 575. Vote: 671. 
111 Vote: 659. Formal recognition occurred on 
February 27, 1939. 
112 Shortly after the outbreak of the war, a noninter-
vention committee composed of the major European powers met 
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In a sense, Reynaud's votes on the Spanish Civil War 
ranging from neutrality to nonintervention were like the 
disastrous approval of the Munich Accords. After it became 
clear that Italy and Germany were continuing the send 
troops and arms to Spain in violation of nonintervention, 
France, except for occasionally allowing the passage of 
Russian arms did little to help the Republican forces. It 
was this policy that Hugh Thomas called "craven indolence11113 
--proof to the dictators that England and France were ready 
to be challenged in other areas of the European theater. 
Brian Crozier, a biographer of Franco, has stated 
that if Republican forces had won, Spain would certainly 
have gone Communist. 114 Surely this was the fear of many 
deputies who in seeing Russian arms being shipped to the 
loyalists had visions of a Stalin supported regime at the 
back door. Puzzo, however, blamed the initial failure of 
the French to supply arms as the reason why the Communist 
element in the Frente Pooular gained strength. The Spanish 
Republic was forced to turn more and more to the Soviets for 
military assistance and this naturally enhanced the prestige 
of the Communists in their coalition with the Republicans 
and Socialists. 
periodically in London in order to determine if violations 
had occurred. 
113Thomas, Spanish Civil War, p. 615. 
114
crozier, De Gaulle, p. 72. 
r 
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Puzzo, moreover, states that the prime factor 
motivating the Soviets in extending aid was not for ideol-
ogical or political reasons but to bring an end to the 
policy of appeasement and to "refurbish the system of 
collective security" with Britain and France against the 
115 fascist powers. 
What eventually developed after Franco's victory was 
the adherance of Spain to the Anti-Cominterm Pact (March 26, 
1939), an arrangement in which Germany, Japan, Italy, and 
Spain solidified fascist ties by pledging their mutual 
opposition to the Communist International. In the case of 
Spain, these ties were reinforced on March 31, 1939 by a 
five year friendship treaty with Germany. This was hardly 
the result Reynuad anticipated when he noted in a radio 
speech of March 1938 that "Since the beginning of the 
Spanish affair, I [have] said to the chamber that the 
interests of the [Spanish] party who would win would be one 
' . h h f F "llG in common wit t ose o ranee. . •. 
Reynaud, who has said little of the Spanish Civil 
War in his personal accounts, is in a sense no different 
than many other French contemporaries of the period. John 
Dreifort in his recent work on Yvon Delbos has commented on 
the paucity of personal accounts on the Spanish conflict, 
thus leaving the historian with a situation difficult to 
115Puzzo, Spain and the Great Powers, pp. 83, 243. 
116L•oeuvre (Paris), March 29, 1938, p. 4. 
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t . t f t' 117 reconstruc in erms o mo ives. In the end, however, 
Reynaud's chamber speeches, radio discourses, press 
articles, and. a goodly portion of his votes proved his 
desire to have France remain neutral which in the Europe of 
the 1930s was appeasement. 
Conclusions 
Reynaud's failure to get his armored corps across 
must be judged in light of the fact the French Chamber of 
Deputies was not the ideal place to examine such an issue. 
It was rife with weaknesses one of which was the legislative 
record left to history. In 1933, without a proper under-
standing of Hitler and his designs, the chamber proceeded 
to reduce military. expenditures and troop levels, a pattern 
which it later had to reverse. Its votes on foreign affairs: 
the Four Power Pact, the Rome Pact, the Franco-Soviet Accord, 
approval of Laval's foreign policy and that of Oaladier's 
at the time of Munich were weak, or recognized the need for 
revision of the Versailles Treaty, or attempted to appease 
fascist aggressors. 
In addition, the French deputies demonstrated a 
limited understanding of military affairs. Removed from the 
high comrnand--the Bernier Resolution debate, an example--and 
117John Oreifort, Yvon Delbos at the Quai D'Orsay, 
French Foreign Policy during the Popular Front: 1936-38 
(Wichita, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1975}, 
pp. 33-34. 
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the problems at stake, the chamber for the most part failed 
to grasp the revolution in military strategy that charac-
terized the postwar years. Part of this was due to the 
discouraging atmosphere of political and ideological 
factionalism that interfered with a dynamic approach to 
critical issues. The best example of this was the debate 
over the Two Year Law conducted at a time when major reform 
and change were needed. Flandin, to keep himself in office, 
proposed only an extension of military service, a measure 
which in itself was weakly worded and vague. 
The chamber more or less relinquished control over 
defense matters to the war ministers especially Daladier 
whose budgets and decree laws were repeatedly passed with no 
satisfactory alternative presenting itself. Such a chamber 
could hardly be expected to handle anything as strategically 
sophisticated as Reynaud's armored corps. Moreover, the 
army commission which acted as a steering committee for much 
defense legislation was content with existing strategy and 
army organization. If such was the position of the 
commission, how could the chamber be expected to take the 
initiative in defense reform? 
A critical aspect of Reynaud's armored corps that 
was unacceptable was the idea of a separate, professional 
army, a concept Reynaud tried to counter with his fer de 
lance theory but which nevertheless stuck--being helped to 
do so by de Gaulle's book, Versl'armee de metier. Another 
r 
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objection was recruitment possibilities. Where were the 
troops to come from and how would Reynaud's armored corps 
soldiers be ~eplaced if decimated in action? 
On these two points, Reynaud failed to properly 
reckon that: 1) French Republican tradition since the 
Revolution had been that of one, unified army (levee en 
masse) where specially trained troops were looked upon as a 
potential threat to peace (It was this reasoning that 
prompted Blum to ask if these mobilized units would prepare 
the country for a "great Napoleonic scheme" and Daladier, 
to warn that such a force would be an open invitation to the 
118 
right Frenchman to make a "tour de l'Europe" ); and 
2) because of World War I and the resultant huge loss of 
life, the French were particularly sensitive to schemes that 
suggested additional sacrifices. Thus it was not sufficient 
to point out that if the armored corps did its job, it would 
thwart the enemy and bring the war to a successful concl11sion. 
To preserve its precious strategy of lightning maneuver and 
armored offensive warfare, the plan should have been padded 
against anticipated contingencies such as loss of life. In 
this respect, closer ties with the national army whose 
troops if properly skilled could have filled in casualty 
gaps was the best solution. 
118Joc, March 15, 1935, p. 1025 and January 29, 1937, 
p. 258 .. 
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In the chamber, there were deputies who to varying 
degrees supported Reynaud's views but they were politically 
weak. More important personnages were alienated from 
Reynaud or disaffected by his views or both: and if Reynaud 
could draw widespread applause from the chamber, it was 
transitory and without effect since there was no party to 
push his views. 
Reynaud's political groups, the Centre Republicain 
and the Alliance, proved to be of little help amidst their 
differences and divisions. When Reynaud because of illness 
was absent from the chamber on December 26, 1935, the date 
his amendment was scheduled to be discussed, no one from 
the Centre Republicain defended his views. 119 A year later, 
on March 28, 1938, practically no one from the Alliance 
supported Reynaud's proposal for a national union government. 
From this, it can be concluded that Reynaud was an 
exceedingly bad politician, and yet this is an evaluation 
that carries both merits and disadvantages. Unfettered by 
party ties, he was free to develop his innovative system of 
defense, but in his isolation, he lacked the influence to 
make his views take hold. He was, in fact, the political 
counterpart to de Gaulle's isolation in the military world. 
The rapid disintegration of Reynaud's defense views--
concurrent with his "burst of optimism phase"--took place 
119 JOC, December 26, 1935, p. 2774. Even though 
Reynaud's measure had been voted down in the army conunission, 
it was still entitled to a hearing in the chamber. 
r 
during Daladier's prewar cabinet of 1938-39. After he 
joined the Radical premier at the justice ministry on 
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April 11, 1938 and then transferred to the finances on 
November 1, 1938, Reynaud voted for all the defense budgets 
as well as the measures approving foreign policy. This was 
done with the knowledge that Daladier was opposed to 
tactical warfare as laid .down in Reynaud's amendment. It 
was done even though Daladier's policy of appeasement was 
opposed to Reynaud's concept of loyalty to allies especially 
in the case of Czechoslovakia. 
The case of Spain also indicated that there were 
basic contradictions between what Reynaud said and how he 
voted or acted. By opting for nonintervention in co-oper-
ation with Great Britain, Reynaud defeated his foreign 
policy on two fronts: 1) by failingto come to the aid of a 
European democracy resisting fascist aggression and 2) in 
failing to further the aims of collective security by 
mutually assisting the Soviets in Spain and thus tightening 
the bond between Russia and France. This discrepancy became 
more pronounced after the commencement of the Daladier 
prewar ministry when it beca~e clear both Italy and Germany 
were in violation of nonintervention in Spain. 
In light of this pattern of action which on Spain 
predated the Daladier regime by two years, one tends to 
question the application to Reynaud of the phrase, 
antimunichois. Used loosely by historians to describe the 
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foes of appeasement in the last years of the Third Republic, 
it was meant to encompass those deputies who resisted 
fascist aggression. Surely this cannot apply to Reynaud's 
position on Spain over which he urged neutrality for fear 
of endangering the Marseilles-North Africa line of commu-
nication and later, recognition of the fascist regime of 
Franco helped to power by Germany and Italy. Reynaud's 
collaboration with Daladier and his refusal to bow out of 
the Radical's cabinet after Munich suggest that the term 
antimunichois was in this case, a misnomer. 
Reynaud was totally submerged in the complicated 
politics of the last years of the Third Republic. In this 
respect, his voting pattern was motivated more by political 
or professional reasons than by his aforeexamined national 
defense views which in the end were limited in vision, were 
not well adapted to the climate of the chamber, and were 
crippled by Reynaud's parliamentary isolation. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESPONSE FROM THE MILITARY 
The military who for the most part rejected 
Reynaud's ideas participated in only a portion of national 
defense administration which in France was controlled at the 
top by the Supreme Council of National Defense (CSDN}. This 
body was made up of the premier, his war, navy, and air 
ministers, a research commission and the Secretariat 
General. Various members of the Supreme War Council (CSG} 
or high command attended in an advisory capacity but did not 
have the power to vote. Since the CSDN met infrequently 
during the 1930s, real control was vested in the premier and 
through him, in the war minister who convoked the CSG when 
he wanted advice. This arrangement truly reflected the aims 
of the founding fathers of the Third Republic who during the 
period of the provisional government (1871-75} had con-
structed a constitution giving ultimate power to the 
parliament. Thus the chamber approved premier appointed the 
war minister who in turn consulted the military leaders. 
Such a system intended that the army be kept strictly in a 
subordinate role, a position which would make a revolt or a 
coup difficult. 
The CSG constituted the essence of the high command 
or general staff and included the war minister, the chief of 
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the general staff, the vice president of the same council, 
the three joint chiefs of staff (war, navy, air), the 
generals of the twelve largest divisions, the commander-in-
chief of the troops in Morocco, the chief of staff of the 
colonies and Marshal Petain. It served as an organ of study 
that the war minister consulted on such matters as mobil-
ization, troop concentrat.ions, adoption of new materials, 
and general organization of the army. 
The Secretariat General, a body that directed 
defense expenditures and planning, weakened co-ordination 
by making itself directly responsible to the war minister 
instead of working jointly with the latter and the military 
chiefs. Administered by a controller general of the army 
but staffed to some extent by civilian personnel, the 
secretariat had representatives in most of the departments 
of national defense. Its unilateral decisions on finances, 
however, were often made without the consent of the high 
command, a factor that General Maxime Weygand has cited as 
having impeded defense efforts during the 1930s. 1 
Weygand, who served as vice president of the CSG and 
generalissmio of French troops (de facto commander-in-chief) 
from 1931-35, was born an illegitimate in Brussels in 1867. 
1
weygand, Memoires, 2:400. National defense organ-
ization in France during the interwar period was complicated. 
For an attempt at an explanation, see Lieutenant-Colonel 
Jean Vial, "La Defense nationale: son organisation entre les 
deux guerres," Revue d'histoire de la deuxi~me guerre 
mondiale 1 (April 1953) :11-32. 
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Physically small and high strung like Reynaud, he graduated 
in 1887 from St. Cyr (the French West Point) after which he 
taught at Saumer. In 1914, he became the military adjutant 
' 
of Marshal Foch who in suffering from a difficulty in 
expressing himself made excellent use of Weygand's talent 
for translating ideas into an orderly and effective expose. 
Weygand, a general in 1918 (even though he had 
never commanded troops in action), became in the same year, 
France's permanent representative at the Versailles peace 
negotiations. Sent to Poland as the military advisor to 
Marshal Pilsudski in 1920, he was instrumental in pushing 
back the Russians which in turn brought a Polish victory 
the following year. In 1922, he put down a revolt in Syria 
and the year after, he became the high commissioner for both 
that country and Libya. In 1924, Weygand not only became 
director of the Centre des Hautes Etudes Militaires but also 
a member cf the CSG. Appointed chief of the general staff 
in 1930, he was, following Petain's retirement in 1931, made 
vice president of the CSG, generalissimo, and inspector 
general of the army, all at the age of sixty-four. 2 
Thus from 1931 to January of 1935, he held the 
nation's top military titles, an unenviable position since 
2
rn 1929, Petain suggested Weygand's name as his 
successor in the position of chief of the general staff, but 
Minister of War Paul Painleve objected on the grounds that 
Weygand, a practicing Catholic and mer.ber of the Republican 
Federation, posed a possible threat to the regime. Painlev~ 
was replaced by Andr~ Maginot and Weygand was appointed. 
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his time was spent arguing with Minister of War Oaladier 
over budget cuts, dismissal of officers and troop reductions. 
Later, after the Stavisky riots when Oaladier was replaced 
by the more sympathetic Ooumergue government, Weygand was 
occupied by the effects of the approaching annees creuses 
and the solution he felt was needed, the Two Year Law. 
Because of these problems.and his other duties, Weygand as 
he noted in his Memoires had little time for technical 
questions. 3 To his credit, the General did motorize certain 
divisions as well as parts of others, and he did initiate 
the development of a OLM which in maneuvers during 1932, 
however, did not live up to expectations. 4 
Weygand was sixty-eight and retired when Reynaud and 
de Gaulle took their campaign to the public in March 1935. 
Yet in a series of articles in the influential Revue des deux 
mondes and other journals, he repeatedly expressed his 
opposition to the armored corps. France, noted Weygand, 
could not have two armies. The armored corps would turn the 
national army into one of second choice: " .•• a National 
Guard without pride and enthusiasm. 115 From the viewpoint of 
3weygand, Memoires, 2:407. 
4Gamelin, Servir, 2:83. The OLM developed from the 
detachement mecanique de combat or unite blindee. 
5General Maxime Weygand, "L'Etat militaire de la 
France," Revue des deux mondes, October 15, 1936, p. 725; 
Weygand, 11 L 1 Unite de 1 1armee, 11 Revue militaire generale 1 
(January 1937) :18; Weygand, "L'Arm~e d'aujourd'hui," Revue 
des deux mondes 40 (May 15, 1938) :334; Weygand, "La France 
doit etre aussi fort que sage," Agence litteraire 
strategy, firepower, the lesson of the last war, remained 
all powerful while couverture and fortifications were the 
mainstays against attack. 6 
Although Weygand did not wholly commit himself to 
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the defensive, he never formulated a novel tactical plan of 
attack or counter attack. Speed, maneuverability, and tank 
action remained for him a. nebulous affair and his writings 
led the reader to expect a World War I frontal system to 
develop characterized by a static, linear conflict. Silent 
on the technical revolution in strategy and tactics, Weygand 
in 1937 wrote that "The military force$ of France are in a 
material and moral state to respond to all that the service 
of the country demands of it. 117 
The same vagueness on the new techniques in warfare 
permeated the writings of the aged but revered Marshal 
Petain, minister of war in 1934. Born in 1856, Petain 
graduated from Saint-Cyr in 1878, entered the Ecole de 
Guerre or war college in 1888, and taught an infantry course 
at the latter from 1909 to 1910. He was gradually promoted 
by the seniority system so that in 1914, he had reached the 
rank of colonel. Petain, by his famous defense of Verdun in 
internationale service de presse, n.d., unpaginated [in 
Reynaud Papers, "Dossier Militaire 1936-1938," AN]. 
6weygand, "L'Arm~e," Revue des deux mondes, May 15, 
1938, pp. 325-26. 
7General Maxime Weygand, La France est-elle 
defendue? (Paris: Flammarion, 1937), p. 46. 
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1916 and by his success in restoring morale and discipline 
among the northern armies in 1917, won for himself the title 
of Marshal of France in November 1918. In 1920, he was made 
vice president of the CSG, a position which automatically 
made him commander-in-chief designate in time of war. Two 
years later, he was appointed inspector general of the army. 
These positions made him the top ranking soldier in the 
French army up to the moment of his retirement in 1931. 
Petain, married for the first time after he had 
reached the age of sixty, could best be described as 
cautious. Possessed of excellent health and blessed with 
endurance and longevity, the Marshal, through the system of 
army advancement, moved slowly to the top ranks of the 
military in a way that others could have only done through 
war time service. Petain, of peasant stock, was orientated 
toward the ancien regime: a nominal Catholic, a nationalist, 
and a monarchist who felt that Third Republican politics and 
politicians were totally corrupt and rotten. The assessment 
of some contemporaries that Petain wavered between senility 
and rationality during the 1930s was perhaps an overaction 
to his innate qualities of aloofness and secretiveness. 8 
8The charge of senility is raised by Gamelin in 
Assemblee nationale, Temoignage et documents recueillis par 
la commission chargee d'enqueter sur les evenements survenus 
en France de 1933 a 1945 [annexes-depositions] (hereafter 
cited simply as Temoignage), 9 vols. (Paris: Presses 
universitaires de France, 1951-52), 2:462. Jacques Szaluta, 
however, in an extensive study of works on the Marshal in 
his "Petain between Two wars: 1918-40. Interplay of 
Personality and Circumstance" (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia 
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Petain was ambitious. His official retirement in 
1931, in fact, marked the beginning of his most active role 
in the history of the Third Republic. He was assisted in 
this course by the fact that he was a life member of both 
the CSG and the CSDN. Because of these positions and the 
hero worship given him by an uninformed public, Petain 
wielded an influence on military history during the 1930s 
equivalent to that he exercised as commander-in-chief 
designate during the first postwar decade. 9 
This influence was used to keep his name in the 
running in4ependently from the two most important soldiers 
of the thirties, Weygand and Gamelin. In 1932 and in 
opposition to both of these generals, the then retired 
Petain informed the CSG that fortified centers from Montmedy 
to the coast were a mistake. As a result, the CSG in a 
June 4, 1932 meeting voted (much to the chagrin of Gamelin 
and Weygand) 7-6 against permanent fortifications of this 
sector. Instead, the Marshal proposed that the French army 
go into Belgium, a plan he advocated two years later as war 
minister. 
University, 1971), pp. 249-51, states that this was due to 
his personality and that Petain was "alert." 
9
"The mass of historical evidence," wrote Szaluta, 
"bears that [Colonel Alphonse] Goutard's thesis [on the 
effect of Petain on military thought] is more nearly correct 
[than Alfred Conquet's]. Szaluta continued that "Petain's 
influence permeated French military thought, and although 
he was not very active in propagating his ideas, his 
influence nevertheless was enormous." See Szaluta, "Marshal 
Petain," p. 249. 
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In 1933, his chief of staff, General Auguste Laure, 
submitted a proposal to the war minister drastically 
altering the composition of France's twenty divisions, a 
plan constructed without the approval of either Gamelin or 
Weygand. Moreover in December 1933, when Weygand was 
soliciting support in opposition to the Bernier resolution, 
Petain refused to inform him of his position until the 
moment of the showdown between Daladier and the CSG on 
December 18, 1933. 10 
Petain also chartered an independent course vis a 
vis his aspiring literary career be it through books or 
journals such as Revue des deux mondes. His staff writers 
took his ideas and put them into words to which the name of 
Marshal Philippe Petain was attached. In this respect, he 
came into a direct clash with de Gaulle who during the 1920s 
had been one of the Marshal's ghost writers but who now 
desired recognition. The affair concerned La France et son 
armee, published in 1938 under the authorship of de Gaulle. 
Prepared during the 1920s by de Gaulle, the manuscript was 
intended to reflect the ideas of Petain on the French army 
down through the ages. When feelers were put out for 
publication around 1930, de Gaulle demanded credit. 
Although the book did not appear at that time, de Gaulle and 
10Gamelin, Servir, 2:100; Bankwitz, Weygand, p. 103; 
David Coox, "French Military Doctrine 1919-1939: Concepts 
of Ground and Material Warfare" (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
University, 1951), pp. 46-48. Petain was opposed to the 
reduction of troops as anticipated by the Bernier resolution. 
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Petain were alienated one from the other, a factor that did 
not favorably dispose Petain to de Gaulle's military theories 
as later expounded by his political mentor, Reynaud. 
In Petain's defense, he was not unaware of certain 
aspects of the revolution in military strategy. A 1935 
article written in Revue des deux mondes recognized that 
armored engines required new strategy and that success in 
avoiding stabilization of fronts demanded brutal aggression.11 
That same year in a speech at the Ecole de Guerre, the 
Marshall observed that victory would go to those who would 
be able to exploit modern engines to a maximum, combining 
12 their action in some plan so as to defeat the adversary. 
Moreover, at St. Quentin on October 4, 1936, Petain noted 
that the defensive had seen its day and that only modern 
means or the offensive would ultimately be effective. 13 
Petain, however, never indicated the details of 
this plan and a result, ambiguity, confusion, and contra-
diction marked many of his more important pronouncements. 
11Marshall Philippe Petain, La Securite de la France 
au cours des annees creuses," Revue des deux mondes 26 
(March 1, 1935):!-xxi. Petain supported Reynaud's idea of a 
unified command. He also foresaw that aviation would change 
future wars, how exactly was not clear. See Petain, 
"Defense nationale et commandement unique," Revue des deux 
mondes, May 1, 1936, ·PP· 5-17 and Le oevoir des ~lites dans 
la d~fense nationale (Paris: Editions Berger-Levrault, 1939), 
pp. 26-27. 
12speech given on April 6, 1935. Michel Dacier, "Les 
Responsabilites politiques du desastre de 1940. A propos 
d'une lettre de M. Paul Reynaud," Ecrits de Paris, no. 236 
(April 1965), p. 7. 
13Ibid. 
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This began with his appearance as war minister before the 
senate army commission on March 7, 1934. French troops, 
Petain told the senators, would move up into Belgium in case 
of attack. 14 What strategy they would follow once there 
remained to be seen. No mention was made of whether tanks 
would be allowed to take independent action instead of being 
made subordinate to the infantry. Further, in his eight 
months as war minister, P~tain never made a public pro-
nouncement on Versl'arm~e de metier, then on sale in the 
bookstalls and at a time when Petain had a great deal of 
influence. Later, when Gamelin suddenly became aware of the 
importance of armored divisions and tried to get the approval 
of the CSG on the matter, Petain did not second Gamelin's 
request. 
Petain's first mention of Reynaud's proposal came in 
his preface to General Narcisse Chauvineau's 1939 book, 
Une Invasion est-il encore possible? In the forward, Petain 
warned that the professional army risked having no tomorrow 
if no guarantee could be taken against its initial failure; 
and since reserves were lacking for this corps, its capa-
bilities remained in doubt. Further, the Marshal stated: 
"It seems also that the technical possibilities of tanks and 
the possibilities of the command of armored divisions might 
not have been sufficiently studied." Petain in fact antic-
ipated the return to the 1914-18 system when he endorsed the 
14Gamelin, Servir, 2:128. 
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"less ambitious but more sure" ideas of Chauvineau. "The 
outstanding merit of General Chauvineau," wrote Petain, 
"will have been to show that the continuous front is at the 
same time founded on the lessons of history and on the 
technical effectiveness of arms and fortifications .• 
The Marshal in a course given at the Ecole de 
Sciences Politiques downplayed the effects of tanks which he 
claimed were limited as evidenced by the Spanish Civil War 
and which he felt should be kept strictly as accompaniment 
for the infantry. 16 In an incredibly naive passage which 
canceled out his previous insights, Petain wrote: 
But the era of technical surprise in relation 
to it [armored vehicles/tanks] is passed, and this 
has resulted from the development of the antitank 
weapon, an auxiliary weapon destined--like the 
artillery--to help the infantry ...• The latter 
will stimulate defensive power which by means of 
permanent fortifications in open country will 
restrain the mobility [?of armored vehicles] and 
will necessitate a vast organization of the infantry 
proper to the defensive.17 
Mistaken on military strategy but venerated by both 
parliament and public alike, Petain refused to withdraw from 
the military arena of the 1930s. His few observations on 
armored engines came after his eight months as war minister. 
15General Narcisse Chauvineau, Une Invasion est-elle 
encore possible? with a Preface by Marshal Philippe P~tain 
(Paris: Editions Berger Levrault, 1939), pp. xii, xiii, xxi. 
16Marshal Petain et al., cours de defense nationale 
(Paris: Ecole Libres des Sciences Politiques, 1939), pp. 103, 
112. 
l 7 Ibid • I p • 113 • 
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Moreover, these later pronouncements were fragmentary, 
generalized and did not seize the initiative in working for 
a drastic alteration of the 1921 system. What benefit of 
truth that lay in them was eventually lost by his identif i-
cation with poorly conceived and badly mistaken works. 
Petain in the postwar parliamentary investigation implied 
that he was weak and lacked influence. 18 If such was the 
case, why did he not retire instead of involving himself in 
the military-politico imbroglio of the 1930s? 
General Maurice Gamelin, chief of the general staff 
and commander-in-chief designate from 1935-39, was more 
direct in his objections to Reynaud's project than either 
Weygand or P~tain. Born in 1872 and graduated from St. Cyr 
in 1893, Gamelin served on the staff of General Joffre from 
1902 to 1911 and later became his military secretary or chef 
de cabinet. A major in the opening year of the First World 
War, Gamelin had been the first to grasp the significance of 
German General von Kluck's swing southeast (Schlieffen Plan) 
and as a result, he got Joffre to act immediately, an action 
which led to the Marne victory. 
In 1916, Gamelin became brigadier general and·in 
1917-18, he served as commander of the ninth division, 
keeping it in action when in the last year of the war it was 
almost completely surrounded. Appointed head of a military 
mission to Brazil in 1919, Gamelin served there until 1925 
18Temoignage, 1:167-70. 
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when he was transferred to Syria after which came his 
commission as commander of the twentieth army corps at 
Nancy (1929). In 1931, he was made chief of the general 
staff, a position which still left him subordinate to 
Weygand until the latter's retirement. In January of 1935, 
a sixty-three year old Gamelin became commander-in-chief. 
A small, stout man, Gamelin has been desceibed by 
various sources as learned, cerebral, academic, and skilled 
in the discussion of ideas--a characterization that 
suggested he had become another fatality of peacetime in 
which the practical skills of a military commander rusted. 
His relationship with his immediate subordinate, General 
Alphonse Georges, commander in chief of the important armies 
of the northeast, was less than harmonious, a situation 
which caused divided loyalties to develop in the highest 
ranks of the army. More important, Gamelin because of a 
basic personality clash, got on badly with Weygand with whom 
he had to work during the difficult period from 1931 to 1935. 
In contrast, he enjoyed good relations with Oaladier (as 
well as with other key politicians such as Fabry) and on 
more than one occasion during the defense cuts and troop 
reductions of 1933, he sided with Daladier much to the 
chagrin of Weygand. 
Gamelin in a 1935 report stressed that an armee de 
metier would: 1) result in two separate armies; 2) require 
too many men; and 3) cost too much. Moreover, the armored 
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corps would not lighten the tasks of the troops defending 
frontier fortifications and in actual combat, it would wear 
out too fast since properly trained replacements would be 
lacking. 19 
In another study, Gamelin questioned the effect the 
specialized corps would have on the morale of a national 
army relegated to a seconpary position. Reynaud's proposal 
to teach and train the regular army's active and reserve 
ranks by members of the armored corps, Gamelin argued, was 
a serious error. The colonels of the regiments would feel 
alienated from their officers and men by the interference 
from this elite. A natural sense of inferiority was sure to 
follow. What France needed according to Gamelin was the 
opposite of Reynaud's proposal: one, single, unified army, 
an army with no preference given to any special sector. 20 
Gamelin repeated the same idea when in response to 
the Blum ministry's demand for information on the armored 
corps, he wrote that the national army not the armee de 
metier had to be the dynamic element. Further, modern war-
fare envisaged the "saturation of fronts" which called more 
for large numbers of troops rather than for their special-
ization. Finally, the problems of instruction, supply, 
19General Maurice Gamelin, Etude relative a l'amende-
ment de Paul Reynaud, n.d., pp. 1, 3, 6-7 [in Reynaud 
Papers, "Dossier Militaire - 1935," AN]. 
20Etat-major de l'arm~e, Examen du contre projet de 
M. Paul Reynaud, n.d., pp. 4-5, 7, 13 [in Reynaud Papers, 
"Dossier Mili taire - 193 5," A..."'J] • 
antitank artillery, finances, and materiel all worked 
against justifying the glorified position of the armored 
corps. 21 
In spite of these objections, Gamelin was not 
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opposed to moving in the direction of Reynaud's instrument 
of maneuver. He was aware, in fact, that tanks were more 
important than permanent fortifications. 22 Indeed, the 
largest portion of the fourteen billion francs allocated for 
the four year plan of rearmament (January 1937 - December 
1940) was devoted to the production of mechanized and 
motorized equipment. 23 Moreover, on October 14, 1936 and 
December 15, 1937, Gamelin suggested to the CSG that the 
army develop an offensive instrum~nt of attack or counter 
attack similar to the German panzer divisions. 24 
Gamelin, however, did not allow the tank to be 
liberated so as to pursue its tactical action of surprise 
and maneuver. It was still harnessed to the ideas layed 
21L 1 Etat-major de l'armee, SECRET: Notes pour le 
cabinet militaire du ministre: reponses aux questions poses 
par la note N° 3689 du 7 juin 1936 au sujet du corps 
sp~cialise et des ameliorations a apporter a notre 
organisation actuelle, July 1, 1936, pp. 1-6 [in Reynaud 
Papers, "Dossier Militaire 1936-38," AN]. 
22Gamelin, Servir, 1:306. 
23Temoignage, 1:199-200 and Gamelin, Servir, 2:244-46. 
24Temoignage, 1:107 and in the conclusions of the 
same study: Ra ort fait au nom de la Commission • . . ar 
M. Charles Serre (herea ter cited simply as Rapport , 
2 vols., 2:182-197. 
down in the Instruction sur l'emploi tactique des grandes 
unitAs as stipulated in 1921 and reiterated in 1936. The 
infantry was still the primary fighting force and tanks 
along with the artillery were to join with it in a 
t . 1 25 supper ive ro e. 
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Resistance to Reynaud's proposal characterized the 
ideas of other leading generals. Most noticeable among 
these was General Marie-Eugene Debeney, chief of the general 
staff from 1923-30, who although retired after this date was 
still active from a literary point of view. Debeney, who 
had begun his career as a rifleman, worked his way up 
through the ranks until by 1914 he had become a professor 
at the Ecole de Guerre. In May of 1915, he was made 
commander of a division and in 1917, he was appointed major-
general to Petain assisting the latter in the breakthrough 
victories of 1918. Described as cautious, pessimistic, as 
well as Petain's mouthpiece, Debeney played a major role in 
the composition of the Instruction of 1921 and the plans 
concerning the Maginot Line. 
In addition to criticizing the armored corps for its 
costliness, lack of reserves, impracticality in terms of 
instructing the regular army, destruction of morale, and 
bifurcation of the national army, Debeney in a 1935 article 
argued that the mechanized corps would fare poorly in the 
frontier region because of the wooded -terrain. With this 
25Temoignage, 1:105 and Gamelin, Servir, 2:237, 306. 
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factor impeding its progress and mobility, the professional 
army would be of limited value assisting the covering 
troops. Consequently, any thought of mutual assistance 
beyond the frontier was an "intolerable pretention." 26 If 
the country was to be subjected to a lightning attack, 
Debeney wrote in 1938, France had to rely on its fortifi-
. d . t 27 cations an covering roops. 
Aside from their distrust of an elitist corps, the 
belief of Debeney and other generals that mechanized 
divisions were tactically limited followed from the failure 
to carry out sufficient maneuvers. 28 In this regard, the 
role of General Julien Duf ieux, inspector general of 
infantry and tanks (1931-38} and member of the CSG during 
the 1930s, was crucial. Chief of Petain's operations bureau 
during World War I, literary critic for Le Figaro's military 
pages, and friend of Weygand's, Dufieux--following improp-
erly held operations near Valmy (Camp Mailly} in 1932--
advised Weygand against the concept of tanks as autonomous 
26General Debeney, ''Encore l'armee de metier," Revue 
des deux mondes 28 (July 15, 1935} :281-95. Debeney thought 
the frontier could be expanded if the German-Belgium border 
was considered as an extension of France's border. In this 
situation, according to Debeney, the armored corps might 
have possibilities. 
27General Debeney, La Guerre et les hommes (Paris: 
Librairie Plon, 1937}, pp. 176-208. 
29The 1932 chamber protested the heavy expenses 
incurred from "grandes manoeuvres spectaculaires." There-
after, the maneuvers were kept smaller and several forms 
were combined into one exercise. See Coox, "French Military 
Doctrine," p. 131. 
r 
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units. It was his opinion that the tank was meant to 
accompany the infantry. 29 Thereafter, Weygand until his 
retirement in January 1935 encouraged little experimentation 
with independent mechanized corps. This lack of practical 
application thus forced high ranking officers to rely on 
supposition and conjecture. 
General Georges, ~ member of the CSG, maintained 
that German panzer division tactics were a serious error and 
that their tanks would be destroyed in open country. 30 
Georges, commander of an infantry division in 1914, later 
served under Weygand on Foch's staff. In 1926, he was chief 
of staff to Petain during the suppression of the Riff tribe 
rebellion in French Morocco, and in 1931, after having 
served as war Minister Maginot's chef de cabinet, Georges 
was appointed commander of the nineteenth corps in Algiers. 
Seriously wounded during the 1934 assassination of Barthou 
and King Alexander of Yugoslavia, Georges sufficiently 
recovered to become the framer of the 1936 Instruction on 
the tactical employment of divisions. If war broke out, the 
General was to become commander of the armies in the north-
east. Shortly before World War II, Georges stated in a 
29Rapport, 1:78-79. 
30Pertinax, Gravediggers, p. 11. 
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course that no new methods of warfare had evolved since 
1918. 31 
~ 
In contrast, General Joseph Maurin, war minister in 
1934-35, knew that factors of success in future war moved 
around mass and surprise. 32 Maurin who had been the 
prodigee of Jof f re and who had been attached to his general 
staff since .1914 was a retired gunner and on the point of 
going blind when his appointment as war minister was carried 
out at the recommendation of his predecessor and friend, 
Marshal Petain. Maurin's ideas, however, never progressed 
beyond the generalizations of one who was unsure of the 
changes in strategy. Indeed, four years before the publi-
cation of his 1938 book, L'Armee moderne, in which Maurin 
recognized some of these changes, 33 the former artillery 
officer stated to the chamber that " ... a man protected 
by cement or by steel has more value than another--not only 
because he lasts longer but because he feels that his life 
is protected. 1134 
31E. Tollemache, "French Military Training for 
Defeat," Quarterly Review, October 1941, pp. 182, 186, 188. 
32General Joseph Maurin, L'Armee moderne (Paris: 
Flammarion, 1938), pp. 87-88, 132, 134. 
33Pertinax refers to this book as the "best of all 
the second rate military literature of the day." See his 
Gravediggers, p. 328. 
34Joc, November 22, 1954, p. 2589. 
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Maurin took an immediate dislike to Reynaud's Le 
Probleme militaire francais. In an article in Paris Soir 
entitled: "No, Mr. Paul Reynaud, the Military Chiefs are 
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not Conformist," Maurin charged that the elitist corps would 
not only drain the regular army but that it would also make 
the latter feel inferior. 35 Worse still were Reynaud's 
claims that military personnel were nothing more than 
technicians, that they could not be relied upon to activate 
important reform, and that it was up to civilian leaders to 
engage such an action. In his article, Maurin reacted to 
this portion of the book by stating that such attitudes were 
erroneous and that they in turn made the job of the high 
command even more difficult. Further, Maurin in a veiled 
reference to de Gaulle (who he is reputed to have removed 
from the promotion list in 1936) frowned upon politicians 
who with the aid of ambitious officers took off on exhil-
arating but irresponsible adventures in the military arena. 36 
By far and large the best example of how the 
departure from strategic reality retarded the evolution of 
French military thought lay in the 1939 book of General 
Chauvineau, Une Invasion, est-elle encore possible? A 
brilliant technician on fortifications and one of the most 
celebrated professors at the Ecole de Guerre, Chauvineau, 
35Paris Soir, July 27, 1937, p. 4. To Maurin' s credit, 
he did argue for the need to increase tank and gun production. 
36Ibid. See Appendix C for details on de Gaulle's 
removal from the promotion list. 
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"the high priest of fire power," wrote that the tank 
because of fuel limitations was entirely subordinate to the 
infantry, the latter continuing as the true protector of 
the frontiers. Cement fortifications, antitank obstacles, 
and especially antitank guns would cause armored vehicles 
to fail in an invasion. In the end, the tank was an 
instrument of couverture, an armored engine which along with 
the infantry was designed for defensive action in the 
maintenance of frontal continuity. 37 
With such attitudes expressed by the more illus-
trious members of the high command, it was no surprise that 
attempts to foster the ideas of Reynaud in the CSG met with 
a great deal of opposition. Almost all of its fifteen 
generals repeatedly voted .against Gamelin's proposal for a 
French counterpart to the German panzer divisions with the 
comment that the idea needed "more study." 
One of the few officers to disagree was General 
Pierre Hering, commander of France's only DLM (Rheims) and 
a correspondent of Reynaud's during 1937. To Hering, 
French armored divisions capable of taking the offensive 
were an absolute must. Still, when the CSG finally decided 
on the creation of two of these divisions on December 2, 
1938, the details of their composition and strategic 
37chauvineau, Une Invasion, pp. 100, 106-7, 205-6. 
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direction were left to some later date. 38 Thus no clear cut 
proof existed that ·the CSG as a whole had been converted 
from the 1921 Instruction with its emphasis on the supremacy 
of the infantry. 
Very much the same frame of mind was evident in an 
opinion handed to the war minister by the Secretariat 
General, an organization charged with administrative control 
over military expenditures and which at the same time 
expanded on its duties by giving opinions on military 
strategy. In addition to echoing the high command's 
distaste for the form of Reynaud's project, the expense, 
the number of recruits involved, the professional army as a 
teaching staff for the national army, the Secretariat 
General objected to the tank strategy as set down in 
Reynaud's 1935 amendment: 
Properly speaking, there is no tank tactic. 
There is a tactic of iniantry detail in which 
tanks have their place--on the same level as the 
machine gunners, general artillery or canons and 
accompanying mortars. 
Far from grouping the tanks in units which 
would have a tendency to conduct their own battle 
in disinteresting themselves from the infantry, 
38Rapport, 2:182-197. These pages contain minutes of 
the meetings of April 29 and October 14, 1936; December 15, 
1937; and December 2, 1938. The CSG included: Generals 
Bellotte, Besson, Colson, Conde, Dufieux, Gamelin, Garchery, 
Georges, Hering, Huntziger, Maurin, Pretelat, and Prioux. 
Ma=shal Petain was marked absent from these sittings. 
it would be necessary to portion them out organ-
ically--at least in certain divisions.39 
Levels of the army below the high command and 
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secretariat also shared the same lack of receptivity to new 
ideas on strategy. Enormous amounts of time were spent 
having the officers do ritual paper work while the schools 
kept them occupied with abstract theory instead of sending 
the cadres out to the field for maneuvers. To aggravate 
this, army code was too scholarly and too involved to excite 
the imagination while at the same time, military literature 
was poor since it was addressed more to 1914-1918 than to 
the world of the 1930s. 4° Finding little to gain from the 
higher ranks in terms of strategical innovation, less well 
known, subordinate officers reflected the misconceptions of 
their superiors. 
General Jean Mordacq, in his 1934 publication, Les 
Lecons de 1914 et la prochaine guerre, believed that Maginot 
s 
Line garrisons were capable of temporarily stopping a 
lightning attack by means of fortifications and fire power. 
39secretariat General de la Guerre, Etude sommaire 
sur la constitution d'un corps specialise, n.d., pp. 11-13 
[in Reynaud Papers, Dossier Militaire - 1935, AN]. 
40commander Tony Albord, Pourquoi cela est arriv~e 
ou les responsabilites d'une gen~ration militaire (Nantes: 
Aux Portes du Lorge, 1946), pp. 98-99. Albord has testified 
that many military journals and reviews remained on library 
tables--their pages uncut and unread. This author has the 
same impression. Some of the articles analyzed in this 
dissertation had to be opened page by page with a pair of 
scissors. 
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While agreeing with the ideas of Reynaud that France had to 
remain strong and that she had to work closely with her 
allies at the outbreak of hostilities, Clemenceau's personal 
military assistant during World War I said little on the 
41 particulars of tank tactics and maneuvers. 
The reliance on fire power a la mode 1914-18 also 
imbued the 1936 article of General X, "L'Armee de metier. 1142 
Since the missle was still superior to armor, the response 
to the German tank had to be the antitank gun. Moreover, 
according to this World war I veteran whose identity is 
unknown, it was wrong to believe that armored corps 
divisions would replace France's modern cavalry in wooded 
regions. In addition, this elitist corps of Reynaud, a 
euphemism used to mask the professional army so that it 
would be swallowed by the antimilitarists, would only 
succeed in weakening the regular army by bleeding its 
specialized troops. As in the case of Hordacq's thinking, 
General X's thesis had little to say of tank maneuvers or 
of that portion of the frontier unprotected by fortif i-
cations. 
The inability to understand the strategical 
importance of the tank was widespread throughout the ranks. 
41General Jean Jules Mordacq, Les Lecons de 1914 et 
la prochaine guerre (Paris: Flammarion, 1934), pp. 198, 242, 
256-57. 
42General X, "L'Armee de metier," Mercure de France, 
April 1, 1936, pp. 9, 14-17. 
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colonel A. Grasset in his review of Reynaud's Le Probleme 
militaire francais stressed that couverture troops in large 
numbers stayed the important factor. To him, the Spanish 
' 
civil War showed that tanks did not have an undeniable 
. 't 43 superiori y. In this analysis, however, Grasset neglected 
to consider that on the Spanish front, the antagonists 
failed to mass their tanks--dispersing them instead in 
driblets. In contrast, as such places as Malaga and 
Guadalajara where this massing action had been carried out, 
advances into enemy territory had been considerable. 
These successes failed to convince such officers as 
Colonel Mainie who claimed in 1937 that the speed of th~ 
tank would create a fatal separation between the rest of 
the army and itself. It ~as necessary, observed Mainie, 
that an armored force depend on infantry and artillery. 44 
Sharing his view, Commandant Armand Krebs wrote in the same 
year that tanks had the triple role of accompanying the 
infantry, engaging in antitank fights and carrying out 
reconnaissance. 45 
43colonel A. Grasset, Le Vrai probleme de la securite 
francaise (Seine-et-Oise: La Cause Carrieres-sous-Paissy, 
19 3 7 ) I PP o 9 I 12 • 
44colonel Mainie, "L'Offensive et la d~fensive avec 
les engines blindees," Revue militaire generale, February 
1937, pp. 154, 171. 
45commandant Armand Krebs, "Considerations sur 
l'offensive, 11 Revue militaire generale 2 (September 1937): 
363, 366. 
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Other officers stuck to vague generalities without 
ever mentioning the specifics of strategy. In a review of 
Reynaud's Le Problerne rnilitaire francais, General Duchene 
.,, 
denied Reynaud's premise that French military doctrine 
condemned the offensive. "The most logical and sure way of 
safety," wrote Duchene, "is ••. to contain the aggressor 
by a combined use of men and fortification." Once the 
containment had been effected, it was Duchene's conclusion 
that the French could pass to the offensive. 46 Inherent in 
this view was an inability to grasp the idea that a 
lightning attack had to be met by immediate counter attack 
and not by a holding action aimed at containment. 
Aside from the failure to grasp the nature and 
implications of the corning war as well as the innovations in 
weapons strategy, the officers shared the negativism of 
their chiefs. In reviewing the technical aspects of 
Reynaud's proposal, General Julien Brosse, a professor at 
the Ecole Libre des Sciences Politiques, wrote that such an 
army would interfere with the proper build up of reserves 
since it would bleed men from the regular army. It would 
also drain human resources and materiel. Like Gamelin, 
Bresse stated that the losses sustained by this elitist 
group in actual combat could not be easily replaced. 47 On 
46L'Echo de Paris, June 17, 1937, p. 1. 
47General Julien Brosse, Les Elements de notre 
defense nationale {Paris: Librairie Militaire Universelle, 
1936) , pp. 89-91. 
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this last point, however, Brosse never allowed for the fact 
that if the armored corps carried out its strategical 
operation properly, it would reduce loss of life by cutting 
short a long and costly war. 
Among these officers--Brosse, Duchene, Krebs, Mainie, 
Grasset, X, Mordacq--caution reigned. Gazes turned toward 
tradition and the events of 1914-18 for help in preparing 
the battles of the future. Such attitudes preempted 
innovative daring and creative response. Thus, the tank was 
deprived of its strategic potential and other concepts such 
as speed and maneuver remained undeveloped. 
To a lesser extent, the same views characterized 
another group of officers who although being able to 
recognize certain beneficial aspects of Reynaud's armored 
corps, either clung to the skirts of the high command or 
failed to salvage those parts of Reynaud's ideas they found 
acceptable. An example of this was General Emile Allehaut 
"' who noted in his Etre pr~ts that the doctrine of invulner-
ability of fronts based on the Maginot Line was fallacious 
and that motorization and mechanization could not be 
effective in the presence of outdated formulas and para-
lyzing dogmatisms. Further, Allehaut argued for taking the 
battle to enemy territory but in order to do this, an army 
of maneuver composed of professional men was needed. 48 
48General Emile Allehaut, Etre Pr~ts (Paris: Berger 
Levrault, 1935), pp. 146, 157, 168, 177, 220. 
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In trying to fit de Gaulle's ideas to his book, 
however, Allehaut ran into difficulty. In addition to 
recruitment problems and cost, the creation of the 
professional corps outside the national army would have the 
unfortunate effect of reducing the regular troops to the 
status of a militia. 49 Thus although Allehaut came close to 
the armored corps in terms of strategy, maneuver and the 
offensive, he could not hurdle the fear of a separate army 
developing. 
Two years later, Colonel Epailly proposed that shock 
troops might be formed from the existing army in order to 
meet a critical situation. Nevertheless, Epailly did not 
give specifics on how this was to be carried out. Further, 
Epailly underestimated the effects of the German panzer 
divisions. "Certain people," he wrote, "imagine that the 
German army is capable of pushing its armored divisions 
into the heart of France within a few days." Epailly went 
on to say that "There is nothing to this [idea]. Our 
neighbor knows perfectly well that one cannot conquer the 
French army by taking a few divisions on an adventure. 1150 
Other officers mirrored confusion when faced with 
the dawn of a new age of warfare. One of these was 
Commandant Jean de Cugnac, a famous French cavalry officer 
49Ibid., pp. 178-79. 
SOColonel Epailly, "La Defense centre une attaque 
allemande par surprise," Revue militaire generale, May 1937, 
pp. 606, 610, 618. 
r 
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from World War I and a participator in the 1927-28 laws on 
the organization of the army. Writing in 1937, de Cugnac 
noted that the Spanish Civil War showed the definite limits 
of tanks and planes. This brought the French back to the 
lesson of 1914-18, the cooperation of arms in which the 
infantry predominated. The contradiction was, however, that 
while de Cugnac denied the tank its independence, he advo-
cated a war of movement plus a rapid plan of attack--an 
impossible combination unless the planes and tanks were 
freed from the fetters of a relatively nonmobile infantry. 51 
Like de Cugnac, General Henri Niessel favored 
bringing the war to the enemy, but similarly, he gave no 
details on how the operation was to be carried out. Niessel, 
a famous French air force officer and de Gaulle's immediate 
superior in Warsaw during the Polish campaign, wrote in 1937 
that success in wartime could only be assured by assuming 
the initiative which naturally meant the need to attack 
first. Niessel, however, was far from the Reynaud-de Gaulle 
thesis. In a direct attack on their approach without 
mentioning either name, he wrote: 
The [political] orators are indeed without 
exception by themselves incompetent. Their docu-
mentation when it has some foundation has been 
collected from irresponsible military personnel; 
the occasionally deductive originality of these 
views is in general of the most debatable value. 
51commandant Jean de Cugnac, "Preparons-nous la 
guerre de mouvement ou la guerre de stabilisation?" Revue 
militaire generale 2 (October 1937) :5, 8, 11. 
r 
The best among the officers content themselves 
to keep their place and to do their work in 
silence instead of seeking political relations 
advantageous for their professional career.52 
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Niessel went on to write that he would not support 
an offensive based on an armored corps. The armored corps 
which was nothing other than a professional army was 
economically, socially, and politically foreign to the 
French and their resources. Moreover, according to Niessel, 
the professional army had been uniformly condemned by the 
"great chiefs of our army. 115 3 
This was not to say that Reynaud lacked supporters. 
A small group of unknownsreiterated for the most part, his 
ideas on strategy. Lieutenant-Colonel Magne wrote in 1936 
that France needed an army capable of maneuver and attack. 54 
Lieutenant-Colonel Lancon elaborated on this. Masses of 
) 
rapidly moving tanks would enter into the action free from 
dependence upon the infantry. Moving in successive ~aves, 
they would overwhelm an enemy position in one blow after 
which the infantry would follow with mop up operations. 55 
General Segonne in a review of Reynaud's Le Probleme 
militaire fran~ais wrote that each Frenchman had to be 
52General Henri Niessel, Le Desequilibre militaire 
(Paris: Editions a l'Etoile, 1937), pp. 166, 170, 196. 
53Ibid., p. 178. 
54Le Petit Journal, November 17, 1936, p. 2. 
55Lieutenant-Colonel Lancon, "La Defense devant la 
mecanisation," Revue militaire fran~aise, October 1936, 
p. 39. 
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inspired by Reynaud's study. Given the gravity of the hour, 
this patriotic work of Reynaud's, according to Segonne, 
presented an excellent solution to the anguishing problem 
of how to defend Franc~. 56 
Other officers such as General Velpry argued for the 
offensive by means of armored engines equipped with 
offensive tactics. Velpry, a noted French tank expert who 
commanded the first French tank battalion in May of 1918, 
felt that the maximum exployment of tanks was as equally 
important if not more so than the use of cement fortif i-
cations. 57 
In a surprising departure from the ideas of many of 
his colleagues, Colonel Charles Gautier in his 1938 book, 
Nos Alliances, 58 predicted a short, swift war that would in 
no way resemble the war of 1914-18. France, according to 
Gautier, simply could not look back to the history of other 
wars for advice. Even the Spanish Civil War was not a good 
example of how future conflict would unfold since the two 
opponents were neither well armed nor organized. 
The date of Gautier's future war was predicted by 
General Daubert to be about 1940. Writing in Mercure de 
56Le Journal, June 3, 1937. 
57General Velpry, "Tactique d'hier et de demain," 
Revue militaire aenerale, February 1938, pp. 188-89. 
58colonel Charles Gautier, Nos Alliances (Paris: 
Berger Levrault, 1938), p. 93. 
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France in 1938, 59 Daubert was one of the few officers to 
stress the need for military collaboration with Belgium, 
Poland, England, and members of the Petite Entente. Further, 
since the Maginot Line was of limited value and since the 
future conflict would be a war of movement, specially 
trained troops would be needed. to operate tanks used for 
speed, surprise, and fire. power. 
In examining the reaction from the military, one is 
struck by the lack of response to Reynaud's plan for 
collective security involving the Petite Entente, Poland 
and Russia. In a sense, this was the result of a defensive 
frame of mind developed over the years by military as well 
as civilians which was reflected in the 1921 Instruction, 
the 1927-28 army, and the ,Maginot Line. Still paying lip 
service to the pacts agreed to during the 1920s, the French 
in reality had no intention of going to the aid of allies. 
One of the best examples of the resulting inconsistency 
occurred with Hitler's reoccupation of the Rhineland--a 
violation of both the Versailles and Locarno Treaties. 
When Foreign Minister Flandin asked General Maurin what 
could be done, the war minister responded that "The French 
army had been entirely conceived for a defensive mission and 
59General Daubert, "D~fense nationale," Mercure de 
France, April 15, 1938, pp. 258-59, 265, 282. 
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that it had nothing prepared and was even less ready for a 
military intervention of this type." 60 
Another reason for the inconsistency was an attitude 
best described by John Young in his doctoral dissertation, 
"Strategy and Diplomacy in France: Some Aspects of the 
Military Factor in the Formulation of French Foreign Policy 
1934-39." "The prospect of a long war," wrote Young, "which 
was as likely to end in def eat as in victory encouraged 
cautious generals and politicians to avoid being provoked 
by issues which did not present an immediate and direct 
threat to security." 61 To Young, this was why the military 
shied away from intervention in the Rhine, Spain, and 
Ethiopia. 62 
To the reader of military periodicals, it explained 
the desire to avoid risk as typified by General X's spring, 
1936 article in Mercure de France. After noting the non-
existence of the Versailles Treaty and resigning himself to 
the inevitability of German rearmament and reoccupation of 
the Rhineland, X made a reference to Reynaud's armored corps. 
GOPierre-Etienne Flandin, Politique francaise 1919-40 
(Paris: Les Editions Nouvelles, 1947), p. 194. 1 
61John Young, "Strategy and Diplomacy in France: Some 
Aspects of the Military Factor in the Formulation of French 
Foreign Policy 1934-39," (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
London, 1969), p. 519. After a well researched study of 
more than 500 pages, Young concluded that there was 
inadequate liaison between military and diplomatic circles. 
This helped to explain why France failed to rectify the 
overextension of her diplomacy. 
62Ibid., p. 519. 
r 
~. 198 
To fly across Europe in order to help friends, X observed, 
was downright pretentious considering that the German army 
could utilize upward of 4,000,000 men. 63 
In actuality, the main criticism leveled against 
Reynaud concerned not the quest for allies but the manner 
in which the armored corps would be used to guarantee pacts 
and agreements. In this respect, there was an overaction 
to Reynaud's plan that suggested he had not adequately 
guaged the resistance to a French force going beyond the 
frontier. General Victor Bourret argued that the sending 
of such a force vite et loin (fast and far) or from one 
end of Europe to the other had never been witnessed in 
European history. Further, in case something went awry, the 
French with their capital and industries near the border did 
not have the great spaces to retreat and maneuver as did the 
Ru~sians. 64 
Indeed, the overriding view of the day was one of 
caution. One officer writing under the pseudonym of trois 
etoiles (three stars or ***) noted in his reaction to 
Reynaud's Le Probleme militaire franc;::ais that where an 
armored corps was developed, it would be questionable as to 
whether the .high command and the nation would allow this 
63x, "L'Armee de metier," p. 14. This figure 
included paramilitary organizations such as the SS, the SA, 
portions of the German police force, railroad and postal 
workers as well as former veterans from the previous war. 
64General Victor Bourret, La Tragedie de l'armee 
fran)aise (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1947)., pp. 54, 61. 
~ 
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trump card to travel to a theater of operations remote from 
national territory. 65 Just such an attitude was reflected 
in the words of War Minister Maurin who during Reynaud's 
discourse of March 15, 1935 said to Premier Flandin: "Would 
we be so foolish as to go beyond this barrier [Maginot Line] 
to I do not know what adventure? 1166 
Such attitudes naturally discouraged the tightening 
of ties with the Czechs and Soviets, the latter being the 
core of Reynaud's foreign policy. There was, however, some 
justification in not expecting too much from these allies. 
A commitment to the Czechs naturally understood assistance 
from Russia but the latter was a mystery. Indeed, aside 
from its internal turmoil and the unclear aims of communism 
under Stalin, Russia remained an enigma to the French 
military. 
In 1935, General Loiseau, sent by the general staff 
to Russia on an observation tour, returned with glowing 
reports about the material and moral strength of Stalin's 
army. Loiseau strongly felt, moreover, that concord with 
65Lieutenant Gelot, "Chronique des livres," Revue 
d'infanterie 542 (November 1937) :1128-33. De Gaulle credits 
the work of *** to the entourage of General Gamelin. See 
Reynaud Papers, "Lettres de Gaulle," AN, de Gaulle to 
Reynaud, December 12, 1937. 
66Reynaud, Memoires, 1:434. Two years later, in the 
July 27, 1937 issue of Paris Soir, Maurin claimed that his 
1935 statement meant the Belqium-German border as a frontier. 
Note that he did not refer to the word barrier. 
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Russia would help insure the safety of both Poland and 
czechoslovakia. 67 On the other hand, a report delivered to 
the high conunand made by another officer returning the 
following year stated that the Red Army was insufficiently 
prepared for a war against a great European power. 68 
Because of these conflicting accounts and because of a 
natural reserve toward Stalinist Russia, the chiefs of the 
French army avoided encouraging a pact with teeth in it 
until the summer of 1939--too late since Stalin was 
convinced neither England nor Prence could stand up to an 
attack from Germany. 
********** 
Among the postwar commentary on why Reynaud's 
armored corps miscarried was that of General Jean Perre, an 
officer who served in de Gaulle's fourth army division 
during May-June 1940. Writing in Ecri ts de Paris in 1955, 
Perre cited lack of materiel and prohibitive costs. More 
important in this failure were the tactics used by de Gaulle. 
Perr~ not only disapproved of de Gaulle's door to door 
67 Le Temps, September 20, 1935. 
68oocument of General Schweissguth in Daladier to 
Delbos, October 13, 1936, Documents diplomatiques francaise, 
2e serie, 1936-1939, iii, no. 342, pp. 510-14. Reynaud has 
repeatedly attached considerable responsibility to Marshal 
Petain for condemning an effective alliance with the Soviets. 
He cites as evidence Petain's interview with Le Journal, 
April 30, 1936. In this interview, however, P~tain never 
used the word "condemned"--an expression attributed to him 
by Reynaud. Rather, the Marshal stressed the dangers of an 
alliance with a power whose raison d'etre was its belief in 
communism. See Reynaud, Memoires, 2:157. 
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campaign among politicians but he also felt that de Gaulle's 
1934 publication, Versl'armee de metier fatally compromised 
the armored corps by mixing it with a professional army--
an impossible concept in a country wracked by internal 
political turmoil. 69 In such a situation, how could France 
use an armoredcorps to conduct preventative and repressive 
action against an enemy? 
Most important to Perre were the technical weak-
nesses inherent in de Gaulle's conceptions. His ideas were 
too general to find specific solutions to tactical problems. 
Among other defects was the fact heavy tanks in the 1930s 
could not exceed fifteen kilometers an hour (9 3/8 miles). 
This would prevent them from being effectively integrated 
into line divisions. Further, the length of the column 
itself would make it a monster--difficult to control and to 
manage. 70 
Joining Perre in this criticism was Commandant 
Jacques Minart, one time secretary of the CSDN during the 
disarmament conferences (1932-34) and later a provost-
marshal under Vichy. Minart went straight to de Gaulle's 
69General Jean Perre, "De Gaulle, proph~te de la 
guerre des blindees?" Ecrits de Paris, June 1955, pp. 75-78. 
70
rbid., pp. 75, 78. In his article, Perre noted 
that the 1940 panzer divisions were too large and had to be 
thinned down both in the number of tanks and troops. The 
same proved true of American divisions later on in the war. 
These had to be divided into three parts and then, there 
was a need to lighten them further. Note, however, Perre 
did not raise this point before the war. 
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• 1934 publication and severely criticized it for its failure 
~ 
~ 
to go into more detail on speed and production. Where were 
the point by point specifics on the rules of deployment for 
the armored corps--be they used in autonomous enterprises 
or in conjunction with operations by the rest of the army? 
What were the details on how the artillery would combine 
with the tanks or how the tanks would combine with the 
infantry?71 
The weakest spot according to Minart was the failure 
to adequately pair aviation with the tanks. The Germans in 
1940 had succeeded in combining the speed of the tank engine 
with the power of the dive bomber, the latter being used as 
an extension of artillery. De Gaulle had no comparable plan 
for French planes which were to serve mainly in the role of 
reconnaissance and as fighters. "The military readers," 
wrote Minart, "would have been really excited by his [de 
~aulle's] work if it had shown how to combine the aerial 
trump of power with the armored trump of speed." 72 
Minart, however, felt that Versl'armee de metier was 
needed if only to strike the spirit of French officers who 
for the most part had slipped into apathy and indifference. 73 
The book should have been a stepping stone toward stimulating 
71commandant Jacques Minart, "La Doctrine militaire 
du Commandement de Gaulle," Le Crapouillot, no. 17 (1952), 
p. 27. 
72 Ibid., p. 28. 
73 rbid., pp. 27-28. 
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more creative thinking; but instead, almost to a man, it was 
ignored or rejected. 
Postwar military did not exclude their fellow 
comrades from the blame in this rejection of de Gaulle's 
ideas. General Gabriel Gluck in a 1947 article noted the 
mistakes of Colonel Perre and General Keller in believing 
that in 1940, the tank remained an auxiliary to the infantry 
or the mistake of General Duf ieux in believing that the 
German blitzkrieg in Poland would not be repeated in France. 
Yet Gluck quite frankly felt that if the political inter-
ference by Reynaud in March of 1935 had not caused such a 
fracas, then perhaps modern tanks would have been built much 
sooner. 74 
Echoing this opinion of Gluck was Colonel George 
Groussard, head of Marshal Franchet d'Esperey's staff and 
a leading light in La Cagoule (an unofficial protection 
service organized by certain military for the purpose of 
tracking down Communists in the army) . Groussard stated 
that the intervention of Reynaud urged by de Gaulle raised 
such an outcry that when their ideas were forcibly reviewed 
by the general staff, they had already formed an unfavorable 
74General Gabriel Gluck, "La Doctrine rnilitaire 
fran9aise d'avant-guerre et la situation reelle de nos 
armements au 10 mai 1940," Ecrits de Paris, August 1947, 
pp. 42-43, 45. 
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judgement. "It was not always right," observed Groussard, 
"but it was human." 75 
Groussard like Gluck spread out the blame to the 
lack of imagination he encountered among his fellow junior 
officers at the Centre des Hautes-Etudes Militaires. When 
a proposal was made during 1935-36 to use tanks en masse for 
special operations, the majority of Groussard's colleagues 
along with the director pooh-poohed it. According to these 
officers, communications and refueling problems prohibited 
the tank from assuming an independent ~ole. 76 
Still, the armored corps received high postwar marks 
from such Generals as Victor Bourret and Alfred Conquet. 
Bourret, head of the defense cabinets of Daladier during 
the thirties and later, commander of the fifth army in 1940, 
felt that the use of the specialized army as an offensive in 
Belgium would have been a disaster but as a counter 
offensive, it would have been precieux (invaluable) • 77 In 
other words, as an instrument of offensive reply, the 
specialized units were perfect. 
Conquet, cabinet director of Petain from 1934-37, 
regretted not only that the proposals of de Gaulle did not 
get the attention they deserved and but also the overemphasis 
75colonel Georges Groussard, L'Armee et ses drames 
(Paris: La Table Ronde, 1968), p. 27. 
76Ibid. I P· 29. 
77General Victor Bourret, La Tragedie de l'armee 
fran~aise (Paris: La Table Ronde, 1947), pp. 54-55. 
by the military of the professional army aspect of 
Reynaud's proposal. Conquet, however, suggested that de 
Gaulle and Reynaud made a basic historical error. In a 
democratic state such as France where the war policy was 
exclusively defensive, anything as specifically offensive 
as the armored corps was taboo. The project should have 
been written up as an "in.strument indispensable to a 
maneuvering defensive. 1178 This would have cloaked their 
offensive weapon in the form of a defensive instrument 
********** 
In retrospect, the Reynaud project on national 
205 
defense suffered from a number of defects not the least of 
these was the choice of Reynaud as the defender of de 
Gaulle's ideas. The military, aside from paying little 
attention to Reynaud's ideas on readiness, rearmament and 
related topics, responded more to de Gaulle's Versl'armee de 
metier than to Reynaud's Le Probleme rnilitaire francais. 
Reynaud, in fact, by means of his chamber speeches and 
publications, managed to elicit an adverse reaction from 
those soldiers who felt he was usurping the role of army 
officers in trying to dictate the direction of military 
policy. 
Worse still was the badly worded, ill conceived, 
and poorly delivered plan for the armored corps. Badly 
78General Alfred Conquet, Aupres du Marechal Petain, 
le chef, le politique, l'homme (Paris: Editions France-
Empire, 1970), pp. 139, 146, 257. 
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worded in the sense that the expression "professional army" 
raised the specter of a separate elitist group, the project 
failed to satisfactorily fit the framework of the national 
army to which the military were devoutly attached. At best, 
officers favorably disposed such as Flavigny (see Chapter I) 
still objected to the high level of professionals among the 
ranks of the armored corps. 
At worse, the wording of Vers l'armee de metier as 
well as Reynaud's stress upon the elitist nature of the 
corps sidetracked attention from the strategic utility of 
the plan and prompted chiefs such as Gamelin and Weygand to 
concentrate on why a separate army was out of the question. 
Naturally the preoccupation with this unacceptable aspect 
of the plan delayed acceptance of the very valuable strategy 
inherent in the project. No matter how hard Reynaud and de 
Gaulle tried· to overcome this error--described by Reynaud as 
regrettable--the damage was done. 79 The idea of borrowing 
specialists from the national army in a time of recruitment 
shortages, the dispensation granted armored corps soldiers 
from routine but upsetting induction/discharge procedures, 
and the role of armored corps officers as the training staff 
of the national army only further convinced the high command 
of the elitism and separateness of the plan. 
One reason for this semantic error was the poorly 
conceived ideas of Charles de Gaulle. De Gaulle wrote as if 
79Reynaud, Memoires, 2:144. 
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denying the historical past as represented by the levee en 
masse of 1793. The French in fact preferred a strong army 
only for the duration of a crisis. Standing, professional 
armies for Third Republican Frenchmen smacked too much of 
nineteenth century Napoleons with their coups and armies of 
adventure. More recently and across the newsprint of the 
Boulanger and Dreyfus affairs, many had become wary of the 
army and its elitism. To the credit of Weygand, he was 
aware of this when before the postwar parliamentary inves-
tigating committee he testified that the armee de metier was 
not to the liking of Frenchmen. 80 
De Gaulle seemed not to be aware of this as he had 
not shown much understanding of the reasoning (World War I 
slaughter) behind the 1921 directive, the 1927-28 army 
organization laws, and the Maginot Line. Thus such terms 
as "offensive weapon" and "maneuver beyond the frontier" 
should have been modified so as to gain the strategical 
advantage without upsetting the system or alarming the 
powers to be. Instead, de Gaulle plunged in: predicting 
future warfare based on technical revolution without 
adequately adjusting his ideas to what had gone before--a 
classic case of hasty planning and lack of foresight. In 
these errors, Reynaud was simply de Gaulle's echo. 
The third weakness in the Reynaud-de Gaulle plan 
were the holes in the delivery of the armored corps 
BOTemoignage, 6:1609. 
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especially in the area of foreign aid. Since no specifics 
were given on how far the armored corps was to travel, its 
foreign trajectory was left open to the imagination of the 
' 
military. Telescoping the role of the armored corps by 
describing it as traveling all over Europe, they drew 
attention from its main purpose of relieving pressure on a 
western front and thus contributed to its eventual rejection 
as being impractical and even outlandish. 
The errors of Reynaud and de Gaulle were matched by 
those of the high command. Taken as a collective unit, they 
knew enough to eventually push for more tanks and to admit 
that changes in strategy had occurred. This in itself was 
contrary to what some authorities have stated when they 
described the general staff as closed to all new ideas. 
Nevertheless, many of these top military such as Georges 
and Chauvineau were still committed to the old school as 
reflected in the directive of 1921. Thus the changes in 
attitude among subordinates were slow, confused, not well 
organized, and not well directed toward any final goal. 
More than any other officers, Weygand, Petain, and Gamelin 
were responsible for these conditions. 
Weygand presented a bizarre study in the annals of 
French military history. Described by Bankwitz as 
completely passive in the quest for doctrinal and organiza-
tional change after his retirement in January 1935, Weygand, 
during the remainder of the decade, took it upon himself to 
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personally refute the armored corps after having mistakenly 
interpreted it as a completely separate army. Weygand in 
postwar years claimed that Reynaud's scheme was not in good 
taste with the French. Although this was true, it was the 
strategy of the armored corps that led to the defeat of the 
French in 1940. Little attempt on Weygand's part was made 
to salvage this important strategy. 
Of P~tain, occasional war minister during 1934-35, 
little can be said other than that he was one at the same 
time, influential and incompetent--the convolutions of his 
confused thinking spiraling on down to his 1939 course. 
Petain understood fragments of the changes in warfare but 
he did not use his prestige to encourage the development of 
these changes. Instead, he fell back on supporting men's 
ideas that were more traditional and thus less open to 
controversy. 
More than Weygand or Petain, Gamelin was at fault 
since he passed official judgement on the potential capa-
bilities of the armored corps and related strategy. Perhaps 
the critical point was his lengthy report of July 11, 1936 
to War Minister Daladier which had the effect of minimizing 
the importance of mobile armored units capable of assuming 
a lightning offensive in case of war. Gamelin made little 
attempt to grasp the strategical advantages of Reynaud's 
proposal and remodel them around an army form more 
acceptable to him. Later, when it became apparent to him 
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that Reynaud's theories held weight, his feeble attempts to 
adequately convince the CSG failed. 
Of the lower ranking officers, the vast majority 
were content as Niessel put it, to keep their place and to 
do their work in silence. Those officers who did realize 
in bits and pieces the validity of the new strategy could 
not look to the high command in order to have their doc-
trinal confusion cleared up. The small percentage who were 
aware of the mistaken attitudes of the army leaders were in 
the minority. The fact, however, that a tiny minority of 
mostly unknowns overlooked the phrase "professional army" as 
well as the other technical defects of the Reynaud/de Gaulle 
plan heightened the responsibility of the remaining officers 
who failed to speak or who failed to realize that the 
armored corps was a stepping stone in the evolution of 
strategy. 
Many arguments by the military trying to explain the 
failures of the 1930s pinned the blame on the lack of funds 
for maneuvers, the resistance of Parliament, pacifism, the 
lack of tanks, planes, and men as well as the work stoppages 
due to social unrest. Surely, there was some truth to all 
of these; but before a stronger army could be achieved, the 
military mind had to think through its strategy in order to 
have an effective plan of defense and attack to which 
national efforts could be put to work. The high conunand 
never hit upon a plan of armored corps movement in which 
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tanks predominated. The rejection of Reynaud's plan was 
just one example of this error which the postwar parlia-
mentary investigating committee explained as the failure to 
I 
present early on a comprehensive program making maximum use 
of armored corps and motorized machines. 81 
81Rapport, 1:68, 72, 79. 
CHAPTER V 
RESPONSE FROM THE PEOPLE AND THE PRESS 
France of the 1930s was a violent world. Natural 
disasters such as train wrecks, floods, avalanches and 
gruesome automobile accidents were supplemented by man made 
horrors. Murder and such crimes as the Lindburgh baby 
kidnapping vied with the exploits of French mafia who 
specialized in "les hold-ups," bank robberies, counter-
feiting, black market operations, prostitution rings, and 
heroin traffic. 1 
Political violence was frequent and demonstrated a 
wide variance from assassinations such as those of President 
Paul Doumer (May 7, 1932) and Foreign Affairs Minister, 
Louis Barthou (October 10, 1934), to suicide following 
national disgrace as in the case of Socialist deputy and 
Minister of Interior, Roger Salengro (November 17, 1936) • 2 
1For a detailed account of these people of the 
demimonde, see Roger Peyrefitte's biography of Germaine 
Germain: Manouche (Paris: Flammarion, 1973). 
2When the Popular Front government had Charles 
Maurras arrested in 1936 for incitement to murder Blum, 
l'Action francaise (of which Maurras was editor) retaliated 
by charging t~at Salengro was a traitor during World War I. 
Le Gringoire, another extremist newspaper of the right, took 
up the defamation. Four days after the Chamber of Deputies 
cleared him of the charges, Salengro went home to Lille and 
turned on the gas jets. For the best account, see William 
Shirer, The Collapse of the Third Republic (New York: Simon 
and Schuster, 1969), pp. 310-ll. 
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other politicians came close to getting killed during the 
Place de la Concorde riots of February 6, 1934. Edouard 
Herriot, Radical leader, was almost bodily thrown into the 
Seine by a rightist mob who converged on the Chamber of 
Deputies in order to get the "rats" implicated in the 
Stavisky scandal. Two years later, a group of Action 
fran9aise fanatics yanked Leon Blum from his car when by 
accident it intersected the funeral cortege of right wing 
historian, Jacques Bainville. Blum, punched, kicked, and 
bleeding, was saved at the last minute by construction 
workers. 3 
The investiture of Blum and the Popular Front 
cabinet on June 3! 1936 served only to intensify an already 
growing anti-Semitism in a country where to be a Jew was 
equivalent to having a repugnant birth defect. "If you have 
a baby by your Jew[ish] lover," spoke the mother of French 
beauty, Germaine Germain, "I will never see you again in my 
l 'f .. 4 i e. 
To shut out this grimness, the French turned to the 
world of Hollywood. The film media, the stars, their loves 
and traumas filled column after column of newspaper print. 
On the screen, Snow White, Mickey Mouse, Gone with the Wind, 
3Le Populaire, February 14, 1936. On the life of 
Blum, see Joel Colton, Leon Blum, Humanist in Politics (New 
York: Alfred Knopf, 1966) and Leon Blum, L'Oeuvre de Leon 
Blum, 6 vols. (Paris: Albin Michel, 1955-65). 
4Peyrefitte, Manouche, p. 30. 
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and the movies of Charlie Chaplin reigned. Off the set, 
the transatlantic trips of Marlene Dietrich, the Parisian 
trousseau of Claudette Colbert, the pneumonia of France's 
exported actress, Danielle Darrieux, and the death of Jean 
Harlow figured prominently. 
The papers kept high society and royalty before the 
public eye. Such nonconformists as King Edward VIII and 
Mrs. Wallis Simpson were pursued by readers as the soon-to-
be Duke and Duchess of Windsor made the circuit from chateau 
to chateau. Edward's successors, King George VI and Queen 
Elizabeth picked up where the Duke left off as the press 
oggled them and their daughters, the Princesses Elizabeth 
and Margaret. Other attention getters were the beautiful 
Queen Astrid of Belgium, King Farouk of Egypt, and the 
monarch in exile, Hailie Selassie of Ethiopia. 
Another form of escape was provided by the airplane 
and its courageous pilots. Readers launched themselves into 
the daring exploits of the nation's famous aviators such as 
writer-flyer, Antoine de St. Exuperey, and the courageous 
woman with wings, Maryse Hilz, as they broke or set nonstop 
records. Foreign pilots were spotlighted especially if 
their exploits were dangerous as in the case of Amelia 
Earhardt whose disappearance over the Pacific created a 
sensation. Indeed aviators like Lindburgh were often 
surrounded by an almost mythical adulation. His flight to 
France to escape unwanted publicity following the kidnap of 
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his son rivaled in attention the self imposed exile of 
Edward VIII. 
The F~ench, however, did not restrict themselves to 
being passive observers of aviators, stars, and kings. They 
in fact sought relief from depression doldrums by diving 
into a variety of amusements ranging from horse racing at 
Longchamps (le sport hippique) to charter cruises on the 
Mediterranean. Many of the latter and other group travel 
excursions were sponsored by party owned newspapers such as 
Le Populaire. Thus as Easter or some other big holiday 
season approached, the press would sponsor a train trip to 
some vacation spot, a kind of come one come all affair. For 
the more sedentary, the cabarets offered relief but the old 
standbyfor the Frenchman was the neighborhood cafe. There 
the customer could forget the troubles of the world as he 
drank beer, had his expresso, nursed an aperitif, or enjoyed 
a petit verre. 
Still, the French could not escape the realities of 
the pocketbook and in this depression decade, economic and 
financial problems were the harshest reality. The nature of 
these problems was international in character. The 
components included stock market slumps, bank failures, 
decline in prices, drop in industrial production, fall in 
international trade, and rise in unemployment. Although 
the remedies varied, the basic treatment followed was 
monetary devaluation: the British lowering the pound by 
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40 per cent in 1931 and the Americans, the dollar by 59.06 
per cent in 1934. Other measures such as Roosevelt's New 
Deal did more to boost morale than to bring recovery. 5 
This psychological lift, however, was the crucial factor. 
Historian John Garraty observed that the genius of both 
Roosevelt's New Deal and Hitler's Nazi revolution lay in the 
ability of these two charismatic leaders to sympathize with 
the masses thus revitalizing societies mired in dispair and 
listlessness. 6 
In France, neither economic nor psychological relief 
arrived. Because many stockholders had been ruined during 
the monetary panics of the midtwenties, the governments of 
the thirties were extremely reluctant to devalue the franc. 
The gap between the franc and devalued foreign currencies 
that resulted caused trade and profits to continually 
descend on the graph of economic indices. 
The center-right governments of Flandin and Laval 
which concentrated on reducing government expenditures were 
devoid of imagination in handling the crisis. Thus although 
Flandin acknowledged the daily receipt of hundreds of 
heartbreaking letters from people looking for work, he told 
5For accounts of this effect, see John A. Garraty, 
"The New Deal, National Socialism, and the Great Depression," 
American Historical Review, 78 (October 1973) :907-44 and 
Alfred Sauvy, Histoire economique de la France entre les 
deux guerres, 2 vols. (Paris: Fayard, 1967), 2:145-46. 
6Garraty, "The New Deal," p. 936. 
the National Assembly in February of 1935 that France was 
too broke to undertake large scale unemployment relief. 
Moreover, public works such as those in the U.S. were out 
of the question since France lacked the necessary capital 
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to carry out these measures. 7 The net result of such a 
policy increased budget deficits and aggravated unemployment. 
The left in a reaction pushed for more jobs, higher 
wages, and a shorter work week without understanding that 
such a policy inhibited production. Motivated by a sense 
of economic injustice but unable to grasp the causes of the 
crisis, the Blum Ministry's "100 days" established: paid 
holidays, collective bargaining, a forty hour work week, 
public works programs, government control over the Bank of 
France and government regulation of prices, armaments, and 
wheat production. Since these measures were not preceded 
by a voluntary devaluation of the franc or a sustained 
increase in production, an appreciable economic recovery 
did not take place. 
Amidst this bungling by left and right, Reynaud 
was one of the few who knew what was wrong and what 
remedies were needed. At the end of 1932, Reynaud had 
written that the termination of the crisis would come from 
the readjustment of the currency exchanges between 
7Ministere du travail, Bulletin, 42 (1935) :114-19. 
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countries. 8 In late 1933, still avoiding the word devalu-
ation, he told the chamber that deflation of government 
expenses had to be coupled with deflation of domestic prices 
which were far too high on the international market. 9 In 
June of 1934, Reynaud mentioned the word devaluation for 
the first time, urging this monetary adjustment in order to 
restore international trade. 10 
In 1935, he noted that since Britain had devalued 
the pound, unemployment had dropped and some restoration of 
trade had taken place. 11 During 1936, while refusing to 
support the forty hour week and public works bills, Reynaud 
warned Blum that such measures along with wage increases 
had to be curtailed until the forced devaluation of 1936 
took hold. Business, according to Reynaud, needed a chance 
to take advantage of the fall in gold prices which would 
allow France to compete in foreign markets. 12 
The reaction to this was for the most part negative. 
Tardieu as well as other important politicians disavowed 
Reynaud's stand on devaluation. Eminent economists such as 
Bertrand Nogaro and Charles Rist.either doubted the "mad 
8Paul Reynaud, "Reflexions sur la crise americaine," 
!'Illustration (December 24, 1932), p. 569. 
9Joc, December 7, 1933, p. 4426. 
lOJOC, June 28, 1934, pp. 1942-44. 
11Joc, January 25, 1935, pp. 208-10. 
12JOC, September 28, 1936, pp. 2773-76. 
219 
course of monetary depreciation" or reaffirmed their belief 
in the Poincare france of 1928. 13 
Less renowned Frenchmen resorted to what Fabre-Luce 
called "individual reflexes encouraged by the public 
powers. 1114 Thus Reynaud not only had his daughter's life 
threatened but he also received a variety of menacing 
letters: 
a) Monsieur Commander-in-Chief of speculators 
and extortioners: 
• • . The owner of modest stock port-
folios will not be indifferent if the 
franc is devalued. He will get even and 
will do anything to get you with a gun, 
you and your colleagues--whether in the 
chamber or elsewhere. 
b) • • • My life being finished, I will 
have a bullet for myself but there will 
be another for you and one also for that 
lousy Blum 
c) Under the guise of benevolence and good 
intentions, you are the apostle of 
devaluation and the reason is for personal 
interests of which nobody is mistaken. 
This letter is a warning. Take into con-
sideration that if the devaluation comes, 
you will ruin a lot of honest workers .• 
On that day, your head will roll like a 
hazel nut .... 15 
13Bertrand Nogaro, "Le Probl~me de la devaluation en 
France," Revue economique 1 (1935) :48 and Henri Denis, Les 
Recentes th~ories mon~taires en France (Paris: Librairie du 
Recueil Sirey, 1938), p. 85. Nogaro was the administrator 
of the Bureau of Economic Statistics and Rist, a former 
president of the Bank of France, was director of the 
Institute of Economic and Social Research. 
14Alfred Fabre-Luce, Histoire de la revolution 
europeenne (Paris: Domat, 1954), p. 160. 
15Reynaud, Memoires, 1:406-7. 
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These citizens were hardly interested in Reynaud's 
patriotic plan for military reform. The same conclusion is 
reached when one examines the congratulatory messages 
received by Reynaud following the hotly contested election 
of 1936 in which he won over his Communist opponent by 
twenty-seven votes. 16 
Of these numerous election mementos, kept by 
Reynaud, some reflected anxiety over "la vie chere" or over 
the threat from the "revolationary hordes" of the Popular 
Front. Others reflected predetermined positions based not 
on reason but on prejudice, ignorance, or a sense of hope-
lessness. An example of such was the following letter sent 
to Reynaud by Georges Sampieri, an elector of the second 
district: 
• • • I have told you that I am regrettably 
in complete disagreement with you on the Franco-
Soviet Pact which I consider an error and [on] the 
devaluation (or monetary alignment} on which I an. 
perhaps imperfectly informed. I am resolutely 
opposed to the sanctions against Italy and in a 
general way, against Geneva [League of Nations] 
whose cynicism has disgusted its most devoted 
followers. One can discuss them. But I am 
certain that whatever comes out of it, and the 
16The reason for this close vote stemmed from the 
fact that [?first name] Dailly, a Union Republican and 
Socialist candidate of the right refused to withdraw his 
name at the second ballot. Reynaud's position on the 
devaluation and the Franco-Soviet Pact were the cause. 
Dailly at the run-off thus took 1,966 votes away from what 
normally would have gone into Reynaud's pocket. The left in 
a maneuver had the Radical and Socialist competitors desist 
to their Communist colleague, Dilon, who at the second 
ballot took 4,057 votes to Reynaud's 4,084. Reynaud was 
saved by a few right wing Radicals who feared a Communist 
future is hardly reassuring, you will be in control 
of the situation and of the decisions regarding 
French interests and order. 
One can have confidence in a man such as you. 17 
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The vast majority of electors, however, were simply 
relieved and happy to see Reynaud elected. A good number of 
these must have figured among his elite: ambassadors, 
ministers, military, newspaper editors, deputies, senators, 
nobility, doctors, lawyers, public accountants, businessmen 
and other prominent people. 18 
out of 636 communiques received by Reynaud, only two 
supported in writing the deputy's foreign policy and 
military reform program. One letter congratulated Reynaud 
for demanding closer ties with Great Britain and the Soviet 
Union as well as for encouraging an army of shock 
victory in their sector. Data taken from Le Temps, April 28 
and May 5, 1936. 
17Reynaud Papers, "Dossier Portalet N°XIV," AN, 
George Sampieri to Paul Reynaud, May 4, 1936. 
1811Dossier Portalet N°XIV," AN. Among the letters, 
calling cards, telegrams, and pneumatiques were congratu-
lations from Paris Police Chief, Jean Chiappe; historian 
and former deputy, Georges Bonnefous; the directors of Le 
Petit Parisien ~n~ Le Figaro; the French ambassador to ~ 
London, the Marquis de Castellane; the Secretary General of 
the Quai d'Orsay, Alexis L~g~r; and Dorival of the La 
Comedie fran,aise. The military included General Catroux, 
General Nollet, Lt. Colonel Magne, and Lt. Colonel de Puy. 
Among the deputies were Georges Bonnet, Joseph Courtier, 
Maurice Delabre, Alcide Delmont, Charles des Isnards, Oswen 
de Kerouartz, Guy Mentant, Michel Pares, Le Chanoine 
Polimann, Louis Proust, and Louis Toures. Among the 
senators were Eugene Dumont, Antonin Gianotti, Justin 
Godart, Paul Jourdan, and Alphonse Rio. 
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"indispendable" to France's safety. 19 The other supported 
closer ties with England and Russia while adding endorsement 
of devaluation and sanctions against Italy. This last 
letter ended with a plea for Reynaud to find the elector 
a job so he could "keep his family in bread. 1120 
Thus other issues no matter how important played 
second place to economic concerns. In this atmosphere, a 
real fear existed that an alteration of the monetary 
structure would accelerate the decline in the standard of 
living. Mingled with this fear was an ignorance of the 
benefits to be accrued from a devaluation (Reynaud's job 
seeking elector being the exception rather than the rule) . 
Moreover, such evidence as Sarnpieri's letter indicated that 
Reynaud failed to explain.devaluation effectively. 
This failure was not limited to one or two of 
Reynaud's constituents. In a letter to him during the 1936 
election, Marcel Lamy, a political activist and ally of 
Reynaud's from the fourth voting district, lamented this 
failure: 
••• Truthfully, my dear Minister [?Deputy], 
nobody has understood your thesis [on the devalu-
ation] and it is this ignorance that has allowed 
your adversaries to give you such a hard time. 
Let me suggest that you become more down to 
earth • . . so as to establish a more direct 
19
"oossier Portalet N°XIV," AN, unsigned letter of 
May 2, 1936. 
20
"oossier Portalet N°XIV," AN, Emile Briatte to 
Reynaud, May 4, 1936. 
contact with ignorant humans whom passions 
agitate. • • . You have got to enlighten not 
·by scientific explanations but by a reasoning 
which anticipates the intellectual insufficiency 
of those to whom they [the ideas] are presented 
and [to those] who reject abstractions. Tardieu 
will have to take note of this because his books 
have only the elite for a following and his 
ideas, designs, and systems will not penetrate 
the crowd who for the time being are a. great deal 
more important than the elites •••• 21 
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At first glance, one is tempted to prove Lamy wrong 
since according to various newspapers, the effect of Reynaud 
on his listening public (both on financial as well as 
defense matters) seemed for the most part to be positive. 
His numerous conferences, speeches, and lectures were marked 
by their lucidity and clairvoyance. Reynaud was convincing, 
persuasive, and enlightening. His talks reflected intelli-
gence, frankness, and objectivity. Reynaud was listened to 
with an almost passionate attention. He conquered his 
audiences as much by his verve as by the subtle charm and 
force that he placed in the expression of his thoughts. 
His listeners were numerous and enthusiastically attentive--
almost in a religious sense. Inevitably, Reynaud conquered 
his hearers with his political style. He was at one and the 
same time a joy to listen to and a terror to be heard. The 
applause was always frenetic or warm or passionate or 
repeated or unanimous or lengthy or vigorous. 22 
2111
oossier Portalet N°XIV," AN, Marcel Lamy to 
Reynaud, May 6, 1936. 
22eomoedi~, April 30, 1936, p. 1 and June 20, 1936, 
p. l; L'Eclaireur de Nice et de Sud-Est, November 6, 1936, 
A closer look at Reynaud supporters, however--the 
newspapers that carried the above comrnentary--indicated 
press coverage limited to a narrow political persuasion. 
Thus in addition to the provincial press cited, the news-
papers and journals that repeatedly and favorably opened 
their columns to Reynaud's defense views such as: 
Paris Soir - - - -
Le Journal - - - - - -
Le Figaro - - - - - -
L'Echo de Paris 
L'Epoque - - - -
- Independent 
- - - - - Right 
- - - - - Right 
- - - - Center-Right 
- - - - Center-Right 
were for the most part center-right in orientation which 
eliminated a goodly portion of the left and far right. 
Not surprisingly, many of the meeting halls from 
where the newsmen glowingly reported Reynaud's speeches 
were filled by members of special interest groups such as 
the well educated at the Ambassadeurs, the patrons of the 
lecture society known as Conferencia, members of local 
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Democratic Alliance chapters, as well as participants in the 
University Club of Paris, the Alliance Francaise, and the 
t 
American Club of Paris. 23 
p. 3; Le Journal, October 16, 1937, January 29, 1938, p. 2; 
Conferencia, December 1937 - June 1938, p. 37; Journal de 
Rouen, July 26, 1936, p. 3; Le Petit Marseillais, 
November 11, 1936, p. 3; Le Moniteur, June 14, 1937, p. 3; 
Les Dernieres Nouvelles de Strasbourg, December 21, 1936, 
p. 6. 
23 Les grandes conferences des Ambassadeurs were 
lectures given under the patronage of the Minister of 
Education. Conferencia, founded and directed by Yvonne 
Sarcey, was a program of speeches and articles put out by 
well known personalities and patronized by Belgian and 
French nobility as well as political leaders. These 
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A different view of Reynaud presented itself on 
April 16, 1936 at the Dussoubs Street school for boys, a 
view that no~ only reiterated Lamy's evaluation of Reynaud 
but also suggested that Reynaud had a problem in relating 
to common crowd mentality. 24 
Described by Germaine Decaris, a writer for the 
leftist newspaper, L'Oeuvre, the campaign speech took place 
before the electors of the second arrondissement. Attempts 
by Reynaud to rationally discuss foreign policy, defense and 
financial problems fared badly. At any given time, he was 
never more than in half control of the assembly. Amidst 
booing, catcalls, and obscenities, Reynaud's struggle to 
argue a stronger defense policy was met with shouts of 
"Down with war!" His endeavors to plead for a healthier 
financial policy were sidetracked to answering questions 
about his position on the 200 families. At one point, the 
action deteriorated into a vocal war between two opposing 
factions in the audience with Reynaud partially eclipsed on 
presentations were bound and published semiannually in Le 
Journal de l'universite des annales. 
24There are both primary and secondary sources that 
reinforce the idea Reynaud had major communication diffi-
culties. See La Depeche de Rouen et de Normandie, July 26, 
1936, p. 2; Elie Bois, Truth on the Tragedy of France, 
trans. N. Scarlyn Wilson (London: Hodder Stoughton Ltd., 
1941), pp. 191-21~ and Dan les coulisses des ministeres et 
de l'Etat-Major 1930-40 (Paris: Pierre Lafitte, 1943), 
p. 261. 
the platform. 25 The session ended after midnight on a 
Reynaud covered with perspiration and verbal abuse. 26 
********** 
The almost total lack of receptivity to Reynaud's 
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defense views among the working class and petit bourgeoisie 
was no more in evidence than in the pages of L'Humanite, 
Le Populaire, and L'Oeuvre. Composed of a daily reading 
public of over one-half million (Table 7, p. 227), these 
papers seldom mentioned Reynaud's armored corps. If and 
when reference was made to the project, it was in a negative 
sense. Indeed, none of these three dailies reviewed Le 
Probleme militaire francais. After Reynaud's assignment 
to the finance ministry, the leftist press finally gave 
Reynaud its attention but .it amounted to notoriety due to 
the additional misery his decree laws visited upon the 
worker. 
With rare exceptions, Reynaud and L'Humanite always 
seemed to be on different wave lengths. When Reynaud 
presented his p1an for the armored corps in 1935, L'Humanite, 
the mouthpiece of the Communist Party, was busy decrying the 
25The dispute centered on a question put to Reynaud: 
"Are you for or against the Croix de feu?" Without giving 
Reynaud a chance to answer, a member of the Croix yelled 
back: "The Croix de Feu shits on you." See L'Oeuvre, 
April 16, 1936. 
26L'Oeuvre, April 16, 1936, pp. 1-2, 7. 
r 
Newspaper 
(founded) 
L'Humanite 
(1921) 
Le 
Populaire 
(1918) 
L'Oeuvre 
(1915) 
L'Echo de 
Paris 
(1884) 
Le Figaro 
(1854) 
L'Action 
fran;aise 
(1908) 
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TABLE 9 
PROFILE OF SELECTED PARISIAN DAILIES 
DURING THE 1930s 
Circulation--
Contributors 
300,000 
Marcel Cachin, 
Maurice Thorez, 
Jacques Duclos, 
Gabriel Peri 
300,000 (1936) 
100,000 (other yrs) 
I.eon Blum, 
Paul Faure 
110,000 
Genevieve 
Tabouis, 
Jean Piot, 
Herriot 
100,000 
Kerillis, 
Pironneau, 
Pertinax 
Montherlant 
100,000 
Vladimir d' 
Ormesson, 
Lucien Romier 
40,000-70,000 
Charles Maurras 
I.eon Daudet 
Audience--Attitudes--Quality 
Conununist, extreme left, workers--
anticapitalist, antifascist--
sensationalist, considerable dis-
tortion 
Socialists, extreme left, workers, 
petit bourgeois--concerned with the 
economic and social plight of 
workers and the poor--considerable 
distortion 
Radical, petit bourgeois, moderate 
left--hostile to fascism especially 
Hitler--good 
Center-right, bourgeois, Catholic, 
moderate nationalists, military--
pro-Italy, antimunichois, anti-
Hitler--some distortion especially 
-toward Popular Front 
Right, conservative, military--emu-
lates policy of order and work, 
carries official viewpoint of high 
command--very good 
Extreme right, royalists, military--
anti-Republic, anti-Popular Front, 
fascist, pro-Italy--poor to fair, 
considerable distortion, hate 
journalism 
SOURCES: Henry Coston, Lectures Francais·es-partis journaux 
et hommes politigues d'hier et d'aujourd'hui (Rennes: Imprimeries 
reunis, 1960), pp. 517-55; Raymond Manery, La Presse de la IIIe 
republique (Paris: J. Foret, 1955), pp. 257-59; Genevieve Vallette 
et al., Munich (Paris: Armand Colin, 1964), pp. 286-97; Pierre Milza, 
L'Italie fasciste devant !'opinion francaise 1920-40 (Paris: Armand 
Colin, 1967) , pp. 255-60. 
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Two Year Law. 27 Not only did it encourage mass assemblies 
of workers against this statute requiring two years of 
military service, but it also attacked the treatment of 
army soldiers who in their opinion were poorly fed, housed, 
and clothed. To L'Humanite, Reynaud's plan was in fact the 
recreation of Bonaparte's elitist corps--a separate army and 
a classic example of overarmament. 28 
In 1936, his proposal for military reform was 
totally eclipsed by his stand on devaluation. Reynaud, 
the "shipwrecker of the franc," and the "impenitent 
devaluator," was intent on making the poor pay. 29 How could 
he ask the workers to make sacrifices when it was the 
employers who violated economic and social laws? 30 These 
opinions were reinforced when Reynaud became finance 
minister and unleashed a string of decree laws in 1938-39. 
These regulations included the cancellation of the 
forty hour work week, a 2 per cent tax on all income, a 1 
per cent surcharge on all goods, tax reductions to business-
men involved in new investments, the reduction of wasteful 
27L'Humanite, March 16, 1935, p. 2. 
28 rbid., March 19, 1935, p. 1. 
29rbid., May 1, 1936, p. 2. 
30rbid., February 12, 1936, p. 2. 
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spending among communities, the laying off of 40,000 rail-
road workers and the reduction of public works. 31 
To L'Humanite, the laws spelled one thing: more 
torment for the poor and more prof it for the rich capi-
talists involved in armament industries. In a series of 
front page stories in April of 1939, L'Humanite attacked 
the policy of misery and unemployment of Daladier-Reynaud. 
"Imposed solely on the working classes," wrote L'Hurnanite, 
"the sacrifices ruin the country instead of helping national 
defense. 1132 The workers, caught in the web of socio-
economic malaise, were in fact no longer listening to 
Reynaud, a man for whom "a pedestal is [was] necessary" 
since he claimed to have done better than Raymond Poincare's 
financial reforms of 1926. 33 A front page cartoon of 
July 30, 1939 best summed up the situation. Reynaud, 
delivering a broadcasted speech, was represented by reams 
of paper issuing forth from a radio speaker. Sitting by 
were a Parisian couple sound asleep. Underneath the caption 
read: "There are those who take costly trips to the country 
so they can sleep under the murmuring pines when without 
moving, they can find sleep in the lulling waves of Paul 
Reynaud's speeches. 1134 
31Reynaud, Memoires, 2:235-38. 
32L 1 Humanita, April 24, 1939, P· 1. 
33 Ibid. I March 8, 1939, p. 2. 
34Ibid., July 30, 1939, p. 2. 
r 
Le Populaire, the Socialist party organ, pursued 
much the same idea as L'Humanite. Military and foreign 
policy events were interpreted in light of the economic 
misery of the worker and his exploitation by rich capi-
talists. This approach resulted in an eerie sense of 
unrealness: Hitler howling at the door while the front 
pages concentrated on mass rallies to shorten the work 
week, increase wages, and extend social security benefits 
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to the aged. Le Populaire, in fact, sacrificed a more 
balanced picture in order to further the aims of its party. 
This closed circuit atmosphere inevitably produced misre-
presentations stemming from ignorance and party propaganda. 
Thus the professional army of de Gaulle super-
imposed on the Two Year Law was the grand design of a 
conspiring general staff. 35 Other evidence of Le 
Populaire's departure from reality occurred in 1937 when 
Reynaud presented the chamber with his proposals for 
military reform. Instead of reporting on the merits of his 
ideas, Le Populaire reminisced back to the pre-World War I 
days of Jean Jaures. Would that this great Socialist 
leader, tragically assassinated, would return. Certainly 
he would have known what to advise on military problems. 36 
35Le Populaire, March 28, 1935, p. 1. 
36rbid., January 27, 1937, p. 1. 
r 
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In 1939, as the clash with Germany nearedr the 
concern over the plight of the little man increased. 
Reynaud's decree laws, designed to gear the economy for the 
coming battle, were the straw that broke the camel's back. 
The undemocratic and antiworker regulations of Reynaud had 
to be resisted. 37 The forty-eight hour work week had to 
be reduced to forty. The government was exaggerating the 
foreign peril so war profiteers and armament manufacturers 
wrested more sacrifices from the workers without the latter 
rebelling. 38 Under such circumstances, a patriotic stance on 
national defense died. 
L'Oeuvre, the Radical daily, in contrast to 
L'Humanite and Le Populaire, sof~-pedaled class conflicts. 
Its watered down presentation of social and economic issues 
was in line with the stagnating Radical party at the head 
of which sat Daladier. 39 Still, L'Oeuvre was tied politi-
cally to its leftist neighbors by the strings of the Popular 
Front. Thus it looked askance at any military project that 
tended to strengthen the army, that smacked of the 
offensive, or that challenged the defensive credo implicit 
in the Maginot Line network, a bastion of security to petit 
bourgeois mentality. 
37Ibid., January 14, 1939, p. 1. 
38 Ibid., April 22, 1939, p. 1. 
, 
39For an explanation of the party's blandness, see 
Fran9ois Goguel, La Politique des partis sous la IIIe 
Republique (Paris: Editions de Seull, 1946), pp. 325-27. 
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L'Oeuvre, in fact, gave the same minimal coverage to 
military related problems as it did to social and financial 
issues. Thus news on a rally involving a mass demonstration 
for peace was not a headline sensation but a plodding story 
on page five. The arts, literary life, sport, and crime 
played a more important role than they did in L'Oeuvre's 
sister publications to the left. 
Its 1935 reporting of Reynaud's armored corps was 
perfunctory, indicating simply the outline of his 
proposa1. 4° Follow ups later on treated the whole matter 
lightheartedly or as an affair of secondary importance. In 
a capsule summary of Reynaud's position during the 1937 
debates, L'Oeuvre noted that "In short [according to 
Reynaud], it is necessary to adapt the army to new 
conditions. Mr. Paul Reynaud who must have had a bad 
breakfast is pessimistic.--'The army is in incredible 
disorder. '" 41 
The one area on which L'Oeuvre (and to a lesser 
extent L'Humanite and Le Populaire) supported Reynaud 
strongly was foreign policy. It agreed with Reynaud when 
he warned that Hitler intended to separate England from 
France. It agreed with Reynaud on sanctions against Italy 
40L'Oeuvre, March 16, 1935, p. 4. 
41rbid., January 27, 1937, p. 4. 
233 
and more importantly, it agreed with him on the ratification 
of the Franco-Soviet Pact. 42 
Still, L'Oeuvre at best produced a bland kind of 
coverage. It was a newspaper sitting on the laurels of a 
party made influential in another epoch of French history. 
Its pages were no longer open to radical change and thus it 
was not the place to look. for support vis A vis military 
reform. 
One of Reynaud's staunchest supporters was the 
center-right newspaper, L'Echo de Paris (later, L'Epoque). 
Andre Pironneau, its military affairs columnist, repeatedly 
called for the establishment of an armored corps. To 
Pironneau, the days of clinging to the 1927-28 system were 
over. 43 The army of the next war could not rely on the 
concept of large nonspecialized divisions in which each arm 
was of equal importance. 44 Such a theory denied the 
evolution in weapons and war strategy by which the tank and 
plane in a lightning attack would play the predominant role. 
If France had had the armored corps on March 7, 1936, 
Hitler would have thought twice before invading the 
Rhinelana. 45 How sad it was to see de Gaulle's armored 
corps realized by the Germans while Senac before the army 
42 rbid., December 31, 1935. 
43L'Echo de Paris, January 5, 1936, p. 1. 
44 rbid., July 28, 1935, p. 2. 
45 rbid., March 30, 1936, p. 1. 
r 
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commission condemned Reynaud's proposal as having "logic and 
history" against it. 46 Strange that Fabry had "just 
-
discovered" in the pages of his moderate newspaper, 
L'Intransigeant, that the Germans by June 1, 1936 had four 
47 
armored divisions consisting of 600 tanks each. Why had 
Fabry ignored Reynaud's warnings? The cause lay in the 
impotence, timidity, and conformism of the directing circles 
f b th th d th t . 48 o o e army an e na ion. 
To General Debeney's criticism that not enough 
specialists could be found to service the armored corps, 
Pironneau responded: 
Let us add that this discussion of numbers in 
an Empire which furnished and pays over and above 
240,000 called up soldiers, 250,000 French 
professionals (army, navy, air, militia), 200,000 
natives serving average to long term, 20,000 foreign 
legion, 20,000 auxiliaries (African Goumiers [Arab 
Scouts]), special troops from the Levant, 25,000 
military agents, appears to us in itself almost 
ludicrous. • • • But in this matter [of military 
reforms], it is necessary to see things in their 
overall perspective, it is necessary especially to 
want them in order to realize them.49 
To Debeney's contention that the national army would 
suffer a loss of pride in itself, Pironneau countered that 
perhaps there might be a temporary psychological problem but 
this situation would result not from the injection of an 
46
rbid., January 20, 1936. 
47L'Echo de Paris, June 1, 1936. 
48
rbid., January 5, 1936, p. 1 •. 
49
rbid., July 28, 1935. 
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unacceptable idea but from the painful changes progress 
engendered. Further, the use of the armored corps recruits 
as teachers in the officer's training school (ecole de 
cadres) would foster an atmosphere of dynamism and 
enthusiasm. 50 
The time had come to open the way to new ideas, to 
impart the arguments of the new school. 51 Heed had to be 
taken of Reynaud's reform proposals as set down in his Le 
Probleme militaire franlais, an intelligent and powerful 
book characterized by talent, persuasiveness, conviction, 
and grandeur. 52 
While Pironneau focused on supporting Reynaud's 
military ideas, Kerillis spent equal time on Reynaud's 
economic and foreign policy. Kerillis could not understand 
how Reynaud could support a policy of devaluation. 53 He 
could not see how Reynaud could argue sanctions against 
Italy since that country was France's latin brother and an 
economic war against her was fratricidal. Kerillis, in 
fact, felt that Reynaud's speech of December 27, 1935 
(attacking Laval's concessions to Mussolini), was a sell 
out to the Popular Front. 54 
50
rbid., p. 2. 
51Ibid. I January 5, 1936, p. 1. 
52 Ibid. I July 20, 1935 and May 18, 1937, P• 1. 
53 Ibid. I November 7, 1935, P· 1. 
54 Ibid. I December 28, 1935, p. 1. 
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How were the center and right ever to form a solid 
party of nationalists if Reynaud played the game of the 
left? Reynaud lacked a sense of political realities, a 
direct result of expressing too much individualism. 
Finally, Reynaud's tango with Daladier as the latter's 
finance minister was worrisome. Was not this ministry 
morally condemned and irremediably tarnished by the Munich 
capitulation?55 
Still, on the whole, Kerillis was favorable to 
Reynaud. In his columns, the newspaper editor admired the 
courage and disinterest with which Reynaud coldly sacrificed 
popularity in order to defend his personal conceptions. In 
the political world, such personalities were rare. 56 
Kerillis was quick to defend Reynaud in a variety of 
situations such as the attacks made on him by the moderates 
after Reynaud delivered his 1935 opposition speech to Laval. 
The editor found himself disgusted with these attacks upon 
a man whom he knew to be honest and loyal, a man "that I 
admire and love. 1157 Further, it was L'Echo de Paris who 
55
rbid., and l'Epoque, November 3, 1938, p. 1. 
L'Echo under the direction of Kerillis cannot be called 
extreme right as several historians have labeled it. 
Kerillis repeatedly refers to a nationalist party arising 
out of the center and right. When Kerillis left L'Echo 
midway in 1937 to form L'Epoque, he favored a Franco-soviet 
Pact, an anathema to the extreme right. 
56L'Echo de Paris, November 7, 1935, p. 1. 
57
rbid., December 28, 1935, p. 1. 
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came to Reynaud's defense during the 1936 election, a time 
when the deputy from the second sector of Paris came 
perilously close to defeat. 58 
In 1938, when several rightist newspapers wrongly 
accused Reynaud, the new finance minister, of being an 
accomplice of the Communists and an agent of Moscow, a furor 
arose. L'Epoque, in an attempt to capture this, showed a 
cartoon (Fig. 2, p. 23B) in which Reynaud was sweeping the 
floor while some headless (uncomprehending) readers in the 
background followed the news of Reynaud's appointment. The 
subtitle ran: "Those who no longer understand--Finally, yes 
or no? Is he the valet of Stalin at the justice department 
or the broom of Stalin at the finances?" Dismayed, Kerillis 
noted that even before Reynaud had a chance to improve the 
nation's miserable financial situation, all artillery had 
been trained on him. 59 
Kerillis displayed a keen insight into both 
Reynaud's assets and limitations. On the latter, he noted 
that Reynaud was too talkative, did not accept discipline, 
and didn't have a notion of what a democratic party meant. 60 
More important and perhaps the crucial factor crimping 
Reynaud's style was a personality analysis by Kerillis that 
echoed the letter of Marcel Lamy: 
58
rbid., May 2, 1936 and May 4, 1936. 
59L'Epoque, November 5, 1938, p. 1. 
60Ibid., December 19, 1937, p. 1. 
r ,. 
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QUI NE COMPRENNENT PLUS 
- EnJin. oui ou non ? E::t-U le • Valet de Staline aux Balanc'es • 
ou le • Balal de Staline awe Finances • ? 
Fig. 4 
SOURCE: L'Epoque, November 4, 1938, p. 1. 
238 
It is true that his marvelous talent [as a 
speaker/statesman] does not appeal to the masses. 
He speaks to reason rather than to imagination 
and feeling. This very great orator has neither 
the impulsiveness nor the feeling nor the special 
"sex appeal" which excites and carries away modern 
multitudes. His vivid but logical speech is made 
for the great elites.61 
In treating Reynaud's assets, Kerillis looked to 
Reynaud as did de Gaulle--in expectation of great things. 
Reynaud was "a politician in whom the country places 
hope." 62 Reynaud was "a man of state in every respect of 
the word." He had "a mind always turned toward the 
future." 63 
Kerillis, in lamenting the decadence in French 
society hoped that Reynaud would bring France out of this 
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decline as well as out of the avalanche of misfortunes that 
had beset the nation. 64 Was not the Reynaud of Kerillis the 
same Reynaud that de Gaulle was looking for: a saviour to 
bring France out of her difficulties? 
At first glance, Le Figaro, a conservative daily of 
the right, appeared to give Reynaud a sympathetic audience. 
In reviewing Jeunesse, quelle France veux-tu?, Le Figaro 
called his chapter on military affairs "masterful." "The 
views, the arguments, the philosophy," it wrote, "are 
61Ibid. 
62L'Echo de Paris, June 14, 1937, p. 3. 
63L'Epoque, December 19, 1937, p. 1. 
64L'Echo de Paris, January 27, 1937, p. 1 and 
L'Epoque, April 22, 1939, p. 1. 
convincing without a fault." 65 In addition to giving him 
fair coverage in the chamber, the newspaper reported 
favorably on Reynaud's lectures at the Ambassadeurs. 66 
Moreover, in 1939 when practically all the other journals 
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attacked Reynaud for his decree laws, Le Figaro lent Reynaud 
its utmost support. 67 
Nevertheless, in its military columns, Le Figaro 
supported the high command's point of view at almost every 
turn. In general, the articles followed a traceable 
pattern: recognition of new forms of strategy and weaponry, 
desire to diminish their importance, and finally, a turning 
back to the lessons of World war I. 68 
Reynaud was severely criticized by military critic 
Jean Riviere for inflating the importance of the tank which 
according to the latter did not change the strategic 
character of terrestrial battle. It would be better in 
Riviere's mind if France concentrated on the construction 
65L ' 'l 8 1 36 e Figaro, Apri , 9 , p. 5. 
66For good examples of this coverage, see Le Figaro 
for October 3, 1936 and November 21, 1936. 
67Le Figaro, April 22, 1939, p. 1. 
68 rnterspersed in this pattern were moments of 
insight such as when Reynaud's Le Probleme militaire 
fran~ais prompted Jean Riviere to decry the fact France 
lacked a civilian elite capable of discussing positively, 
the great military questions of the day. Why did not 
Reynaud, wrote Riviere, launch a center of independent 
civilian and military studies where the two parties could 
meet? See Le Figaro, June 10, 1937, p. 6. 
r 
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of antitank arms rather than on the tanks themselves. 69 To 
Riviere, the fear engendered.by the appearance of German 
panzer divisions was exaggerated since the tank simply would 
not play a preponderant role in the life of future battles.70 
In reviewing Le Probleme militaire fran)ais, Riviere 
attacked Reynaud's idea that an offensive beyond the 
frontier was necessary in order to help allies. Who wanted 
another slaughter in the style of 1914? Defend France 
first. Firepower was still king and it was to be used to 
the maximum effectiveness especially at fortification points. 
Lastly, the tank had not given sufficient proof of its 
usefulness in order to make it a unique line of strategy. 71 
Various articles by Riviere and other authors 
reflected the views of the general staff as references were 
made to a protracted war or a war in which horses still 
played an important role. 72 Tanks were described in terms 
of supporting the infantry. Artillery or fire power would 
ultimately clear the way for the infantry. 73 Chauvineau's 
69Le Figaro, February 10, 1937, p. 8. 
70rbid., March 10, 1937, p. 6. 
71rbid., June 25, 1937, p. 8. 
72 rbid., July 10, 1938 and September 9, 1938, p. 8. 
There were some rare exceptions. General *** warned of the 
dangers of the doctrine of the defensive which while agree-
able to the electors would inevitably put the country on the 
road to defeat. See Le Figaro, April 10, 1938, p. 6. 
73Le Figaro, December 10, 1938, p. 9. 
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ideas--especially those that stressed fortification--were 
given a very favorable review by Duf ieux who envisaged 
elongated fronts encompassing vast portions of the 
frontier. 74 
242 
Some of the articles pointed to Reynaud's weak grasp 
of technical detail. The proof was in the Spanish Civil War 
which General Dufieux used to point out the limitations of 
light tanks in rough terrain. The defeat of two divisions 
of Italian 1933 Fiat-Ansaldo tanks at Guadalajara was due 
primarily to the fact they went too fast--the resultant 
jerks and bumps translated into a loss of control over 
direction and firing accuracy. Moreover, the weak spanning 
capacity of these tanks often impeded their progress 
especially on wet ground. These disadvantages demoralized 
the crew who had to occupy these "moving coffins. 1175 
In a similar vein, G. Guilhermy claimed that a 
lightning attack on French borders would not know how to 
74Ibid., April 12, 1939, p. 6 and June 10, 1938, p. 6. 
75Le Figaro, June 10, 1938, p. 6. Spanning capacity 
here means the·ability of tanks to cross the terrain as 
efficiently as possible no matter what the condition of the 
ground underneath. In this article, Dufieux mentioned a 
comment of Colonel von Xylander in the 1937 issue of 
Militar Wochenblatt. Von Xylander, a professor at the 
Berlin War Academy, stated that the failure of the two 
Italian divisions at Guadalajara was due to the intervention 
of the Russian T-28 tank. By means of the demoralizing 
noise of its gun combined with the action of low flying 
bombers, the Russian made tank contributed to the Italian 
defeat. Dufieux, however, did not stress this lesson in 
his article. 
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obtain decisive results since an armored column was 
extremely fragile and subject to connnunication problems and 
even to dislocation. The proof was in the German invasion 
of Austria, carried out in a haphazard and sloppy fashion. 
Further, according to Guilhermy, art armored division could 
only be effective on a front of one kilometer five hundred 
meters (nine-tenths of a mile) and could only penetrate to a 
depth of ten to twelve kilometers (6.2 - 7.5 miles). When 
he added the spatial limitation factor to the anticipated loss 
of trained specialists due to battle casualties, Guilhermy 
concluded that an armored corps could only be used locally 
and then only at the beginning of a campaign. 76 
L'Action francaise, a royalist daily of the extreme-
right headed by the fanatical xenophobe, Charles Maurras, 
undertook a five year campaign of vituperation against 
Reynaud unequalled by other Parisian tabloids of the 1930s. 
To this widely read newspaper of the French intellectual 
connnunity, Reynaud was a war monger, a firebrand (boite de 
feu), a sinister little devaluator, a little skunk, "pro-
German yesterday and pro-Soviet today," wheeler dealer in 
Mexico, killer of the franc, sanctionist against 
76Le Figaro,-August 10, 1938, p. 6: 
r 
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77 Italy, man of intrigues, shady deals, and treasonous 
l "t" 78 po 1 ics. 
According to L'Action fran3aise, Reynaud was a man 
who could do nothing right. His attacks on the mistakes of 
the general staff defamed the nation's military chiefs on 
whom France would have to rely in future conflicts. 79 His 
campaign for national union during 1937-38 indicated he was 
in collaboration with the Communists, the Soviets, Moscow, 
and even Stalin himself.so His decree laws of November 1938, 
devised in part to support rearmament, were a clear sign to 
81 the Germans that England and France wanted war. 
In a cartoon appearing on October 10, 1938, L'Action 
francaise summed up its feelings toward Reynaud. The quote 
J 
below the caricature ran: "First measures to take in order 
to safeguard peace." The picture showed Reynaud ousted from 
a cabinet meeting, lying flattened like a pancake outside 
the door. His portly Jewish friend and "Russian twin," 
77L'Action fran7aise, May 1, 1936, p. 1. The pro-
German comment referred to Reynaud's 1920 speeches calling 
for an economic rapprochement with Germany vis ~ vis 
reparations. · 
78L 1 Action francaise, May 2, 1936, p. 1. 
79Ibid., January 23, 1937, p. 1. 
··' 
SOibid., Febr~ary 13, 1938, p. 3; February 20, 1938, 
p. 5; and February 27, 1938, p. 2. 
Slibid., April 26, 1939, p. 1. 
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George Mandel, was also being ousted by a vigorous kick to 
th d . .. 82 e erriere. 
L'Action francaise's foreign policy of rapprochement 
with Italy and the avoidance of war at all costs naturally 
ran counter to Reynaud's anti-Laval, pro-British stance. 
Reynaud, by supporting England on the matter of sanctions 
over the Ethiopian conflict, pitted Italy against France 
and thus brought Europe to the brink of a Mediterranean War, 
a war in which Berlin would naturally help Rome. 83 The 
whole affair would result in this bellicose little rogue 
triggering the death of two or three million French 
children. 84 Similarly, Reynaud's meddling in Daladier's 
negotiations with Hitler at Munich could endanger an 
already jeopardized peace°' 85 
In the realm of military affairs, L'Action franlaise 
devoted a special biweekly section to the army, air and navy. 
Not surprisingly, a considerable portion of this section was 
given over to promotions or salary increases. Nevertheless, 
when the paper did examine military tactics, many of its 
ideas resembled those of Reynaud such as its insistence on 
the idea that the tank permitted the rupture of an enemy 
82 Ibid., October 10, 1938, P· 3. 
83Ibid., December 12, 1935, p. 1. 
84Ibid., December 29, 1935, p. 1. 
85
rbid., September 23, 1938, pp. 1, 5. 
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front. 86 Indeed, L'Action francaise advocated the use of 
an "armored cavalry" operation of tanks that was: 
1) deployed independently in large groups; 2) characterized 
by speed and surprise; 3) remained tied together by radio 
. t• 87 cornmunica ion. 
L'Action francaise, however, felt that an armored 
cavalry was more important as in instrument of defense and 
counter attack rather than as one used for the initial 
assault. 88 Moreover, the daily could not agree with the 
de Gaulle theory of saddling tank units with cumbersome 
support infantry. In other words, it wanted more freedom 
from the infantry than even de Gaulle was willing to allow 
. h. v l' ,. d "t. 8 9 in is ers armee e me ier. 
Still, the real hiatus between L'Action fran~aise 
and Reynaud concerned not strategy but the form and 
technicalities involved in developing an armored corps. 
Echoing other critics, the newspaper attacked Reynaud for 
linking the armored corps to a professional army. Such an 
army would be difficult to recruit. It would cause a 
86Ibid., October 4, 1937, p. 6. 
87 Ibid., January 10, 1936, p. 5. The main contri-
butors to the military columns were H. de Trezene and Video, 
the latter having written a book summarizing all of his 
articles in L'Action fran~aise (L'Armee et la politique, 
1937). Video was a pseudonymn. The author's real name is 
.unknown. 
88 Ibid., March 24, 1935, pp. 5-6. 
89Ibid., August 25, 1935, pp. 5-6. 
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scission between the national army and itself thus creating 
a morale problem. Moreover, it would also suffer irre-
placeable losses since untrained recruits from the national 
army could not fulfill the tasks of the specialized corps. 
In sum, the armored corps as Reynaud presented it was 
foreign to the molecular stability of the French army. 90 
In spite of these differences, this extreme right 
wing newspaper was more in agreement with the Reynaud-de 
Gaulle strategy than any of the other dailies discussed 
above. _Unfortunately, any positive contributions that 
L'Action fran)aise had to make in terms of improving 
national defense were destroyed by a selfdestruct pathology. 
The newspaper would deliver an excellent article on the 
latest in tank strategy only to complete it with the obser-
vation that "all problems of national defense are nothing 
other than a problem of regime, the present one [the Third 
Republic] must be vomited by all well born soldiers." 91 
This reductionist technique in explaining France's 
woes not only undermined confidence in the government but 
also closed the door to real reform. Ironically, L'Action 
franiaise was correct when it observed that reform could not 
get through due to insufficient national vigor; 92 but its 
9oL'Action francaise, February 25, 1937, p. 5. 
91rbid., June 25, 1937, p. 6. 
92Ibid., March 24, 1935. 
military pages, steeped in hate literature toward the 
government, written in a turgid, convoluted French, and 
replete with contradictions as well as overly simplistic 
views on the causes of French malaise, did not help to 
revive this national vigor. 93 
********** 
In light of the evidence that has gone before in 
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this chapter, little has been uncovered as to the reaction 
of the people themselves toward Reynaud's defense position. 
Instead what has emerged is a mostly unfavorable reaction 
toward him based on his devaluation stance as well as on 
numerous other issues. This appears to indicate that if 
national defense had been a more important facet of French 
life, Reynaud would still have had serious difficulties in 
light of his aforediscussed communication problems as well 
as his limited appeal and this considered in addition to 
his political isolation and his lack of influence in the 
military world. 
93one of the best examples of this writing style is 
contained in L'Action fran~aise, February 25, 1937, pp. 5-6. 
These overly simplistic views included as causes of the 
malaise: the Jews, stock market speculators, the Communists, 
Socialists, and assorted leaders such as Blum, Chautemps, 
Herriot, Daladier, Flandin, Sarraut, and Reynaud. One 
outstanding contradiction was the newspaper's attack on 
Reynaud for criticizing the high command before the chamber. 
L'Action franlaise, itself, had been attacking the logic, 
conformism, and work methods of the general staff since 
1935. Compare L'Action fran~aise of March 24, 1935, pp. 5-6 
with its issue of January 29, 1937, p. 1. 
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As it was, precious little reaction from the 
Parisian press was favorable. Reynaud was not a popular 
personality nor were his views the type that excited the 
typically downtrodden or disillusioned Frenchman of the 30s--
be he of left or right. Moreover, shortcomings in the form 
and technique of the armored corps came to light which 
echoed those discussed in Chapters III and IV. Yet (and to 
Reynaud's credit), certain characteristics were present in 
French society which would have made the Reynaud campaign 
difficult even if his political personality, monetary views, 
and armored corps had been technically perfect. 
Among these was a desire not to meddle in military 
affairs. "You are civilian to the bone marrow," wrote a 
Radical journalist, Nicolas Lerouze, of himself. "Let the 
military speak." Certainly, felt the journalist, an 
illustrious general such as Debeney would expose the 
fallacies of a professional army. 94 
Hand in hand with this attitude went a profound 
ignorance of the capabilities of military personnel. An eye 
witness survivor from this period, a librarian at the 
Biblioth~que Nationale, stated that at the time, Marshal 
Petain was considered a great chief . 95 This error in 
judgement was shared by others such as poet-writer Francois 
.s 
94La R~publique, August 15, 1935. 
95conversation with the author, winter, 1973~ 
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Mauriac who in recollecting the events of 1940 wrote that 
while on the one hand, the name of de Gaulle was unknown, 
"the glorious name of Petain was resounded by me as well as 
by all Frenchmen. 1196 
Without adequate leadership and left to their own 
devices, the people drifted. The 1936 congratulatory 
letters received by Reynaµd showed little concern over 
defense related questions. When such interest was expressed 
as in the case of Sampieri, it indicated a lack of under-
standing of the issues at hand. Eyewitnesses talked of a 
general lack of interest and a general ignorance of military 
questions. The French were far from these issues, they did 
not want their intellectual comfort disturbed by the need 
to reform, they wanted to,believe only what pleased them, 
they did not know or understand military problems, they were 
not excited by the affaire des blindees, they neglected 
these issues, or they were asleep. 97 
Another aspect of the drift was the recurring fear 
of war related suf fering--perhaps an important reason why 
the French subconsciously desired to avoid facing defense 
questions. Tabloids depicted line sketches that showed 
battle dead or that relived the psychological pain brought 
96 . . -" . l' . { . Francois Mauriac, Memoires po itique Paris: 
Grasset, 1967), p. 19. 
97 Reynaud, Auburtin, Baumgartner, Palewski, Conquet 
and Laniel interviews at Paris and Fontainebleau, 1973. 
on by wartime separations of the past (see Figs. 5 and 6, 
pp. 252-3). "The people did not want war," stated Madame 
Paul Reynaud, 98 whose sentiment was also shared by Jules 
Supervielle in his 1937 poem, Prayer to an Unknown: 
My God, without feeling and perhaps without hope, 
I would like to draw your attention away from so 
many wandering heavens, 
To the men who can no longer find rest in this world. 
Listen, the hour is late, they are all becoming 
discouraged 
And soon, they will be unable to recognize the 
young from the old. 
Every morning they wonder if the killing is going 
to start 
On every side they are preparing frightful 
instruments of unhappiness, tears and blood. 
One wonders if the wheat does not already hide 
the guns. 
Are you through concerning yourself with men? 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Let us breathe yet without thinking of new poisons, 
Let us look at our children without constantly 
thinking of death.99 
98rnterview with Madame Reynaud, Paris, March 23, 
1973. 
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99Germaine Bree, ed., Twentieth Century French 
Literature (New York: Macmillan Company, 1968), pp. 171-72. 
Excerpt translated by Joseph Connors. 
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L'EAll LUSTRALE ... 
Fig. 5 
SOURCE: vendemiaite, January 3, 1936, p. 1. L'Eau Lustrale 
translates best as "baptismal water." 
r 
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- fei, t•,. rcuc~a .•• qat 111 Pai:ic ioil bi'lit I 
Fig. 6 
SOURCE: Le Journal, November 1, 1938, p. 1. Bold print 
translates as "All soul's Day." Comment beneath reads: "You have come 
back ••• Oh that peace be blest!" This line sketch recalls the 
armistice day following World War I in which some did not come back. 
CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
On May 13, 1940, seven German panzer divisions 
crashed through the Ardennes Forest and arrived at the 
banks of the Meuse River. Covered by screaming Stuka dive 
bombers that temporarily stunned the F'rench artillery units 
into silence, the German advance guard forded the stream in 
rubber dinghies and established bridgeheads on the south 
bank while German engineers on the far side set up pontoon 
bridges in order to allow the tanks to cross. Paralyzed by 
this combination of armored thrust, terror, speed, and 
surprise, the French of General Corap's ninth army retreated 
allowing a hole to develop thirty miles wide and ten miles 
deep through which poured the divisions of General Ewald Von 
Kleist. 
The German breakthrough in the Ardennes between 
Sedan and Namur (see Fig. 7, p. 255) caught the Franco-
British armies off guard since they had anticipated a main 
thrust further north. Thus they had concentrated their 
armies between Namur and the sea where the least initial 
fighting took place. Unprepared for Blitzkrieg, the main 
allied forces were attacked from behind by General Guderian 
who in racing to the ocean pinned down the allies at 
Dunkirk, thus effectively cutting them off from the rest of 
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the French army and precipitating in turn the historic 
evacuation. 
With the capitulation of the Belgian forces on 
May 28, 1940, the Germans mopped up in Belgium and then 
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turned their armQred machines south toward the Somme River 
(June 5, 1940) where the retreating French army with its 
static artillery proved no match for the deadly plane-tank 
duet of Hitler's forces. The flight psychosis engendered 
by this lightning warfare did the rest. Millions of 
retreating soldiers and fleeing civilians made the use of 
military arteries a sheer impossibility. Paris fell on 
June 14, 1940 and the armistice was signed on June 21, 1940. 1 
Thus, much of the strategy Reynaud advised--tank 
warfare, mobile armor, lightning attack--was used by the 
enemy in a five week campaign that ended in France's defeat. 
1on the military asp:cts of the fall of France, see: 
Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat, trans. Gerard Hopkins (New York: 
Norton Inc., 1968); John Cairns, "Some Recent Historians 
and the 'Strange Defeat' of 1940," Journal of Modern History 
46 (March 1974) :60-85; Guy Chapman, Why France Fell. The 
Defeat of the French Army 1940 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, 
Winston, 1968); Winston Churchill, The Second World War, 
vol. 2: Their Finest Hour (London: Cassell and Co., 1948); 
Theodore Draper, The Six Week War: France May 10 - June 25, 
1940 (New York, 1940); Jean Dutourd, The Taxis of the Marne, 
trans. Harold King (London: Secker and Warburg, 1957); the 
nine volumes of Temoignage and the two volumes of Rapport; 
Gamelin, Servir; Charles de Gaulle, Memoires de guerre, 
vol. 1: L'Appel (Paris: Plon, 1954); Alistair Horne, To Lose 
a Battle, France - 1940 (Boston: Little, Brown, Inc., 1969); 
Shirer, The Collapse; Sir Edward Spears, Assignment to 
C,atastrophe (New York: A. A. Wyn Inc., 1954); Weygand, 
Memoires and John Williams, The Ides of May: The Defeat of 
France, May - June, 1940 (New York, 1968) • 
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Reynaud's armored corps plan, however, had a certain 
haziness about it, a factor that allowed French military 
personnel to criticize it for lack of technical depth and 
practicality. Cases in point were its geographic range and 
recruitment figures. 
A more serious flaw was the limited role of 
aviation. Reynaud never predicted the close interplay 
between tank and dive bomber that Guderian demanded from his 
panzers and stukas. Airplanes, in fact, played a largely 
secondary role to tank maneuvers and tank strategy. In 
light of this, Jacques de Launay, a French historian, has 
speculated that even if de Gaulle's armored corps had been 
applied in 1940, it probably would have been pinned down by 
German dive bombers. 2 
An additional imperfection in the plan concerned 
the use of the term, "professional army"--an error stemming 
back to de Gaulle's 1934 book and which in fact denied the 
basic incompatibility between Third Republican French 
history and a standing army of professional men. Moreover, 
foes of the plan anticipated that such an arrangement would 
divide the army into two divisions: professionals or grade 
As and the conscripts or second choices. Reynaud and de 
Gaulle were never able to satisfactorily convince the 
2Jacques de Launay, De Gaulle and his France 
[A Psychopolitical and Historical Portrait of Charles de 
Gaulle], trans. Dorothy Albertyn (New York: Julian Press, 
1968) I P• 268. 
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skeptics that the armored corps could be effectively 
integrated into the national army. Much precious time was 
thus lost in semantics while the valuable strategy inherent 
in the scheme failed to be appreciated for its full worth. 
The debacle of 1940 was also a witness to the 
defeat of Reynaud's foreign policy: Russia aligned with 
Germany with England unable to help France in its quest for 
collective security. Yet, in a sense, collective security--
along the lines which Reynaud preached (entente among the 
Petite Entente, Russia, and Poland)--was a sheer impossi-
bility. The Versailles Treaty had caused too much enmity 
and distrust between these powers. Further, England never 
really embraced the concept of collective security until 
1939 when it was too late. A lesson to be learned from this 
was that France should have struck out on her own (Rhineland) 
and should have insured her security by her own means. A 
sad example of the failure to do so was Spain where French 
passivity (Reynaud's included) was an invitation to opposing 
European forces to continue their desire to expand and 
aggrandize. 
Another explanation of why the armored corps and 
related defense planning failed was due to the relative 
isolation of Reynaud and de Gaulle within their respective 
political and military systems, an effect that reduced their 
rapport with peers and thus discouraged compromise. They 
never bridged the gap from their own constructed ideals to 
259 
those of the real world of officers and politicians around 
them. The integrity of an idea was in fact more important 
to them than party politics and the realities of power play 
within the military hierarchy. The unpopular de Gaulle 
pursued the professional army as if the high command and 
history did not exist while Reynaud repeatedly called for 
national union although he himself was incapable of forming 
the necessary ties to bring about such an arrangrnent. 
Reynaud, moreover, took on too many projects. His 
involvement in finances interfered with defense matters to 
the point where after his entrance into the Daladier 
ministry, national defense receded into the background while 
the integrity of his defense views collapsed. In addition, 
Reynaud's stand on devaluation was a direct hindrance to 
furthering the armored corps since attention was distracted 
by the divergence of Reynaud's views on the monetary depre-
ciation of the franc. 
It was on the issue of devaluation that is revealed 
Reynaud's distance from the people for there was nothing 
more distasteful to the French of the 1930s than devaluation. 
Reynaud simply plunged in without regard for consequence or 
realities--much the same as de Gaulle did with Versl'armee 
de metier. 
Little in the de Gaulle correspondence is related to 
the socio-economic climate of the day such as the Great 
Depression and the Popular Front with its accompanying social 
r 
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reform program. Defense matters were discussed as if in a 
vacuum, revealing scant insight into the domestic turmoil 
of the decade. Moreover, unlike others who had criticized 
Reynaud's communication failures with the public, de Gaulle 
encouraged Reynaud to continue along what he considered the 
promising path of future leadership of the French nation. 
The fact that Reynaud lasted less than three months as 
premier in 1940 is a telling commentary on how far removed 
de Gaulle was from the limitations of Reynaud as a political 
leader. 
Beyond the shortcomings of these men were those of 
the institutions in question, the government and the 
military power. Other historians such as Philip Bankwitz 
have focused on the imbalance between the two and the 
repercussions of this imbalance. This thesis, however, sees 
their interrelationship as secondary to the dysfunction 
within each one. The chamber's voting record on defense 
matters showed a haphazard and ineffective approach to 
defense related issues where continuity of purpose was 
impossible because of the many cabinet changes. Further, 
many deputies were profoundly ignorant of defense questions 
and it is revealing that no cabinet ever f~ll on a defense 
question per se. Rather, defense budgets were frequently 
voted by raised hands with the details left to a few such as 
Fabry and Daladier. 
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Certainly the lack of dynamic leadership (both in 
the military and political spheres) was the single most 
important resource lacking in France during the 1930s. 
There was no great leader (and no great party) to overcome 
the multiple divisions on foreign policy and there was no 
great leader to guide the people through the depression. 
Instead, an intense and destructive individualism reigned 
where the cult of personality--be it Petain's, Gamelin's, 
Oaladier's or Fabry's--triumphed to the detriment of the 
collective good. 
The military especially the high conunand did not 
make the nece~sary effort to pursue effectively and quickly 
the new ideas purported by de Gaulle and Reynaud. Tied down 
to strategies of the past, it concentrated its energies on 
more inunediate problems such as recruitment and budget 
matters, neglecting the impact of technological change on 
the battlefield. Its obsession with the shortcomings of the 
armored corps rather than with its assets slowed down 
acceptance of armored mobile warfare until it was too late. 
Beyond the shortcomings of the institutions were 
those of the people themselves. Other than being self 
assured by the presence of the Maginot Line, the people were 
not sufficiently concerned with national defense nor did 
they want to be concerned with it. As eyewitnesses have 
stated, they had no interest in it, ignored it, or remained 
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oblivious to it. Perhaps this is why so many deputies also 
lacked interest in national defense matters. 
In recapitulation, the ignorance of the people, the 
narrow interests of socio-economic groups reflected in the 
press, as well as the rigidity of both chamber and military 
are only part of the explanation as to why the nation failed 
to grasp the dangerous implications of insincerity in 
collective security and of revolution in military technology. 
This study also reveals the important failures of 
the main protagonist, Paul Reynaud. At first, this is 
difficult to comprehend since his Memoires and other works 
left to history portrayed him as a clairvoyant who was 
correct on the issues be they mechanized warfare or the need 
for the democr~cies to work together for collective security. 
In contrast, these pages show a Reynaud whose deep immersion 
in the Third Republican political machine emphasized his 
role as a jouisseur and whose actions have left history with 
legacy of inadequacies and contradictions. 
Appealing to the French people's collective will to 
work for national union and for national recovery, he in 
turn lacked the capability of working collectively within 
his parliamentary groups. He even lacked the personality 
and feel for the times to convince people of the idea in the 
first place. A staunch supporter of the Czechs, he stayed 
on in the Daladier regime after the Munich accords were 
signed. An ardent foe of fascist aggression in such places 
as Ethiopia and the Rhineland, he took a noninvolvement 
stand on the Spanish Civil War akin to appeasement. 
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The errors also extend into the area of bad 
judgement. In spite of the fact that there was in every 
arena examined here, supporters of mechanized warfare and 
collective security, a great deal of resistance was 
encountered from the military, parliament, and press. Much 
of this can be directly attributed to the framework and 
presentation of Reynaud's national defense plan--an error 
that had at its base, insufficient planning and foresight, 
the foresight to find a means to transcend the differences 
among Frenchmen so that an adequate reform of national 
defense could be undertaken. 
The only real winner to come out of this study in 
failure was Charles de Gaulle. Protected from the high 
command by Reynaud until 1940, he escaped tu England during 
the debacle with 100,000 francs given him by Premier Reynaud. 
This allowed him to set up a free French government in exile, 
an event that led to fame and later successes. 
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THE REYNAUD-CONQUET FEUD 
General Conquet had made it his special study to 
examine the change in Reynaud's position on defense in 
1938-39. In a 1964-65 literary war between the two men, 
Conquet, joined by Marcel Dacier, presented a compromised 
Reynaud more interested in personal advancement than in the 
welfare of the nation. 
Conquet and Dacier cited the facts that: 1) Reynaud 
stayed in the Daladier cabinet even though he knew on 
May 31, 1938, that Daladier had refused Gamelin the 
construction of three armored divisions; 2) at Leeds, 
England during May 1938, Reynaud called the French army the 
first in the world; 3) Reynaud stayed in the cabinet at the 
time of the Munich capitulation, and 4) on July 25, 1939, in 
his capacity as finance minister, Reynaud reduced the 
credits on war materials from thirteen to six billion 
frances.l 
Later, Conquet pursued the same theme when in his 
biography of Marshal Petain, he called attention to a letter 
Justice Minister Reynaud sent to Daladier on July 8, 1938, 
in which he asked the premier to accelerate armament 2 production without every mentioning the armored corps. 
The General's energy for these indictments was 
fueled by Reynaud's attacks upon his former boss and hero, 
Petain. Reynaud, in his postwar accounts, has heavily 
accused Petain of contributing to the collapse of France 
both before and during the war. On these issues, Conquet 
called Reynaud a liar.3 
1Alfred Conquet, "En lisant les Memoires de Paul 
Reynaud," Ecrits de Paris, December 1964, p. 46 and 
January 1965, p. 63; Marcel Dacier, "Quelques observations 
sur les thes~s de M. Paul Reynaud," Ecrits de Paris, April 
1965, p. 14 and May 1965, p. 137. Responses of Reynaud 
are contained in the April and May 1965 issues of Ecrits de 
Paris. 
2 lf ... ,. ,. . ( . A red Conquet, Aupres du Marechal Petain Paris: 
Editions £ranee-empire, 1970), p. 342. 
3 rnterview with General Alfred Conquet, 
Fontainebleau, May 14, 1973. 
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EXTRACT FROM REYNAUD'S SPEECH OF DECEMBER 27, 1935 
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APPENDIX C 
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OPPOSITION TO DE GAULLE'S 
PROFESSIONAL ADVANCEMENT 
To this day, no one knows who slipped the note into 
de Gaulle's dossier eliminating him from the important 
promotion to colonel, an act which also terminated all 
further advancement. 
There is a school of thought, however, that believes 
General Maurin or General· Gamelin or both were involved. 
Reynaud cites the conclusion of a CSDN meeting in which 
Maurin said to de Gaulle: "Goodbye, de Gaulle, there where 
I am, you no longer belong."l Moreover, Brian Crozier 
states that de Gaulle was struck off the promotion list on 
the "direct orders of Maurin."2 
Lucien Nachin states that Gamelin, in order to win 
favor with the war minister [?Daladier or Maurin], inserted 
the note.3 It would appear that Nachin is more accurate 
since a letter de Gaulle wrote to Reynaud on December 14, 
1935 discusses the incident for the first time.4 This would 
make Gamelin chief of staff and Daladier, war minister. On 
the ot"1er hand, it is possible that the setback for de 
Gaulle had been put in motion as far back as the spring of 
1936 when Maurin had been war minister. 
1Reynaud, Memoires, 1:434. 
2
crozier, De Gaulle, p. 69. 
3Lucien Nachin, Charles de Gaulle, General de 
France {Nancy: Berger-Levrault, 1944; reprint ed., 1971), 
p. 85. 
4
"Lettres de Gaulle," AN, de Gaulle to Reynaud, 
December 14, 1936. 
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